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Daily Report
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FBIS-EEU-94-172 *6 September 1994*

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Visegrad Defense Ministers Meet in Bratislava

LD0509191194 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1630 GMT 5 Sep 94

[Text] Hungarian Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti, Polish Defense Minister Piotr Kolodziejczyk, Slovak Defense Minister Pavol Kanis, and Czech First Deputy Defense Minister Jiri Pospisil discussed mutual relations in Bratislava today. They also assessed the results of cooperation among the Visegrad Group countries so far. At the final news conference in the Hotel Forum, attended by our colleague Jan Baranek, all four ministers issued a statement on their talks which had just ended.

[Baranek] The three defense ministers and one deputy minister thanked Pavol Kanis for staging today's meeting. Those attending the meeting agreed at the talks that experts will meet to discuss certain problems and that they will work toward ensuring that each of our countries is better prepared for joining European security structures.

They assessed cooperation so far and exchanged information about joining the Partnership for Peace program and issues related to involvement in joint exercises. We will take part in two joint exercises. The first one will take place from 12-16 September in Poland and the second will be from 21-28 October in Holland.

They also agreed that legislative experts will meet to discuss the principles of defense in the conditions of democracy.

Another main topic of their talks was the possibilities and prospects for cooperation among Visegrad Group countries in enhancing security in the central European region. A very important point agreed by the participants is that a meeting on this topic will take place in Budapest next May. The main point of these talks will be problems related to the transformation of individual armies. The Czech defense minister is expected to attend. This was the point made by Gyorgy Keleti. Baudys' deputy Jiri Pospisil said that it is up to journalists to explain the absence of his superior.

The Czech Republic does not feel that exerting group pressure should be a way of entering European structures. A conference on the topic Partnership for Peace and central European cooperation will be held in the first half of next year. This conference will be attended by all representatives of the Visegrad Group and by NATO representatives. These problems will be defined more precisely at a meeting in October.

A race for who will be the first to join NATO structures must not take place within the context of Partnership for Peace, Hungarian Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti believes. However, mutual consultations are important in this context.

The participants in the meeting then noted that structural changes in our armies were needed. They must not take place to the detriment of solving other important problems in our countries, however.

The idea which is also of great importance is that NATO should define certain standards as to what is specifically expected from the countries asking for admission. Poland proposed that a group of NATO active coordinators [skupina aktivnych koordinatorov Severoatlantickej Aliancie] should be set up. This would be a group of states capable of making faster progress in being integrated into this organization.

The ministers discussed also legislative questions, such as the possibility of armed forces participating in the work of security and peace corps on the territory of other states.

Minister Pavol Kanis stressed that military cooperation among the Visegrad Four has become subdued and that is why it is necessary to organize today's meeting. This applies to the Partnership for Peace program, too [as heard].

Minister Kanis said that although opinions on some issues differ, it can be said that defense ministries are prepared to develop contacts within the Visegrad Group framework. Problems appear in understanding whether preferences lie in developing bilateral or multilateral relations. Participants in the talks are not shying away from cooperation with countries situated between Russia and Germany, such as Austria, Slovenia or Romania. Our cooperation must be a process that will teach us to avoid crises in our region.

View NATO Membership

LD0509194694 Bratislava STV 1 Television Network in Slovak 1830 GMT 5 Sep 94

[Excerpts] Delegations of the defense ministries of the Visegrad Group countries met in Bratislava today for a one-day meeting. [passage omitted]

[Correspondent] The program of today's meeting of the Visegrad Group defense ministers culminated in the Primates Palace this afternoon with a reception by the Slovak president.

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Michal Kovac praised the interest of the Visegrad Four states in security in their region and said that although they might not join NATO at the same time, there should not be too big a gap between their joining.

This topic was further developed at a news conference, where we wanted to know, among other things, to what degree these steps could be coordinated, and about the situation jointly evaluated at the meeting, since NATO is still far from coming out with a closer specification of conditions governing its expansion. The Czech representative said that these conditions do not exist, neither does a body which could evaluate whether these conditions are met.

It was evident that the three defense ministers did not quite agree with this pronouncement. Pavol Kanish even said that the root of the problem was the unclear relationship between NATO and Russia. He literally said that had we been situated in a littoral region, we might have been NATO members. The reason why we are not NATO members is that Russia lies behind us—end of quote. [passage omitted]

East European Radio Stations Open Conference

AU0309144694 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 2 Sep 94 p 4

[TIKER-attributed report: "Radio Bridge for the Kindred"]

[Text] Belgrade—The conference of independent Eastern European radio stations organized by Radio B 92 began yesterday in the Belgrade Metropol Hotel. The conference is attended by representatives of independent radio stations from Estonia, Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia], Moldova, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine, and Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav radio stations presented are: Radio BUM 93, Antena M, B 92 of Studio B, Radio Smederevo, and Radio Bajina Basta. The conference will debate the draft statute for the formation of a network of Eastern European independent radio stations, whose aim is, according to Veran Matic, editor in chief of Radio B 92, to establish close cooperation, exchange programs, and work on joint ones to establish radio bridges, professionalize the work, and express solidarity with the radio stations whose work is endangered.

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Latest Figures on Deportees From Greece

AU0609110994 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1800 GMT 5 Sep 94

[Text] Public Order Ministry Spokesman Ludmilla Pajo reports that the total number of emigrants deported up to today totals 42,364. Although over 20 days have passed, Albanian emigrants who have been working in various Greek regions and cities for a long time are being deported via Albanian border crossing points. The influx of deportees does not cease either during the day or at night.

The number of deportees today has reached 1,280, many of whom were deported after midnight. From the morning hours until 1930 [1730 GMT], 610 persons were deported from Kakavije, 560 from Kapshtice, and 110 via Sarande, 12 of whom had passports with valid visas and had been employed in Greece for years.

We will inform you of further deportations of Albanian emigrants by the Greek police and army in our later newscasts.

Court Set To Announce Greek Spy Trial Verdict

AU0309210394 Paris AFP in English 2010 GMT 3 Sep 94

[Text] Tirana, Sept 3 (AFP)—The Tirana court will declare its verdict Wednesday [7 Sep] in the trial of five members of the Greek Albanian minority charged with spying here, Albanian authorities said here Saturday.

The news confirmed speculative reports in the Greek media earlier Saturday.

The Albanian state prosecutor called Monday for sentences of seven to nine years against the five defendants who have been on trial since August 15.

On Saturday, the counsel for the defence called for the five to be acquitted, expressing hopes the verdict would not be influenced by increased tensions between Albania and Greece over the matter.

Throughout the trial, the five members of Omonia, the organisation for the Greek community in Albania, have denied any links to the Greek secret services.

Athens has been deporting a steadily increasing number of illegal Albanian immigrants since the crisis began, with around 1,500 immigrants a day now being forcibly repatriated.

Minister Comments on Population Growth at ICPD

AU0209173894 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1800 GMT 1 Sep 94

[Text] An Albanian delegation will be attending the International Conference on Population and Development [ICPD], to be held in Cairo in Egypt 5-13 September. At the end of the conference proceedings, a joint statement will be approved. Regarding this issue, Health Minister Maksim Cikuli and the UNDP [UN Development Program] representative in Albania, (Schumann), gave a news conference today. Inva Tare has the report:

[Tare] The Cairo conference will be organized under the patronage of the United Nations. The world's population is growing at a rapid rate. Natural sources and reserves are drying up owing to rapid consumption. The environment is in jeopardy. The aim of the conference is to determine a common stand to control man's relations with nature.

Health Minister Maksim Cikuli said that the position of the Albanian delegation will be in conformity with that maintained by the majority of democratic states at the conference. Cikuli based the position on three points: Socially, no policy can be successful; the family is the central aspect of society; the role of women in life should be increased.

Cikuli opposed the policy of uncontrolled population growth. He said that uncontrolled population growth has brought, among other things, difficulties in education, unemployment, and a decline in the economic situation.

The current policy consists of respecting the right of a couple to decide on the number of children that they have and when they want to have children. According to the minister, family planning in Albania is done through modern means and ruled out abortion as a means of family planning. The minister did not oppose abortion, however, and suggested that a special judicial body be set up to look into the problem. If the current policy continues, specialists have estimated that in 2025 Albania will have more than 4 million inhabitants.

At the international conference in Cairo, the Albanian delegation will maintain a determined stance against discrimination against immigrants. It is expected that as far as this is concerned, our delegation will be in agreement with the spirit of the conference regarding the Greek policy against Albanian immigrants.

Government Expands Minorities' Education Rights

AU0209151394 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1800 GMT 1 Sep 94

[Text] On 22 August 1994, based on Article 26 of the Albanian Charter on Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms issued in April 1993, which states that the persons pertaining to national minorities have the right to learn and be taught in their mother tongue, as well as in compliance with Article No. 34 of the Copenhagen Document dated June 1990, which recognizes the national minorities' right to have the necessary possibilities to learn or be taught in their mother tongue, the Government of the Republic of Albania issued Decision No. 396, which expands and enables the teaching of Greek even in those areas where there are not enough pupils of this minority to open a school.

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The first clause of this decision sanctions that the persons pertaining to minorities have the right to learn or be taught in their mother tongue in educational units and certain state educational institutions. The full implementation of this decision, which will be applied during the school year that will soon start, enables Albania to fully accomplish the contemporary standard of the Copenhagen Document on the education of minorities, which is an indicator and a new accomplishment of the democratic government's commitment to ensuring a model treatment of minorities in the Balkans.

To draft the decision, the Albanian Government has taken the advice of, and has cooperated with, representatives of the CSCE and the Council of Europe on ethnic minority issues. It has fully agreed with them, found complete understanding, and thanks them for the assistance given.

Convinced that, just like the Albanian minority nationals, this new step would have been welcomed by the Greek Government and people, we express our surprise at yesterday's absurd statements by Greek Government Spokesman Venizelos, who said that, regarding the methods and education conditions of the ethnic Greek minority, the Albanian decisions constitute a further action that testifies that the fundamental rights of the ethnic Greek minority are undermined.

That stand maintained by the Greek Government toward expanding and improving Greek minority rights in Albania shows that it is not the rights of the minority, but manipulation of them that is the major goal of Athen's policy. Following this policy, the Greek Government officials do not hesitate to make accusations about the efforts of the Albanian Education Ministry that, following the experience of the developed European states and in order to face the current financial difficulties of our schools, is establishing a system of collective classes on the entire territory of Albania. This system, which aims to avoid classes with very few pupils—one, two, three, etc.—can bring about the creation of collective classes in hundreds and hundreds of schools all over the country.

With such accusations, they join the attacks of extreme Greek nationalists who, in order to Hellenize the south of Albania, are playing a great role to Hellenize Albanian schools.

We invite the Greek Government to make at least a quarter of the efforts for the education of Albanian minorities living in Greece for centuries and ask the Council of Europe, the European Parliament, the U.S. Senate, and the CSCE to intervene to make the Greek Government guarantee the minimal rights to education for the Albanian minority in Greece.

Commentary Dismisses Radio Emigration Report

AU0209200694 Tirana KOMBI in Albanian 26 Aug 94 p 5

[Commentary by E. Result: "Radio-Tirana Educates the Youth With Dreams"]

[Text] The other day, Mr. Durim, a specialist on emigration in the Ministry of Labor and Social Assistance, was invited to participate in a Radio Tirana program entitled "Diapazon". To give him his due, we must admit that he was quite a good speaker even though he did not tell the truth. For example, when the program's moderator, Mrs. Rudina, asked him if there were many requests for emigration from our country, Mr. Durim firmly answered:

"Recently the number of requests for emigration has fallen. This has to do with the creation of a considerable number of new jobs at home, both in the private and the state-owned sector.

Telling lies in broad daylight, to be more precise at 0950, requires great boldness, because reports reached us that a boat had been captured in Lezha, full of Albanians making a desperate bid to get out of Albania toward Italy. We have also heard of several other boatloads of Albanian boys and girls waiting to disembark, caught in Italian coastal waters. In addition, almost every day, hundreds of Albanian boys and girls are being forced to march through high mountain passes and stealthily cross the border into Greece.

How could one, in the face of these facts, say that the number of requests for emigration is declining? In reality, there has never been any organized emigration from our country. Even the 80 Albanian girls sent to Cyprus and Malaysia to work were obliged to return to their homeland because of the extremely hard conditions that they found there.

As for the newly created jobs that Mr. Durim was referring to, it seems that Mr. Durim is daydreaming, and it would be much better if he told his dreams to the Radio Tirana fortune teller, who, for some time now, has been making a remarkable contribution to the education of the young generation with dreams...

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President Dismisses Chief of Army Staff Petrov

AU0209193394 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1600 GMT 2 Sep 94

[Text] At the proposal of the Council of Ministers, President Zhelyu Zhelev today, on the basis of Decree No. 180, dismissed Army General Lyben Petrov, chief of the Bulgarian Army General Staff from his post. Major General (?Lyubomir) Vasilev, commander in chief of the 1st Army, was also dismissed.

Lieutenant General Tsvetan Totomirov, hitherto commander of the Ground Forces, was appointed chief of the General Staff.

Major General Stefan Dervishev, hitherto commander of the Division, was appointed commander in chief of the 1st Army.

Petrov Position

AU0209125794 Sofia 168 CHASA in Bulgarian 29 Aug-4 Sep 94 p 10

[Article by Bulgarian Army General Lyuben Petrov, chief of the Bulgarian Army General Staff: "Why Ancient Normative Document Is Applied Precisely Now?"]

[Text] The personnel problem is one of the most acute problems of the Bulgarian Army. According to the current Law on General Army Service the retirement age for a general is 60, 50 for a colonel, 45 for a lieutenant colonel or a major, and 40 for a captain. In other countries the retirement age for junior and senior officers is much higher, and therefore, the retirement age in the new draft law has been increased. It remains 60 for the generals, but for the colonels it will be 56, and so on. It is abnormal to discharge experts trained for many years, whose age is 40-50. Precisely when they acquire maturity and experience and become most efficient we discharge them. Exceptional means have been invested in their training. This is an unjustified luxury, if we could describe it in such terms at all.

I would like to point out that the current law has not been applied regarding the retirement age. Now suddenly, in the last few years, the issue emerged of bringing the army into accord with the requirements of an ancient normative document. We have been forced to apply it. However, if we apply the law totally, what will happen to the army? It will suddenly find itself without cadres—and this means the best trained cadres. In recent years, we gradually discharged officers, but we did this in a careful manner in order not to cut the army's head and to prevent the emergence of social tension among the command personnel. What will happen if we suddenly discharge all those officers and send them out into the street? It is more important to keep those cadres.

It is ridiculous to claim that by saving the wages of 200-3,000 [as published] Bulgarian officers the state budget will be saved. There are examples in other states that show what happens when hasty decisions regarding army cadres are adopted.

The young officers really leave the army, but they do this not because of the colonels, but because of the lack of social security. I mean not only the wages, an issue that has a negative influence on the officers' psychic balance. They do not see any security and chances of development in their future, and therefore they turn their gaze to fields outside the army.

Officers Support Petrov

AU0209131894 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 29 Aug 94 p 2

[DUMA PRESS report: "2d Army Officers Support General Staff Chief"]

[Text] The officer corps of the formations and units deployed on the territory of the Plovdiv Municipality fully support the position of Army General Lyuben Petrov, chief of the Bulgarian Army General Staff, DUMA learned from a source in the 2d Army. The officers disapprove of the fact that the defense minister did not allow the general to participate in his news conference.

The 2d Army officers assess the behavior of the defense minister and his deputies toward the uniformed employees of the ministry as scandalous. It is considered that the dissatisfaction with the recent proposals on the discharge of about 300 colonels is a result of the unexpected decision and related to the fact that two personally involved officers have been informed by a high-ranking factor that they will not be discharged now.

The officers of the 2d Army demand the adoption as soon as possible of the new Armed Forces Bill and the settlement of the issue of the military pensions. It is the opinion of many officers that after the elimination of the political departments and, later, of the department on educational activity, the efficiency of the training process in the army decreased sharply, discipline deteriorated, and the number of murders, suicides, and desertions increased.

Among the 2d Army officers, the opinion prevails that the new civilians of the Defense Ministry are incompetent and cannot manage the army and resolve its problems. Their efforts are directed mainly toward eliminating what has been achieved so far.

Aleksandrov Details Position at News Conference

AU0209123494 Sofia BULGARSKA ARMIYA in Bulgarian 26 Aug 94 pp 1,3

["Expose" by Bulgarian Defense Minister Valentin Aleksandrov at a news conference at Sofia's Central Army Club on 25 August: "Woe to the State Whose National Security Depends on 330 Pensioners"]

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[Text] I would like to clarify the personnel changes in the Ministry of Defense, which received contradicting assessments by the political forces and certain mass media. Sometimes they speak the truth, sometimes half the truth, and sometimes they completely twist the positions. My resignation has been demanded. Others explain that the defense minister is illegitimate. Those are important and the minister must take a stand on them. This is my position:

Certain contradictions between ranks, posts, and the relevant educational qualifications are being eliminated in the course of the personnel reform of the Armed Forces, which is a part of the general reform. The implementation of this reform is vitally needed by the Army and it serves the national security. Let me say in a clear and brief manner:

First, we want to introduce in the Army a clear model of the professional development of officers, which must have a precisely defined principles. Thus, the still existing subjectivity inherited from the old regime will be eliminated.

Second, we want to improve the structure of the officer corps regarding the ranks, posts, education, and qualifications. The Army must eliminate once and for all the absurd situation in which generals and junior officers implement colonels' duties. At present, according to the personnel charts of the General Staff, 80 percent of the payroll posts belong to senior officers and only 20 percent to junior officers. This is an absurdity that does not exist in any other army in the world, and it will be eliminated from the Bulgarian Army. Against the background of the existing situation, is it a paradox that we need 2,000 platoon and company commanders while junior officers have been sent to carry out the duties of senior officers? Of course not.

Naturally, an obvious question is asked maliciously by various forces and factors: Do we have to carry out the personnel reform now, when we have no budget and when the social programs that have been announced are not being strictly implemented? Let me tell you in a categorical manner: Yes, precisely now, because what we do now is a step forward toward strengthening the officer corps, rather than a political attempt to get elected or to survive in a given post. I must say categorically that the so-called colonels campaign is a political enterprise—fishing for potential voters. The noise around the discharged colonels is demagoguery aimed at covering up the cruel fact that almost as many junior officers are leaving the Army on their own initiative. This is the tragedy of the Armed Forces. The blood is flowing out of the Army from below because there are no junior officers and not because I discharge 330 pensioners. I cannot accept any accusations that this violates national security. Woe to the state whose national security depends on 330 pensioners.

Only 26 colonels submitted applications for retirement in recent years. On the other hand, during the current year, 149 lieutenant colonels, 11 majors, 93 captains, 58 senior lieutenants, and 28 lieutenants submitted applications for early discharge. This is a total of 438 junior officers, including the lieutenant colonels and the majors. It is precisely the Armed Forces' backbone that we are losing. This is the future of our Army and, therefore, this process must be stopped. If the balance is drawn—something none of those who defend the colonels does—we will see that twice as many young officers than senior officers leave the Army, and this threatens the very existence of the Army.

Let me point out a fact that already was published by the press: Since 1991 we have lost 1,700 lieutenants and captains, and 3,000 majors and lieutenant colonels. All in all, some 4,700 officers left the army in the last three years, and no one asked any questions. Now a dispute has developed around 330 persons. For me, those figures mean one thing: This is a clear and categorical protest against the current personnel policy and not only a result of the aggravated everyday life conditions, as some try to claim. This also is supported by the fact that ever more young officers avoid the chain of command and try to talk directly to me about their personal issues, rather than through the official channels. When this becomes known, those people are reprimanded and threatened. At a meeting of the Supreme Military Council, I sharply reprimanded the higher military leadership for the attempts to disrupt contact between the minister of defense and the junior commanders. This is a form of inadmissible pressure and a violation of human rights. The personnel policy, which certain forces reduce to the fate of the colonels, or rather certain colonels, and demand that it be preserved, blocks the cadre development at all levels. The legal principle of retirement, based on the age principle for those who have exhausted their possibilities, is being violated. It was precisely because of my concern for the Armed Forces that I twice made use of the prerogatives given to me by the existing military bill and left many officers who had completed 50 years of age in the army. This has already been done twice for those born in 1941, despite the fact that many of them are no longer suited for any military service. Nevertheless, I utilized my right to not implement the law fully and to keep in the army those who had to remain in service.

I made those exceptions to the principle on the basis of my personal decision.

I allowed officers with higher education to serve until the age of 60. There is no standard text that obliged me to do so. I did it in the interest of the Armed Forces.

Then, I allowed all military doctors to serve until the age of 60. I again violated the law because the number of medical doctors in the army decreased. This is a precious fund that we must utilize.

Similar actions will be adopted regarding the military finance experts. The situation in this realm is very grave. We cannot deprive ourselves of our highly qualified

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finance inspectors in our pitiless war against corruption. The talks I held with the chief Armed Forces prosecutor and the minister of justice prompted me to also apply this measure to the military jurists. Documents that will allow the military prosecutors and investigators to serve until the age of 60 will probably be adopted. At present, there are almost no junior officers in the military justice system. Without that system, we cannot conduct the struggle against crime, distortions, and corruption. I did another gentleman's act and allowed the colonels—lecturers at the higher military schools and the Georgi Rakovski Military Academy—even those who do not have graduate school higher education, to stay beyond the mandatory retirement age. This was only an act of good will. I deeply suspect the intellectual qualities of a person who teaches for 20 years in a military school or the military academy and cannot find the time to complete graduate school higher education. Those people simply found a comfortable nest there and lived according to the "let another day pass" principle. I do not know what they teach the cadets. I suppose the same nonsense they taught them for 20 years. Nevertheless, I made an exception. This academic year, they will continue to work on a voluntary basis—if they want this of course—and then there will be a competition for their posts. Many of the lecturers in the academy and the schools were born in 1941. They had their chance, once or even twice. The issue was posed in a sharp manner during the tenure of Minister Ludzhev. At that time, I objected to their discharge, but in the past two years not one of them found the time to complete a thesis and become a real lecturer. Semiliterate people, or people who have graduated only from a military school, not even the military academy, cannot lecture to the cadets or in the military academy. This will not happen. This will be their last year. I do not care if gaps emerge because of the time schedule or the competitions. The General Staff was warned four years ago that this would happen, and it is happening now. Many of those people have long lost their qualities. They have been away from real military service for more than 20 years. Claims about their formal training in the military units are pure inventions. None of them can command a regiment, despite the fact that they teach the strategy and tactics of major military units. I wonder where they get their knowledge from. Let us also mention the fact that none of them speaks any other language but Bulgarian.

I have been blamed for not being fully informed about the situation of the officer corps and for having been deceived about the number of various categories of officer. This criticism is justified to a certain degree. The minister draws his information regarding the cadres in the Bulgarian Army from the official reports of the General Staff. Recently, Army General Petrov himself sent me a letter in which he apologized for mistakes regarding 447 colonels, made in reports about the number of various categories of officer throughout last year. Excuse me, but those responsible for such mistakes during the tenure of General Dzhurov [defense minister during Todor Zhivkov's regime], were immediately sent to their villages to grow tomatoes. The fact that the minister demonstrates a liberal attitude at a certain moment is his weakness. I tend to be tolerant and make compromises, but there is a limit to my patience.

During Mr. Dzhurov's tenure, there was an Army department called "Cadres." It was subordinate to the defense minister, and was a computer data bank about the officers' personnel matters. When, three years ago, we, three civilians, entered the Ministry of Defense, we suddenly found out that on somebody's order all this data was transferred to the General Staff chief. The defense minister was left with files in which the movements of the officers from one post to another, something that could be easily established, were recorded. Thus, the defense minister was prevented from having access to the officers' personal files. Naturally, this made it easy to deceive the minister. Therefore, I am firmly determined to turn the "Cadres" Department into a center under the leadership of the minister. It does not matter whether this is me or another defense minister, but this situation cannot continue any longer. The fact that an attempt was made to legalize this policy of dual rule—the defense minister conducts personnel policy at the ministry, while the General Staff chief forms the personnel policy of the General Staff—prompted one of the greatest disputes. I thwarted the attempt by a speech in the National Assembly. I do not know what the politicians will say, but this dual command in the realm of personnel policy must be eliminated once and forever. It leads to dangerous consequences. The case of those lost colonels was very indicative for me. The fact that someone will be punished—naturally, this is always the most junior officer—does not matter. It is a well-known trick. This must be stopped. The Bulgarian minister of defense needs the personnel policy not so much in order to directly participate in the personnel process, but in order to coordinate the general personnel policy of the Ministry of Defense with the law and monitor the implementation of its principles. It is none of my business who becomes the commander of a regiment and who does not. However, I must know the the precise principles and criteria on the basis of which people are promoted.

Let me give you an example, which prompted me to decide that all compromises are made at the expense of the defense minister. In April, when the murders in Dupnitsa became known, I convened a meeting at midnight. The officers I summoned appeared at 2430, and until 0230 we waited for someone to come and open the drawer where the personal files of the two officers I punished were kept. They were the commander of a division and the commander of an army. Naturally, I punished them (on 3 or 4 April), but to my great astonishment, I learned the other day that my order was included in their personal files in the registers of the Defense Ministry on 18 August. I had a talk with Mr. Petrov. He explained that another mistake had been made and that a lieutenant colonel is to blame. I reached

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the following conclusion: This case involves intimate friends who are being protected and promoted by someone. I imposed grave penalties and yet the orders I signed were locked in a drawer and not carried out. Naturally, when the minister falls they will disappear! This is an old and transparent trick, but since I am preoccupied with work, sometimes it succeeds. I am not satisfied with the explanation that this was another mistake and that the colonel from the "Cadres" Department is to blame. I simply refuse to believe it. Therefore the dispute reaches the National Assembly. What does it mean to manage the Ministry of Defense through someone else? Can one fulfill his conjugal duties through somebody else? I do not think so. The minister cannot blindly sign every document placed in front of him, nor is he somebody's messenger in charge of checking personnel decisions adopted outside the Ministry of Defense. One could say anything about the current law, but it still exists, and the minister's prerogatives are specified in Chapter 5. Nobody has the right to usurp them or to teach me how to apply them. Only in Turkey or in certain Latin American states does the defense ministers manage the army through other people. If there are such candidates in Bulgaria—let them be candidates in Turkey or Latin America and become commanders there. Since I am familiar with the tests they will have to take, especially in Turkey, I fear that many of their parachutes will not open.

It is a judicial absurdity and legal nonsense to ask me not to implement the existing law because the parliament is debating a new one. Announcing a moratorium on retirement from the Bulgarian Army until the new Defense Law is adopted is another absurdity. This is a crude anticonstitutional act. The opinion of one of the political forces on this matter was rejected by a strong majority at one of the National Security Commission meetings. The situation in the parliament was almost the same. At the Commission the minister was supported directly, while in the parliament the support was passive and was effected by abstaining from attending the relevant session. Only 96 members of the political force that proposed the moratorium supported the proposal. In other words, there was no unity on this matter even there. I would like to hope that the opinions expressed at a news conference two days ago do not represent the opinion of a serious political force, but only of individual members.

I have the feeling that the ado about the colonels is aimed at concealing many far more important things that the military command has proved incapable of resolving: the situation in the Army as a whole, discipline, the murders, suicides, draft dodging (this year again 8,000 recruits did not report for duty), violence, and human casualties. Obviously, something is not working and an attempt is being made to divert attention from this fact. There is no clarity regarding the new formations, structures, corps, brigades, and modern battalions. There is no clarity regarding the new tactical methods of the modern conduct of combat. Those are grave facts that confuse the military leadership. Naturally, nothing could be achieved through pressure or commands. In Germany, they discussed the independent combined brigade for nine years. We have been discussing this issue for four years, but I am yet to see anything in print on that matter. This cannot continue any longer. As one of the younger generals—a financial expert—said at a meeting, some people in the General Staff assume the policy of awaiting. This is no longer admissible. What are they waiting for? For the cabinet to fall? All right, the cabinet will fall, and I will go, but every minister who will replace me will have to deal with the same issues if he wants us to have an army. The political color of the defense minister makes absolutely no difference. There are objective and specific problems that must be resolved in an objective manner, if those who will be charged with resolving them indeed can do this. If they cannot resolve them—there is a solution. At one of the recent Military Council meetings, when the cuts were discussed, I said clearly—if you are incapable of making an army for 14 billion leva, please say so. People who can do it can be found.

More than a month or two ago we had a meeting that was attended by myself, my deputies, the head of the General Staff, and his deputies. It was organized by the Center for Training Leading Cadres. We invited six leading finance experts to the meeting—from the rank of deputy minister and above—in order to discuss the prospects of financing the army in the future. We must know what we will have and then plan how many officers, sergeants, soldiers, units, brigades, tanks, and so forth we will have. This is how the planning process is conducted, not the other way around. The finance experts were categorical—if the present economic situation persists, and there is indeed zero economic growth, as expected, the Army will not receive more than it received last year. Consequently, since we have to to take account of the inflation, the crisis will be even sharper. I would not like to be in the place of the person who will replace me and will have to resolve this issue. With this structure and payroll and the myth about a mobilization army rather than compact and intact units ready for combat, we will face a very serious crisis. This is a very complex issue regarding the philosophy of what army Bulgaria needs. I posed this issue in the parliament, the Supreme Military Council, and the Consultative Council on National Security. This is a political issue. It is not the business of the defense minister or the head of the General Staff to determine whether we need 70,000, 60,000, 30,000, or 20,000 soldiers and officers. This is an issue for the parliament. The supreme legislating organ must determine what army the country needs and secure the means for that army. Means must be secured. However, to demand the resolution of certain issues, for which no one is responsible, is at best incorrect. I have the impression that the politicians are "passing," so to say. There are no clear positions. There are disputes—and some of them are

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sharp—accusations, and politicization, which to a certain degree is an artificial one, but there are no clear and specific decisions that we should implement.

I would prefer not to give you the details and not to cite figures related to the question of how long we can manage with the budget granted to us for 1995. The situation is worse than tragic. We are confronted with decisions that are far beyond my own competence and even exceed the prime minister's powers. I have repeatedly submitted the problems in question to the Council of Ministers. The cabinet is perfectly aware of the issue, but unfortunately—this is the situation. The crisis of the Army has not yet even started properly, it is just about to begin. Very serious measures are required in this respect. Financial improvements are called for in the first place, but political consensus is necessary so as to avoid the crisis, otherwise things are likely to deteriorate in a dramatic manner.

While our soldiers are destroying themselves, while our Army is starving because of fuel shortages and missing spare parts—modesty and polite reticence on our part would be quite out of place. The Army should not be involved in internal political struggles. This also applies to the supreme command staff. Interference by any political force whatsoever on behalf of any military commander or branch of service whatsoever jeopardizes the entire process of the Bulgarian Army's depoliticization. It is particularly dangerous when certain military commanders themselves are seeking the support of political forces through conspiratorial methods, a fact that has unfortunately been confirmed in specific cases. Appealing for the intervention of political parties, newspapers, and public organizations is incompatible with an officer's honor. Nevertheless, some people are doing so. I must say that the international response to such cases is more than negative. Lately, people abroad—at least those with whom I am in contact—have started asking the same question as three years ago, namely whether the Bulgarian Army has really been de-politicized, whether it is really serving only the people, and whether it is really not under the influence of certain political forces... Evidently, the attempts to become involved with such forces are watched very carefully, and people abroad are drawing their respective conclusions.

The demands for my resignation shall not divert me from the path I have embarked upon. I am not afraid to leave my post one day, if this should become necessary. I hope that my successor will appreciate the achievements the Defense Ministry accomplished under my leadership. As long as I am minister I shall fulfill my obligations, and I will not permit anyone to use me as a cover. I shall not allow people who are have no responsibility for the state and future of the Army to impose their decisions. I am saying this quite frankly. It is my duty to care for all officers and not only those whom a certain political force considers as their own men. All soldiers and citizens are equal before the law—the rank-and- file soldiers as well as the defense minister. It is not the defense minister's job to comment on the military legislation. He must apply the law. If we fail to promote the necessary reforms today, it will become absolutely urgent to implement them at a later stage under far more unfavorable and difficult conditions, which applies to the Army as a whole, as well as to the entire officer corps, regardless of who should take my place.

The problem of Article 71 of the Law on the General Military Service [Vseobshta Voenna Sluzhba] has been facing us for a long time. I raised it as early as in April 1994 by setting a personal example and disbanding my total military cabinet, thus applying the Law within the framework of the Defense Ministry. Now I have 22 colonels on my personal staff, and we are working 12 hours a day. I keep regular working hours on Saturdays, sometimes even on Sundays. I presume that such a work schedule should also be applied to the General Staff. When I introduced this measure, we immediately conducted an opinion poll within the Armed Forces, the results of which were published. They showed that 70 percent of the officers were in favor of retirement at the age of 50 with 20 years service for officers. The Army clearly expressed its view, which makes me think that some people became afraid. They did not like the results of the poll. Hence, a new poll was conducted by a public opinion institute that was definitely involved with a certain party. Nevertheless the results turned out to be more or less the same.

The question of the alleged conflict between the minister of defense and the General Staff is also interesting. No conflict exists between us as far as human relations are concerned. Evidently, however, a conflict—and even a serious one—exists in the differing views about the future of the Armed Forces. The order I issued on 20 May 1994 contained quite unmistakable instructions on how to implement the painful process. A certain passive attitude on part of the General Staff forced me to take a new step. On 1 July 1994 I issued a new order under which I entrusted the deputy ministers and the chief of the General Staff to submit lists of particularly useful officers whom I would be entitled to retain in active army service. At that moment, we had 2,700 officers in the Army whose terms of service were irregular, 330 of whom were colonels.

I had issued perfectly clear instructions. In the first place, I suggested the drafting of a pattern according to which we could see how many lieutenant colonels would join the regular service [shte vlezyat v suotvetstsvie] after the colonels in question have been discharged. In the meantime, I expressly forbade that the aforementioned individuals should be included in any lists whatsoever. There are boys whose files are "ejected" by the computer for reasons that do not depend on them. Imagine a person who has started elementary school a year later than usual and has graduated from a technical high school. He actually graduated at the age of 20 instead of at the age of 18. Thus the computer shows him to be a lieutenant colonel who is not entitled to a

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pension. There are some boys who have gone to military school after a year at the Reserve Officers' School or after being regular soldiers. They are people with university degrees and are graduates of military academies. They represent the golden reserve of the Army. Hence, I was resolutely opposed to an inflexible, formal approach to such exceptional cases.

After I issued the aforementioned order, two things happened that made me reflect on the whole matter with great concern. When I said that the most valuable people should be selected out of 330 colonels, I thought that I would be confronted with the 15, 20, 30, or even 100 most useful colonels. I expressly ordered that the lieutenant colonels should by no means be touched as long as a decision has been adopted on their case, while the majors and captains should be consulted on the question of whether they would agree to serve at lower ranks. As a matter of fact, a document was submitted to me that left me in great consternation. Instead of the maximum of 100 people that I had expected, the list contained 227 names, and the Chief of Staff had not even signed it. He cravenly passed it on to his deputy, Admiral Pavlov, who signed. I considered 227 people to be an excessive number of irrepleacable officers. Hence, I wrote the following message: "No, General, this is a formalistic, phony implementation of my order. By 14 August, I wish to receive an exact list of the individuals who should remain in active service." Later, I was submitted a list of 403 people. I do not know what it was supposed to mean. Was anyone trying to prevail over the chief of the General Staff, or had some political force complemented the list...? I can only describe such an act as insolent. Hence, I adopted a categorical decision.

I have to admit that we made a mistake in the case of 11 individuals. Considering that the terminology of the Defense Act is descriptive, it was not clearly stated who should appoint the Army's chiefs of staff and the division commanders, whether they should be appointed by decree, or not. We have another Army unit called TUTS [expansion unknown]. It is a ridiculous, dying institution that has the same rank as a division. Four of the 11 aforementioned people were TUTS chiefs, two of them were deputy commanders of Army branches, and one of them was a brigade commander. Their case was resolved in a letter I sent to the chief of Staff. I ordered that they should remain in active service on account of their undoubted merits and usefulness to the Army.

I do not tend to underestimate any particular officer. Those are people who have learned and served in various garrisons, however, an interesting fact emerges when one checks who is doing what. When we exclude the 102 born in 1944, plus another 11 and a few more, we are left with 275 persons. Thus, the minister of defense actually retires 275 officers. Those officers have specialized in 11 spheres. Some of them are heads of housing services at the various garrisons. This is a very "valuable" profession. One must be a colonel to carry out the related duties. Those are the people who distribute the apartments (I fired one of them), who receive money from the officers, but do not provide apartments. Then, there are the heads of warehouses and storage areas. It is another job only a colonel can do. I think that an intelligent petty officer-cadet with higher education, a captain, or even a major, could carry out those duties.

Let us talk about the garrison commanders. True, this is an important job. The military commander of Sofia has three deputies. Two of them will be retired. After all, he does not need so many deputies. The personnel shock will not be that great. It just so happens that one of them is from Gotse Delchev and the other from Bansko.

Let us take the commander of the computer center at the oblast military administration. He is a qualified person. I studied his case thoroughly. This center is in Sofia, and it is very important. Dimitur Ludzhev kept two officers and four civilians in this center. Two of them are graduate mathematicians and two are engineers, graduates of the Machine-Electrical Engineering Institute. They could take any computer apart, and they have done this in front of me. Suddenly, a reform is carried out in the center, and the six become 18. This is three times more than in the past. Now there are three colonels there, and the head, who knows why, also comes from Bansko.

Let us take the officer in charge of military transportation control. He also is a colonel. He is simply a traffic control employee. He stops vehicles, greets the driver, and asks him to present his documents. It is an insult to the rank itself to use a colonel for such a job.

Then, there is the senior aide on automation issues. Another important post for a colonel. Take the post of head of the firing range. Another important job—but for a captain, not a colonel. Take the officers in the personnel departments and units. This is a very interesting category of officers, and I do not have a positive attitude toward them. The fact that such distortions were allowed despite the fact that perfectly clear regulations exist on the transfer and promotion of officers and that many officers asked to be discharged precisely because of the manner in which those regulations were carried out shows that those people have not carried out their duties in an appropriate manner.

Let us take the lecturers at the military academy and schools. Those mainly are people born in 1941 and are without a military education. They were recruited and graduated from the Machine- Electrical Engineering Institute, however, without a graduate degree. In other words, they have the qualifications of a high school teacher, while we appointed them to a higher military school that is expected to keep abreast of modern developments.

Then there are the senior aides at departments and units at all levels. The senior aide job is very interesting. Those people hang somewhere between the commander of a regiment and the deputy commander of a brigade. A commander usually has three-four aides. Those are

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people who help, and people who help in a senior manner. This situation can easily be eliminated. It is a matter of good will.

The combat readiness of the Army will not be disrupted in this manner at all. None of those people have commander's functions. It has been pointed out repeatedly that civilians could perform the duties in the automation centers, other centers, warehouses, and storage areas. A graduate of an economic institute is no less qualified than an officer who, when promoted to the rank of lieutenant colonel or colonel, becomes the head of a warehouse. I live in Lozenets. In the great area between the Military Hospital and the Lozenets River there are big warehouses that occupy an area of 40 decares. They contain garbage that has been collected for 40 years. There is nothing modern there, and there are no guards. The warehouses are managed by a colonel and three petty officers. The colonel can go and finally do something useful.

Those are the people who were described to me as absolutely necessary. I cannot agree.

Presents New Army Chief

AU0309164294 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1600 GMT 3 Sep 94

[Text] Defense Minister Valentin Aleksandrov today officially presented Colonel General Tsvetan Totomirov to the leadership of the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff of the Bulgarian Army. General Totomirov was appointed chief of the Bulgarian Army General Staff by a presidential decree.

At the ceremony, Minister Aleksandrov thanked Army General Lyuben Petrov for his work as chief of the General Staff.

Army General Lyuben Petrov said that changing cadres in the Bulgarian Army is a normal procedure and that no one should make a tragedy of the fact that the chief of the General Staff is leaving.

The newly appointed chief of the General Staff, General Totomirov, said that he feels a bit awkward because he is assuming the post of Army General Petrov, whom he considers a highly qualified military leader and from whom he learned a lot during his military service.

Cabinet Submits Written Resignation to Assembly

AU0509133694 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1300 GMT 5 Sep 94

[Excerpt] Kalina Stancheva reports from the Council of Ministers:

[Stancheva] Good day. In the last hour the cabinet dealt with various documents. Apparently, the written resignation of the government, as well as a report of the prime minister are already on their way to the parliament. I received this information from the chief secretary of the Council of Ministers. Veselin Blagoev refrained from any statement on the report, but the sheer volume of the report—35 pages—is very impressive. Therefore, the report hardly deals only with the last three-month period of the cabinet's activity. More probably the report deals with the entire period of the cabinet's existence—20 months. [passage omitted]

Further on Resignation

AU0509160194 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1500 GMT 5 Sep 94

[Text] The resignation of the Council of Ministers has been deposited with the parliament. According to the motives for the resignation, which are outlined in eight pages, the government has decided to resign now, at the beginning of September, before the first session in order to allow the parliament to freely and promptly adopt decisions on the complex problems that have emerged in the country.

In conclusion, it is pointed out that, on behalf of the majority of the cabinet, Lyuben Berov, due to a sense of responsibility to the nation, declares that there is no other honest choice.

The document also contains a report on the cabinet's activity for the period of 26 May-2 September 1994. It is related to the implementation of the cabinet program's tasks, in the name of which the cabinet received a confidence vote until September 1994.

Berov Explains Resignation

AU0209182794 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1541 GMT 2 Sep 94

["Official statement" by Prime Minister Lyuben Berov on the cabinet's resignation—live]

[Text] Dear compatriots, I am addressing you in a moment of anxiety when the three-month term of service of my government is about to expire, but the country is still divided and facing a crossroads.

Nearly two years have elapsed since the day when the National Assembly elected this cabinet of experts which is not affiliated with any political party. It was a time of serious political and economic crisis in Bulgaria and a time of sharp confrontation between the major political forces.

Recently the political crisis in parliament has been further exacerbated by additional dangerous conflicts.

Certain distortions also caused a deterioration of our social life. The political and moral insolence of numerous editions of the yellow press which is trying to increase its circulation through scandals has escalated. I am also frustrated by the lack of social ethics and scruples with which some of our businessmen are trying to make profits in this epoch of speedy primordial enrichment.

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In our controversial everyday life the government, unfortunately, failed to introduce more ethics, more noble spirit, and more sense of public duty.

Nevertheless, the government succeeded in achieving some important, positive results for the country. Despite the counter- actions of certain social circles, the government managed to ensure a relatively calm period of development in Bulgaria, a period without major strikes or disturbances of public order.

Within a year and a half the cabinet managed to rescue Bulgaria from the depths of the economic crisis.

In 1993 the drop in production was less than in 1992. In the first half of 1994 up to the present moment, a slight increase of the average production level as compared with 1993 has manifested itself.

This is the second month in a row in which we are noticing a positive trend in the country's economic development.

In 1993 the government managed to halt the annual trend of inflation compared with 1992. In 1994 we succeeded in keeping the level of 1992, despite the speculative price increase and of currency rates deliberately provoked by certain social circles. The implementation of the most important economic reforms has started. I am talking about agrarian reform and privatization, although the extent of the reform may not be sufficiently great.

The government managed to settle the question of the country's foreign debt by signing the relevant agreement with our creditors under optimally favorable conditions and within the framework of the mandate granted us by parliament. We also managed to agree on credit support by international financial institutions for our balance of payments.

On 26 May 1994 the government won a confidence vote in parliament for a short-term program until September 1994. The program has been fulfilled on the whole, or is in progress, at least in its major part. The delay in connection with the fulfillment of some long- term tasks, such as mass privatization, for example, is due to the fact that parliament has not timely adopted certain laws and to some additionally emerging technical difficulties.

A similar report on the implementation of the aforementioned program shall be submitted to the National Assembly on Wednesday [7 Sep].

In my statement on the occasion of asking for the confidence vote in May 1994 I quite clearly stated that we are facing a threatening escalation of contradictions between the major political forces, as well as between various institutions, economic branches, trade unions, professional groups, and so forth. As a matter of fact, diametrically opposed views already exist on most of the basic problems related to our economic and social policy.

The correct solution of these complicated contradictions can only be effectuated by holding early parliamentary elections. Such was the opinion of the overwhelming majority of the political forces in the country which at that time, namely on the eve of 26 May 1994, insisted on elections by the end of 1994. For this reason, precisely, parliament passed a confidence vote for the government limited to a three-month period during which some urgent, current problems had to be resolved, such as the conclusion of a deal on the country's foreign debt.

Subsequently, however, the political situation in parliament changed and became further complicated. A new electoral law was not passed. Many of the initial ardent supporters of early elections quietly began to change their minds, expecting that someone would help them to preserve the status quo. The main problem of those political and trade union leaders today is how to explain their change of mind to the public and whom to blame for this. They hope to do so at the expense of the government.

However, despite all this, the call for early elections still prevails. Under such circumstances the cabinet refuses to bear the responsibility for the postponement of early elections, if it should continue to govern the country after the expiration of the mandate scheduled for September 1994. Elementary political ethics demands that the government should withdraw in September and clear the road for parliament so that it may somehow resolve the political crisis of our country.

It does not clearly appear from the National Assembly's decision when the mandate of the government is supposed to expire, whether it refers to the first or the last day of September 1994. However, the obligation of the government for the last three months ends here. Hence, the further development of the country is now parliament's problem.

Under such circumstances the parliament could select one of the following four possible solutions, each of which demands certain conditions:

First, parliament could accept the cabinet's resignation, and after the two major parliamentary groups have refused to accept the mandate, a coalition compromise may be reached by passing the mandate to some of the small parliamentary groups. This would mean to form a government of national consensus, to postpone the elections, and to adopt a specific program for this government's work until the next elections.

Such a coalition government needs the support of a considerable majority of parliament members in order to achieve a certain stability and greater longevity in accomplishing its complicated tasks and in overcoming all sorts of contradictions.

The second option would be to vote confidence in the present government and to form a new coalition government of national consensus supported by a solid majority, according to the well-known procedure.

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The third option would be for parliament to approve the government's resignation, and after the major parliamentary groups have failed to form a government, and even the smaller groups do not succeed in forming a coalition cabinet, the next step would be to disband parliament and it would be up to the president to appoint a caretaker government which should serve until the date of the next elections has been scheduled.

The appointment of a caretaker government formed only by representatives of one of the two major parliamentary groups, such as for example, according to the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] option, as proposed by Deputy Georgi Markov, with the sly intention of artificially winning elections, would be a great mistake and would even further exacerbate the political controversies in the country.

The fourth possible option for parliament would be not to obtain a sufficient majority for approving the resignation of the current government and to be incapable of forming a new coalition government likely to permit a postponement of elections.

This would create a vacuum of power, quite dangerous for the country. If such a critical situation should emerge, the current cabinet, so as not to risk being accused of cowardly abdication, shall be obliged with or without any personnel changes to demand a second confidence vote, which should extend its mandate from the beginning of September 1944 to the end of the year, or until the spring of 1995, for example.

Naturally, such a new confidence vote should be based on a new program of work, combining the hitherto conducted anti-inflation, monetary policy with the numerous, contradictory demands for a more active role of the state in investment activities, the requests for increasing pensions and for increasing civil servants' wages, higher cost of living adjustments, considerably greater expenditures for the Army, guaranteeing high purchasing prices for the basic agricultural goods to the detriment of the consumers, controlling the prices of first necessity consumer goods, and so forth.

In the autumn of 1993 I proposed to parliament to examine some of these problems emerging in the country and I demanded a partial change of the country's economic policy, but I did not obtain any response. Today, an acceptable solution of such economic policy problems is only possible on the basis of new elections under which these problems, precisely, should be the major issues of the election campaign rather than the vain noise raised about the prices of hamburgers in the Council of Ministers and parliament's vacation residences.

If a new government should try to resolve such acute problems within the framework of the present parliament, without having recourse to early elections, it must necessarily rely on a convincing, new majority.

Some people say that if early elections should take place today, the new parliament would be no better than the present one, and could be even worse. This is a method of promoting the wish of certain deputies that the government should not resign. Such attempts of guessing the future are not based on any reliable facts and can only be based on fortune telling.

A government can by no means adjust its behavior to such fortune telling methods. Even if the prophecies might prove correct, the government is not the institution in charge of pushing the country to new elections or toward postponing them.

For that reason, at a cabinet session behind closed doors held this morning I proposed that the government should submit its resignation to parliament, after the expiration of its three-month mandate. The cabinet members unanimously accepted the proposal. The relevant documents are already on their way to parliament.

The government is submitting its resignation today, on 2 September, prior to the first session of parliament, so as to offer the opportunity to the National Assembly of deciding on the difficult problems facing our country.

On behalf of the government, with a sense of responsibility toward the nation, I declare that we have no other, honest alternative behavior than the aforementioned resignation.

Despite the insults I suffered from many people I dedicated all my strength to the service of Bulgaria for nearly two years, and I paid a high price for this. Let whoever succeeds me in this post be ready to do the same, or even more. Let one of the gentlemen who are highly recommended as suitable candidates for the post of the next prime minister assume the burden from the parliament and let him preserve democracy. Thank your for your attention.

Politicians Approve

AU0209161494 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1500 GMT 2 Sep 94

[Text] In connection with the cabinet's resignation, Filip Dimitrov, leader of the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS], in a live broadcast on Sofia Khorizont National Radio Network today, welcomed the government's act, but pointed out that it is rather late. He explained this by stating that the government's policy has contributed considerably to an even greater disintegration of the country.

Asked whether a new cabinet could be formed in the current parliament, the SDS leader said that this could be accomplished only if the government is nominated according to the same formula, namely with the support of the largest parliamentary group, which is not likely to solve the problems.

Krasimir Premyanov, deputy chairman of the Bulgarian Socialist Party's [BSP] Supreme Council, expressed the party's view on the cabinet's resignation, which he described as a decent move and as a fulfilled promise,

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pointing out that the government's resignation opens the path to early parliamentary elections.

The Rights and Freedoms Movement [DPS] is expected to hold an urgent meeting tonight or tomorrow in order to discuss the resignation of Lyuben Berov, Yunal Lyutfi told a BTA reporter.

Mr. Lyutfi refrained from commenting further on the cabinet's action before the DPS leadership has met.

I congratulate the whole Bulgarian public on the good news of the Berov cabinet's resignation, Dr. Konstantin Trenchev, president of the Podkrepa Labor Confederation, declared in his statement.

Throughout its term of office the cabinet repeatedly confirmed through all its actions and lack of actions that a nascent democracy cannot be governed either politically or economically by people deprived of any political profile whatsoever, by people who have no well defined ideas on free market economy and who have no moral qualities whatsoever. If I should regret anything, it is that they did not leave in disgrace, which would have happened within a month or so, and that they escaped from the confrontation with the people's tremendous hatred, which would have been manifested in future street demonstrations. Such was Dr. Konstantin Trenchev's statement.

The Confederation of Independent Trade Unions in Bulgaria [KNSB] welcomes the announced resignation of Prof. Berov's cabinet with satisfaction and relief. Albeit late, the government made the only sensible and correct decision. The KNSB appealed to the leadership of the parliamentary groups and to National Assembly deputies to vote for the government's resignation, thus providing an opportunity for new elections and for a change in the economic reform.

Deputy Defense Minister Relieved of Duty

AU0309151094 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1900 GMT 2 Sep 94

[Text] The Council of Ministers has relieved Iliya Marinov of his post as deputy defense minister for military-economic issues. Major General Simeon Petkovski, until now adviser to the defense minister, has been appointed acting deputy defense minister, the Press Center of the Ministry of Defense reports.

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PRC Delegation Concludes 'Very Fruitful' Visit

LD0509152694 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1500 GMT 5 Sep 94

[Text] Ye Xuanping, permanent vice chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, has described his four-day visit to the Czech Republic as very fruitful and useful. He told journalists before his departure that he sees opportunities for Czech-Chinese cooperation in the economic sphere as well as in culture and science and technology.

In this connection, he recalled the planned fall visit by Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus to China, which ought to deal with the specifics of the development of future bilateral cooperation.

As well as holding talks with Prime Minister Klaus, the Chinese delegation also met members of the foreign affairs and economic committees of the Czech parliament in Prague today.

Poll: Politicians Least Trusted Public Figures

AU0409142894 Prague DENNI TELEGRAF in Czech 30 Aug 94 p 2

[CTK report: "Politicians Are Trusted by Thirty-Five Percent of People"]

[Text] Prague—Politicians are the least trusted people by the citizens of the Czech Republic. Only a mere 35 percent of the population trust them. Potential voters of the Civic Democratic Party trust politicians more than the voters of opposition parties. This ensues from an opinion poll conducted by the Institute for Public Opinion Research (IVVM).

The president is the most trusted of all publicly active people. When asked whom they trusted most among publicly active people, the respondents most often named Vaclav Havel (16 percent) and Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus (11 percent). Vladimir Dlouhy, minister of industry and trade, is most trusted by 7 percent of respondents. Milos-Zeman, chairman of the Social Democratic Party, is trusted by 4 percent of respondents. Of all public occupations, television correspondents are the most trusted (76 percent); radio correspondents are trusted slightly less (72 percent), followed by teachers (71 percent). According to the IVVM, women are more inclined to trust teachers. Regarding other groups of public workers, people who conduct public opinion polls are trusted by 68 percent and direct superiors by 67 percent. Journalists are trusted by 58 percent of the citizens and mayors by 43 percent of those polled.

Daily Outlines Half-Year Economic Trends

AU0409151094 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 30 Aug 94 p 7

[Second installment of a "(vac)"-attributed article based on reports issued by the Czech Statistical Office, the Czech National Bank, and the Finance Ministry: "Favorable Development in the First Half Year (Part Two)"]

[Text] With revenue of 186.8 billion korunas [Kc] and expenditure of Kc177.1 billion, the state budget in the first half-year recorded a surplus of Kc9.7 billion. Most of this was caused by a surplus in the foreign trade clearing account, which is in Slovakia's favor. The revenue structure is unbalanced, primarily on account of the lower aliquot levies to the state budget from value-added tax and income tax from legal persons, despite the relatively higher social security contributions.

Economic development hitherto was reflected in a surplus balance of payments current account. According to estimates, it amounted to $600 million at the end of June. The credit for this is due to the surplus generated in services and transfers. The influx of foreign capital continued in the capital account sphere. Portfolio investments in the first half-year amounted to $525 million ($300 million in the first half of last year), and the increase in the amount of credits in convertible currencies amounted to $533 million, while direct foreign investments were down by 23 percent and amounted to $300.5 million. (The overall amount of foreign capital in the form of direct investments amounted to $2.5 billion on 30 June.) The overall influx of foreign capital amounted to $1.358 billion.

Foreign demand continues to be supported by the undervaluation of the koruna's exchange rate, which, like last year, is undervalued roughly three times compared with its purchasing power parity. According to the preliminary figures, exports rose by 1.9 percent during the first half-year compared with the same period of last year. At the same time, a distinct rise in exports to countries with advanced market economies was recorded. On the other hand, exports to Slovakia fell sharply—by 26.6 percent. Imports in the first half-year amounted to Kc189.4 billion, which was 10.3 percent more than in the same period of last year. The balance of trade ended with a surplus of Kc5.7 billion. The balance of trade returned a surplus with European Union and developing countries, was almost balanced with Slovakia, and returned a deficit with the countries of the former USSR.

For the first time since 1990, industrial production recorded an increase in output—for the first half-year, compared with the same period of last year (by 0.8 percent). Small businessmen, first and foremost, deserve the credit for the increase in industrial output. According to estimates, industrial output has increased by 23.5 percent in enterprises with fewer than 25 employees, including individuals registered and unregistered in the company register. Output fell by 1.4 percent in larger enterprises. The structure of industrial production is not improving. In the so-called high-tech branches, production increased in only some sectors; however, it declined in engineering.

The year-to-year rise in construction output, by 6.4 percent for the first half-year, also signals a recovery in

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the investments sector. Agricultural output is continuing to decline this year, despite a bigger cereals harvest. The sale of animal products fell by roughly one-tenth during the first half-year as compared with the first half of last year. The numbers of livestock have fallen 7 to 12 percent in a year.

Development in the social sphere, in addition to the 7-percent rise in retail sales, is characterized during the first half-year, compared with the same period of last year, first and foremost by a rise in the number of working people by 79,000 (spring 1994/93) to 5,025,000, while the number of unemployed fell to 165,000 at the end of July. Households' real incomes have increased, as is indicated by the 13-to-15-percent rise in average wages and the roughly 10-percent rise in the cost of living. The social stratification of the population increased further.

The economy's future development is not free of problems. For example, structural changes, applying scientific-technical know-how, the rise in the productivity of labor in all spheres of human activity, penetrating further the markets of the economically advanced countries, and, first and foremost, enforcing market economy techniques in the conduct of businessmen and management and in the behavior of the population remain sensitive issues.

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Moravcik Interviewed About Council Session

LD0209202994 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1600 GMT 2 Sep 94

[Interview with Prime Minister Jozef Moravcik by correspondent Martin Bartisek—live]

[Excerpts] [Bartisek] In your address at the National Council of the Slovak Republic on the occasion of the end of the 10th parliamentary term, you said it is necessary for the constitutional bodies to improve their work. To what extent did your statement concern the Government of the Slovak Republic?

[Moravcik] It is necessary to develop some aspects of the Constitution—for instance, the mechanism for dissolving the parliament. [passage omitted]

In March, the parliament found itself in crisis; it was unable to continue working properly in its relationship with the government. The government lost its majority in the parliament. Changes took place in the parliament. In fact, the party that had gained a majority in the elections and formed the government subsequently split.

In such a situation, it would have been much better if the president had the right to dissolve the parliament himself. Instead, that was done by the deputies. Calling an election after such a short time has, de facto, meant the dissolution of the parliament. [passage omitted]

[Bartisek] In your speech to the parliament, you spoke about the advantages of a parliamentary system, highlighting them appropriately. However, there are views being voiced about some disadvantages of such a system. Could it happen that, in the future, we might switch to a presidential system or a combined system in which the government would have a decisive voice in matters of state affairs?

[Meciar] In our situation, such a change would be undesirable. I have consulted on this matter with officials from other postcommunist states, and we have reached the conclusion that, wherever there is insufficient experience with democracy and the implementation of democratic principles, the concentration of power in the hands of one person is very dangerous. In my view, our country is under such a threat. [passage omitted]

[Bartisek] If the Slovak Government continues to ignore the developments in the clearing account and does not change the exchange rate between the Slovak koruna and the clearing ECU, the payments agreement between the two republics will have to be substantially reassessed. That is what Ivan Kocarnik, the Czech finance minister, said yesterday. My question is whether the Slovak Government intends to take this step and whether it is probable that, at the next meeting of the two finance ministers, an agreement will be adopted that will be acceptable to the next government.

[Moravcik] [passage omitted] We were in a similar situation at the beginning of this year, over six months ago. Then Slovakia reacted quite normally: It made use of the provisions of the payments agreement and devalued the Slovak koruna. The Czech side can do the same thing in this situation. The means are there. Because the Czech side is the one that is interested, it is up to it to take this step. It would not be appropriate for us to do this.

[Bartisek] To end this interview, I would like to speak about you and your future. Regardless of the results of the early parliamentary election, can you tell us about your possible future political orientation?

[Moravcik] The direction is clear. I was a cofounder of the Democratic Union, which is a liberal party, and I will try to promote this party and its policies.

[Bartisek] When you were a member of the HZDS, you were open about your social-democratic orientation. You were probably not invited to join the Social Democratic Party of Slovakia, and that is why the Democratic Union was founded.

[Moravcik] I still believe in this social aspect, and it is not incompatible with liberalism. [passage omitted].

[Bartisek] Mr. Prime Minister, I would like to thank you not only for this, but also for all the previous interviews.

Meciar, Russia's Yarov Discuss Relations

LD0409204694 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1630 GMT 4 Sep 94

[Excerpt] [Announcer] Relations with the Russian Federation are of crucial importance to us from a geopolitical and, in particular, an economic point of view. Even after the breakup of the Soviet Union, Moscow continues to be regarded as one of the world's superpowers. Correspondents from Slovak Television and Slovak Radio took advantage of the recent visit by Yuriy Yarov, the deputy chairman of the Russian Government, to the Slovak Embassy in Moscow to get an interview. Radiozurnal was represented by Maria Mikusova.

[Mikusova] In the interview, the deputy chairman of the Russian Government began by saying that his recent visit to Slovakia, on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Slovak National Uprising, was enlightening. Slovakia's attitude toward that historic event from 50 years back had set him thinking about preparations for the commemoration of victory in World War II in Russia.

Asked about Russian-Slovak relations and the official Moscow view of the current situation in Slovakia, Yarov replied:

[Begin recording] [Yarov, in Russian, fading into correspondent's Slovak translation] In spite of the difficulties appearing in our country, we are pleased about your successes. This conviction stems from the stability in Russian-Slovak relations as seen from our own analysis

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and, most importantly, from the legislative basis. One of the very first treaties ratified in Russia was the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between Russia and Slovakia. Your parliament likewise ratified it by a majority vote. This is evidence that whatever the changes in your leadership that have been, will be, or just might yet be, they cannot affect this question. The course of mutually beneficial cooperation between our two states cannot be called into question.

[Mikusova] During your stay in Slovakia, you met the whole spectrum of our political representation and had an unofficial meeting with former Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar. Could you tell us something about the content of those talks?

[Yarov] I certainly could. Above all, I was able to ascertain for myself that nothing had changed in the course of mutual relations, for which we had laid the foundations with the former prime minister. The government is continuing to pursue it in its new formation. I am grateful for the fact that we set a proper, clearly defined direction, which is not affected by fluctuations in the government composition or in the political scene.

I was also interested in (?the position of) economic cooperation with Russia in the program of his movement. The way the current Slovak opposition sees developments in Russian-Slovak relations is important to us. We did not attempt to influence one another. We agreed that there was no need to alter the course we worked out in the past, not even in the event of a change in government. [end recording] [passage omitted]

HZDS's Meciar Comments on Coming Election

LD0409214894 Bratislava STV 1 Television Network in Slovak 1730 GMT 4 Sep 94

[Text] At the invitation of the Association of Slovak Journalists, our news team took part today in an unofficial meeting with the chairman of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] and other leaders of this movement. Vladimir Meciar termed the approaching election and election campaign a struggle that should be for something rather than against something. The HZDS considers the endorsement of statehood a basic axiom of the election.

According to Meciar, of the 18 parties standing, 14 were against the creation of an independent Slovakia. Meciar added that, although the election is to be for a four-year term, it will determine the path for Slovakia for decades. As to how the HZDS would characterize the government of Jozef Moravcik, the movement's chairman said that it is not very effective. It is inconsistent and, in terms of personalities, of very low profile. That is why, according to him, it made many mistakes—in particular, concerning the economy.

A coalition of several parties after the election would, according to those present, again mean instability.

Criticizes Foreign Ministry

LD0409222494 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1930 GMT 4 Sep 94

[Text] At today's news conference in Bratislava organized by the Association of Slovak Journalists, the chairman of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] said that the struggle for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Slovak foreign policy is only just beginning. According to him, the ministry is failing to fulfill its task—namely, to represent the interests of Slovakia abroad.

Speaking about media policy, Vladimir Meciar said that the work of the press and information department of the government must be changed and that the HZDS will implement a general overhaul of the structure of the media policy of the Ministry of Culture.

Following the election, this movement reckons on the creation of an institute, an advisory body attached to the government, which would permit the analysis of information. Meciar also said that the HZDS wishes to create an independent institution for the formation of public opinion, which would conduct broader media policy.

SDL's Weiss Views Political Scene, Election

AU0309194094 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 31 Aug 94 p 9

[Interview with Peter Weiss, chairman of the Party of the Democratic Left, by Martin Hric; place and date not given: "Peter Weiss: We Are Against Extremes in Politics and Wealth; We Are For Tolerance and Demand the Same From Our Partners"]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Hric] Could you sum up the principles that distinguish your election program from other parties' programs and those that are identical?

[Weiss] Our program is based on the Constitution, which we coauthored and for which we voted. We advocate stability of the constitutional system and reject politically expedient attempts to change the Constitution. We reject attempts to cast doubt on parliamentary democracy, to weaken the citizen's position and enforce authoritarian forms of power. We support the transformation of the economy into a market economy, but without further social polarization of our society. We do not want a narrow section of the population to live in excessive wealth, gained not always on the basis of performance but by means of speculation, fraud, or bribes, with the majority of people having to contend with growing unemployment, poverty, and a feeling of hopelessness. The Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] set itself the task to establish a layer of the rich after the elections. We want not only the costs but also the fruits of economic changes to be distributed more evenly so that a broad middle class is formed, comprising skilled workers and farmers, that would enjoy good living conditions and become a guarantee of political stability.

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[Hric] According to the preelection preferences, the next parliament will differ only negligibly from the current one in terms of political composition. What do you expect of the election?

[Weiss] The early election is a product of the political failure of the winner of the 1992 election. If one-quarter of all members left the HZDS Club of Deputies and if the HZDS's main ally, the Slovak National Party, disintegrated, this amounts to a political debacle of its leadership. The talk about traitors is only an embarrassing attempt to cover up the inability to profoundly analyze problems into which this movement has repeatedly been getting because of its refusal to clearly define itself politically and because we find in its ranks literally everything that exists in Slovak politics.... The early election has become the sole way out of the permanent political crisis caused by the inability of the HZDS to gain a durable majority in parliament.

In spite of that, parliament has not been as ineffective as is being claimed. It has done an enormous amount of work in transforming our legal system after the Slovak Republic became independent, in passing the Constitution, and in transforming federal legislation. Responsibility for the quality of the new political figures in parliament will be borne by the political parties that compiled the slates of candidates. The election and the voters will decide whether this country will return to the method of government we had until 11 March 1994 or whether conditions for a broad coalition government will be created. I am convinced that only a broad coalition government can bring Slovakia longer-term stability.

[Hric] What are the ideas of the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL] and the [SDL-led] Common Choice coalition regarding the possibilities of postelectoral cooperation?

[Weiss] Slovakia needs political balance if it is to avoid further internal political crises. In view of the distribution of forces, this balance can be secured in parliament only by sufficient influence of the Common Choice coalition. This represents the only alternative to a policy based on the systematic exposure and creation of enemies, on unnecessary conflicts.

On the other hand, political analysts are paying exaggerated attention to the SDL's behavior. So far, I have not read any analyses on their part of the electoral and postelectoral consequences of the Hungarian coalition's decision to abandon the present platform and return to the platform of the Komarno Appeal, which is unacceptable to the Common Choice, the Christian Democratic Movement [KDH], and the Democratic Union. Nor do they analyze the consequences of the inclusion of candidates of the Permanent Conference of the Civic Institute [SKOI] on the KDH's slate of candidates. [SKOI leaders] Messrs. Langos and Sebej are behaving like Bourbonists. They have not forgotten anything, they have not learned anything. They are firing at the SDL from all possible calibers just like in the days of the Public Against Violence glory in 1990. We are now in the year 1994, however, and, given their vocabulary and acquired image, these gentlemen are unacceptable to our voter base as political partners.

Common Choice will decide according to its program. We will not let ourselves be pushed into anything. He who wants to cooperate with us should ponder whether to hurl invectives at us or to pay heed to the points of departure of our program and our political culture. We have been and will be implementing a calm policy without scandals, based on the professional mastering of problems. By joining the present government coalition, we demonstrated that we share responsibility for the country. Bet let no one blackmail us. It is not our obligation to take over responsibility, to our own detriment, for the amateurish political decisions of others.

[Hric] Judging from the published slates of candidates and electoral preferences, the future composition of parliament is more or less known. Do the deputies' personal characteristics establish prerequisites for the new parliament to operate more constructively?

[Weiss] The elections can result in various possibilities. One extreme possibility is the representation of eight entities in parliament—the HZDS, Common Choice, the KDH, DU [Slovak Democratic Union], the Hungarian coalition, the Association of Workers of Slovakia, the Democratic Party, and the SNS. The other extreme possibility is the presence of only three entities—the HZDS, Common Choice, and the KDH. Everything will be decided by the voters, who will either support political balance or will prefer small parties, be it for ideological reasons, because of prejudice, or out of spite, that will not make it into parliament.

We offer on our slate of candidates not only well-tried personalities but also new people. We see no reason to change the style of our policy, which has been based on professionalism, political culture, and rejection of extremes.

[Hric] What will be the most urgent tasks of the next parliament?

[Weiss] The most urgent task of the new parliament will be to challenge expedient efforts to change the Constitution and resist efforts to set up a commission to investigate the alleged unconstitutional activity of the Slovak president. This would amount to the preparation of the first political trial. Parliament is facing a magnitude of legislative tasks, and its duty will be to enhance its credibility among citizens. It must therefore concentrate on the expeditious passage of the law on the conflict of interests, of new rules of procedure, and of the law on territorial and administrative arrangement, rather than on settling political accounts.

[Hric] The SDL has proved to be the party most resistant to efforts to break it up from the outside. Are you confident that it will also be able to resist those efforts in the future?

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[Weiss] I agree that the SDL really is the last party the HZDS chairman has not managed to break up. We have behind us political and moral experience from the shaping of a new party, and we have experienced people in the leadership. The unfastidious attacks on the party leadership and the efforts to pit the party leadership against the member base have had only one effect—growing aversion among our members and sympathizers toward politicians who are incapable of striking long-term compromises and of cooperating seriously and who base their policy on the old Roman slogan "Divide and conquer!"

[Hric] The opposition kicked off its election campaign in April. What do you want to emphasize in Common Choice's campaign, and to whom do you want to appeal?

[Weiss] Indeed, thanks to its much bigger financial and material resources, the opposition started the campaign much earlier. That is why it was so vehemently opposed to the law on limiting campaign spending. The HZDS is betting on a dirty campaign, on discrediting its rivals. I receive summary reports from the HZDS chairman's rallies and the monitoring of the daily SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA. However, if anyone expects us to respond to political rowdyism with a lingo that is used in pubs before closing hour, betting on disinformation and unfounded accusations of opponents, he is wrong. We have a positive program and will defend ourselves against attacks by analyzing the facts. Vladimir Meciar has been in power for 36 of the 53 months [figure as published] since November 1989. He is not credible when he laments about the bloated and unfunctional state administration, as he himself carried out the transformation of national committees.

Common Choice wants to resist the policy of intolerance, nationalism, profiteering, and lies. We do not want to sever reasonable links to the past—quite the contrary. We are building on the work of the previous generations and our national traditions. We are appealing to those who have made the biggest sacrifices in the name of transformation to the market economy and who rightly ask why only they have to carry the burden over and over again. We support privatization, but we want to create the broadest possible class of owners, including workers, rather than privatize for the benefit of a small group of the privileged. We will seek to prevent the growth of prices and the depreciation of wages, pensions, and savings. We want to create a healthy investment environment. We want to guarantee the citizen's safety, protect the consumer, and guarantee civil rights. We will establish conditions for Slovakia's integration into European political, economic, and security structures.

Weekly Eulogizes StB Secret Police Chief

AU0309160894 Bratislava SME in Slovak 31 Aug 94 pp 1-2

[Article by Jana Pankovcinova: "'Outrageous' Article by Chief Editor of Monthly POLICIA Will Apparently Be Dealt With Only After Election"]

[Text] Bratislava—"I have read it, and it is outrageous." This is how Interior Minister Ladislav Pittner, in an interview for our daily, commented on a column in the August issue of the monthly POLICIA.

In an editorial entitled "Self-Confidence," Lieutenant Colonel Robert Behan, chief editor of the monthly POLICIA, which, according to the imprint, is published by the Trade Union of Police Workers and by the Ministry of Interior of the Slovak Republic, writes, among other things: "Let me stress that I have nothing against the Czechs or against the periodicals they are foisting upon us. I only want to point out that, if we want to be independent, we must protect ourselves. We must carefully consider to what extent foreigners are offering us goods and to what extent they are starting to purposefully influence our way of thinking and to enforce what is theirs at the expense of what is ours. Ever since the founding of the Czechoslovak Republic in 1918, we in the police have been in the mass media bondage of the Czechs. [sentence as published] What effect has this had? Today we do not have in Slovakia a single significant police personality. From literature we know only the Czech Jaroslav Sejnoha and Czech police theoreticians and not a single Slovak criminologist or theoretician. Of course, we did have one—General Alojz Lorenc [deputy minister of interior and chief of the now defunct communist secret police StB until 1989]. The world appreciated him, but the Czechs have liquidated even him. And the impression is inescapable that they sentenced him because the boys were clearing their desks after years."

Although Gen. Lorenc was sentenced [to four years by a military court in Tabor in 1992], he refused to serve his sentence in the Czech Republic and, subsequently, also in Slovakia. The Slovak General Prosecutor's Office will deal with the case anew from the beginning.

We asked Interior Minister Ladislav Pittner for his opinion about the text of the POLICIA column, which portrays Czechs as enemies of Slovakia and defends, in a way, Gen. Lorenc:

[Pittner] Such a claim is, at any rate, outrageous. Out of professional responsibility alone, the police officer in question should know how to formulate his own opinion. Speaking about liquidation executed by the Czechs for national reasons or saying that he was liquidated by the Czechs is simply outrageous, in my opinion. Of course, it is up to the editorial team how it will come to terms with such articles. This particular editor has expressed very peculiar views many times before—for example, about the continued employment of former StB staffers with the police. It is a trade union newspaper, and the trade unions should consider to what extent they can tolerate such a representative, given the fact that they subscribe to the democratic traditions of the trade unions of police workers existing in democratic countries.

[Pankovcinova] Yet this article was written not by a rank-and-file correspondent but by the chief editor of the monthly, which, according to the imprint, is published

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jointly by the Trade Union of Police Workers and the Ministry of Interior. What consequences can you draw as minister?

[Pittner] I will wait for the trade unions' response.

[Pankovcinova] When will the issue be settled?

[Pittner] Apparently, we will have to wait until after the election. It is difficult to make any interventions or take any measures at this moment, when we are awaiting the election results, which can characterize those matters quite differently.

ASV Highlights Risks, Threats to Country

AU0209114094 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA (SNS supplement) in Slovak 23 Aug 94 pp 2-3

[Statement by Association of Slovak Soldiers, ASV, Presidium: "Main Risks and Threats to Slovak Statehood"]

[Text] Since the seizure of power by the coalition this March, not only has the political situation changed, but also the situation in the sphere of Slovakia's defense and in the Army's transformation. Moreover, the situation continues to change very rapidly. The risks and threats to state sovereignty and, literally, to the existence of the Slovak nation are becoming more and more clearly visible. They dwell in Hungarian irredentism, Czechoslovakism, neocommunism, and foreign interests in Slovakia.

Key positions at the Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic, as well as in the government, parliament, and at the Castle, are today held by people who had up to the very last minute of the unequal federation rejected the sovereignty and statehood of Slovakia, its proper defense, and its own army. The seizure of control of the defense department by representatives of the neocommunist Party of the Democratic Left [SDL] has not only markedly raised the self-confidence, verging on aggressive assertiveness, of former political officers and party fundamentalists, particularly at command and staff posts, but also brought about changes in security policy and personnel policy, which, in reality, still is the old "cadre" policy. Key positions are being filled with "top-level experts" from the former Military Political Academy and the [Army's] political apparatus. Their influence on the overall orientation of the Army, military intelligence, the training of soldiers, and future military academy officers will have far-reaching negative consequences. A section of the officers, particularly young officers, are losing faith and hope that the present situation can be changed. The Army's confidence in the political leadership of the state, of subordinates in their superiors, and mutual confidence among soldiers are among the basic pillars of the moral condition of the Army and its general combat ability. How can a soldier or an officer trust the manifestations of patriotism of those who not only opposed Slovakia's independence but were openly defaming their country? How can they trust the former most fanatic advocates of the destruction of NATO who are today zealous propagandists of our entry into it? This is confirmed by a whole number of official documents on political and security issues such as the Defense Doctrine, the Slovak Republic's endorsement of the Partnership for Peace project, the Presentation Document on it, the Pact of Stability, and so forth. In none of these documents will we find an answer to the question of how to really secure Slovakia's defense in the period before security guarantees are provided to us. Slovakia's basic geopolitical and geostrategic realities, which require a balanced foreign and security policy in all directions, are not respected in them. It is becoming increasingly evident that the endeavor of the present state leadership to join NATO and the Western European Union is not aimed at obtaining guarantees for Slovakia but for themselves, for the power elite, as presented in stark nakedness in the "Memorandum" of Dr. Vasil Hudak, director of the European Center of the Institute for East-West Studies, based in Atlanta (United States), of 11 April 1994. This memorandum, which was published in a special supplement of SLOVENSKE NARODNE NOVINY, issue No. 29 of 26 July 1994, is a memento and a challenge for all Slovaks, for all honest people loyal to the nation, for everyone who is not indifferent to the future of Slovak statehood and the Slovak nation.

Czechoslovakism of all shades is manifesting itself more and more overtly within the department of the Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic. This ranges from innocuous nostalgia for the pre-Munich republic [1918-38] up to open debates, conducted on the "impartial soil of military staffs," about how "cardinally stupid" it was to divide the federation and the army. Naturally, such talk is accompanied by wishes for reunification at least within a union. We in the Association of Slovak Soldiers [ASV] consider Czechoslovakism, along with irredentism, the greatest threat to Slovak statehood. Its danger dwells, in particular, in the purposeful utilization of the naturally good attitude of Slovaks toward Czechs, of Slovak soldiers' family ties, and other facts. With a view to legalizing Czechoslovakism in the Army, deliberate use has recently been made of the preparations for the 50th anniversary of the Slovak National Uprising and of the anniversary festivities themselves, of various seminars, articles, and events such as the Chabenec march, which had before November 1989 been organized in honor of Sverma [Jan Sverma, founder of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia], and a whole range of activities by the "Slovak" Union of Anti-Fascist Fighters, whose members either openly embraced and still embrace Czechoslovakism or who even attempt to present their share in the liquidation of the first Slovak state almost as a historic act of patriotism. All of that should culminate in representative foreign participation in the festivities. This is highly reminiscent of the endeavor of the present coalition leaders to have their policy culminate in entry into NATO.

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How are those who wanted Slovakia's sovereignty and statehood supposed to understand the government's proposal to appoint and promote 21 generals who, with a few honorable exceptions, had fought for the restoration of Czechoslovakia, for the liquidation of the first Slovak state (the struggle against the fascist regime should not have been also a struggle against Slovak statehood) or who had until 31 December 1992 openly and categorically rejected Slovak sovereignty and, in their statements, even lowered the Slovak Republic and its Army in the estimation of others? The ASV Presidium regards it as undignified and as an act of defamation of Slovak officers and generals if the government was unable to propose and the president of the Slovak Republic appoint Slovaks into key Army positions such as those of chief of the Operational Staff of the Army of the Slovak Republic [ASR] Command, commander of the Military Police, rector and commander of the Military Academy, dean and commander of the Military Department of the Transportation College, and other important positions. Slovak has not become the sole language of duty [sluzobny jazyk] in the Army to this day. Czech continues to be used, in addition to Slovak, as the language of command, orders, and instruction. Regrettably, even the draft language law does not address the issue of language use in Army service. The disregard for the law on decorating buildings and other facilities with the state flag of the Slovak Republic during Slovak Republic national days could be described, literally, as a hostile attitude.

In relation to the celebrations of the 50th anniversary of the Uprising, we in the ASV respect and acknowledge it as an act of taking a stand against German fascism. On the other hand, we cannot fail to see that it helped liquidate Slovak statehood and restore the unjust and unequal Czech-Slovak state. At the same time, it significantly contributed to the more than 40 years of bolshevik totalitarianism. Not only were partisans' heroic deeds part of the Uprising, but also senseless killings of innocent women and children of Slovak Germans and Otto's mission in the Martin barracks. Indeed, there are blank spots even on the part of the insurgents—"Katyn forests" that may have been small but that did exist. No one must grant pardon to murderers of women, old men, and children, whether they be on the side of winners or losers. The endeavor to place the Uprising and the partisans' activity into the context of the European resistance movement is also guided by the endeavor to shield oneself behind such an authority, to obliterate the postwar continuity of service to Bolshevik totalitarianism, and even to present oneself today as Slovakia's savior. While the brave must be honored, it also needs to be said that, before the end of the war as well as afterward, it was precisely a section of the partisans who had cooperated with the NKVD [Stalin-era Soviet secret police]. How many Slovaks who disagreed with the Uprising or who were innocent were been dragged into Soviet gulags as a result of having been denounced! And how many of them never returned! Only members of the Confederation of Political Prisoners of Slovakia have the full moral right to pass judgment on the entire development in Slovakia to date. After the war, some of the partisans were among the most active and most fanatical members of the repressive apparatus—the ZNB [National Security Corps], the StB [State Security Corps], and the VKR [Military Counterintelligence]. They unequivocally backed the putsch of February 1948, actively promoted collectivization of farms, participated in the liquidation of religious orders, prepared and cooperated in the 1968 occupation, formed the backbone of the purges and inquisition in the Army and the VKR during the years of the so-called normalization and stabilization, and, after November 1989, advocated the armed defense of "the interests of the workers class" even at the price of bloodshed in the streets. After November 1989 and, above all, in 1992, they were the most fervent and expressly hostile opponents of sovereignty, Slovakia's statehood, the Slovak Army, and, self-evidently, the partition of Czechoslovakia.

In view of the above facts, which confirm that the history of the first Slovak state, its Army, the Uprising, the postwar Bolshevik totalitarianism, and the place and role of antifascist resistance in the liquidation of initial Slovak statehood is full of blank spots, or, to be more precise, the history of the Uprising is full of black spots, the ASV does not consider this year's pompous celebrations of the 50th anniversary of the Uprising to be the right step or a sincere contribution toward national reconciliation. In our opinion, it should rather be an opportunity to pay tribute to the memory of all fallen Slovak soldiers, regardless of the side on which they had fought and the front on which they had fallen. It is an opportunity to honor those who were murdered and tortured to death in "Katyn forests" and gulags and to finally pay homage to the heroes of anticommunist resistance. It is an opportunity to place the history of the Uprising and postwar totalitarianism from one onto both feet and to get rid of the dangerous, erosive, and destructive Czechoslovakism, which undermines not only Slovak statehood but also the self-confidence of Slovaks and their faith in their own strength. Czechoslovakism has a strong background and particularly strong roots in the Army.

National Council of the Slovak Republic [NRSR] deputies have unscrupulously damaged even the future of Slovak statehood by means of the so-called law on bilingual signposts. The symbolic fact that the law goes into force on 1 November of this year can be regarded as a "velvet Bratislava arbitrage," as a sad recurrence of the Vienna arbitrage of 2 November 1938 [under which parts of southern and eastern Slovakia were ceded to Hungary]! The law's passage establishes legal prerequisites for the further escalation of demands of the irredentist fifth column in southern Slovakia. It is a deliberate attack on Slovak statehood, on the integrity and territorial cohesion of Slovakia, which can turn southern Slovakia into a zone of destabilization. The gentlemen deputies and the government did not even bother to

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ensure that, before the passage of this law, which has turned us into a hostage, the Hungarian side at least contractually declared the unchangeability and inviolability of current state borders. We in the ASV regard as irresponsible, to say the least, the conclusion of a treaty by the Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic with the Ministry of Defense of the Hungarian Republic before the conclusion of a state treaty. Of course, lending credence to and relying on treaties with Hungarian politicians would be naive. Slovakia has had bitter experience with the southern neighbor's word of honor.

The military, foreign, security, political, legislative, organizational, personnel, and other activities of the Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic are evidently accelerating, without parallel and, above all, competent parliamentary control. There do not exist even minimal guarantees that those activities are to the benefit of Slovakia, its security, and its defense. Neocommunists have won in Poland and Hungary, and the defense departments there are, naturally, in their hands. We have somehow failed to realize the impact of the fact that the Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic is more firmly in the hands of the SDL than is the case in Poland and Hungary. In this respect, the Small Warsaw Pact has come into being already.

Who can have faith in a political party whose deputies in the NRSR voted for the sovereignty of the Slovak Republic, while its deputies in the Federal Assembly voted against the termination of the CSFR's existence? Competent civilian, pluralistic, independent, and democratic control of security policy, the Ministry of Defense, the Army, and military intelligence has never been needed more badly than now. The 18 months of the existence of the Slovak Republic's power structures vindicate the ASV's proposal of 11 January 1993 to draft a law on the Army's control through the NRSR commissioner for defense. The ASV had been accused then of radicalism, nationalism, incompetence, and so forth.

With the approaching election, the endeavor of political parties and movements to gain control over the area of defense, the Army, and other power structures is becoming increasingly transparent. The SDL has the advantage of continuity in this regard. It has its faithful and adamant supporters deployed at all levels, vertically as well as horizontally. Since March, they have come to life like the knights of Sitno [reference to legend about dormant knights who wake up only when the treasure they guard is endangered] and are becoming increasingly active. Some other parties and movements are also trying hard to gain control over the Army, although they are evidently handicapped. As early as last year, their representatives contacted leading functionaries of the ASR Command and the Ministry of Defense to explore the situation. Their cooperation yielded results, above all, after the change of government in March. All of this is happening with watchful foreign eyes looking on and alert foreign ears listening in. One can say, with a dose of exaggeration, that the covert struggle for the power structures of the state has turned into an overt struggle. Even the layman will probably understand the significance of intelligence service information in the election struggle—for example, for the prime minister, direct supervisor of the Slovak Information Service, who is concurrently chairman of the Democratic Union, and in the Army, where the chief of military intelligence is a "person without party affiliation" with an SDL membership card. Thinking all of this through to the end makes one feel anxious!

The ASV Presidium therefore considers it its patriotic duty to draw attention to the aforementioned facts, which can fundamentally influence not only Slovakia's further orientation and its security and defense but, in the final analysis, also the preservation of Slovak statehood in the preelection period but, in particular, after the elections.

[signed] ASV Presidium
Engineer Jan Repasky, colonel in reserve

Cuts at Defense Ministry, Army Command Detailed

AU0409142594 Bratislava OBRANA in Slovak 27 Aug 94 p 3

[Article by Frantisek Kasicky: "Army's Transformation From Above; General Staff Will Replace Command of the Army of the Slovak Republic"]

[Text] The number of generals at the Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic will be cut by 11 as of 1 September 1994 and the number of colonels by 211. Another 17 generals and 106 colonels will depart from the General Staff. The new chief of the General Staff will be appointed by the president of the Republic at the recommendation of Defense Minister Pavol Kanis. A total of 526 soldiers and 441 civilian employees will belong to the new organizational structure of the ministry and subordinated offices, which means a reduction in the ministerial work force by 24 persons. The limit on the number of employees at the new General Staff will be 1,059 persons, which is a reduction by 162 compared with the original number.

Annual savings in wage funds as a result of cuts in the number of managerial staff are projected to amount to 3,640,000 korunas [Sk]. The difference in the average salary of employees of the Command of the Army of the Slovak Republic (VASR) and the Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic will be eliminated (average salaries at VASR have been Sk1,060 higher thus far). Career soldiers reassigned to lower-level functions as a result of reorganization will retain their former salary for 12 months, in accordance with the law on certain conditions of employment.

"The adopted concept of transformation of the Army of the Slovak Republic should permit the establishment of organizational structures similar to those existing in the armies of advanced European states and, at the same

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time, establish prerequisites for the integration of the Army of the Slovak Republic into European security structures," Defense Minister Pavol Kanis said about the changes.

He also stressed that, in its policy statement, the coalition government expressed its determination to continue more forcefully in the Army's transformation. The changes have been preceded by the adoption of a number of basic documents related to defense and security issues, such as the Defense Doctrine of the Slovak Republic and the Concept of Building the Army Until the Year 2000.

According to Pavol Kanis, the fundamental element that would permit the fulfillment of tasks of strategic nature in the sphere of military and defense policy has been absent at the Ministry of Defense. The ministry has not been able to fully exercise the role of the central body of state administration for securing the defense of the Slovak Republic. Ever since the ministry's founding, its activity has been marked by inconsistent identification with the military-political contents of activity and the endeavor to take a greater part in the direct command of individual components of the Army. Also, the ministry has not been successful in consistently applying relations of partnership with VASR, which differ from relations of strict command subordination. Relations between the ministry and VASR have been marked by insufficiently clarified jurisdiction.

The guiding principle in establishing the new organizational structures was that of eliminating duplicity between the Ministry of Defense and VASR with a view to reducing staff numbers in the two bodies. The number of civilian employees working in them will also increase compared with previous years.

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Horn Discusses Ties With Austria Prior to Visit

AU0509162994 Vienna DIE PRESSE in German 3 Sep 94 p 4

[Interview with Hungarian Prime Minister Gyula Horn by Tibor Fenyi; place and date not given: "Hungarian Prime Minister Prior to Vienna Visit: 'Trust in Austria as Mediator'"]

[Text] [Fenyi] Prime Minister, before this interview you met the president of the Austrian Parliament, Heinz Fischer. What did you discuss?

[Horn] Heinz Fischer and I have been friends for almost 30 years. Before the change of the system, he personally helped the reformist forces a lot. Now we talked about my visit to Austria on Wednesday.

[Fenyi] It is going to be a very short visit: Discounting the time for protocol and lunch, you will have three to four hours. Is there so little to talk about in the relations of the two countries?

[Horn] I am not going to Vienna to save the world, and I have known Federal Chancellor Vranitzky as a man of action and facts. Moreover, we will focus on work even during our lunch. Besides, if a certain issue cannot be discussed in three hours, it might not need any discussion considering the excellent relations that we have.

[Fenyi] What are the topics you would like to discuss with the Austrian politicians in these three hours?

[Horn] Basically the same topics I discussed with Mr. Fischer: Most importantly, the consequences of Austria's entry into the European Union—something we Hungarians see as a most positive accomplishment, since it might open several possibilities for us, too. We must not forget that EFTA [European Free Trade Association] rules are much stricter than most EU regulations. Yet, we will also discuss tasks in the sphere of major investments. Chances for cooperation are particularly good in the sphere of infrastructure. To come back to Heinz Fischer: I was very glad to hear his high assessment of the steps that we have taken vis-a-vis Slovakia.

[Fenyi] Sources in Hungary have emphasized again and again the great expectations pinned on Austria's help for Hungary's EU membership efforts. What kind of help are you thinking of?

[Horn] Most importantly, we want to learn about the experience your country made in fulfilling the EU entry conditions. Another thing is that, although I regard Hungary's associate membership agreement as great progress, it has some defects. It should not be revised, but modernized and developed further. Austrian assistance would be most important in this sphere, too. At the moment, the European Union has taken measures that are not very generous. Unexpected EU actions could, however, maneuver the Hungarian economy into a difficult situation.

[Fenyi] Five years ago you made more positive statements on EU and NATO membership....

[Horn] Yes, at that time I was more optimistic. After all, who could have expected the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty to be so difficult and the recession to be so protracted? It has had a strong impact on our access to markets and capital sources. Who would have thought of the Yugoslav tragedy, which has caused serious, immediate financial damage for Hungary? Who could anticipate that the Western Europeans would become much more cautious in the way they treat us? It is understandable that they are not all too eager to cooperate more closely with an unstable region. Nevertheless, we have not been able to influence most of these developments.

As far as NATO membership is concerned, I am a supporter of the "Partnership for Peace," even though this scheme puts off full membership and the granting of security guarantees to a more distant future. I understand the shared interest in not letting Russia's situation further destabilize. Nevertheless, in NATO's place, I would take more courageous steps toward the other countries in the region.

[Fenyi] In a few days we will have the fifth anniversary of the opening of the Hungarian border for tens of thousands of GDR [German Democratic Republic] tourists, in which you personally played a decisive role....

[Horn] First of all, I must mention that Austria was also involved: It had to guarantee these people entry to its country. In my capacity as foreign minister at the time, I had many talks with Foreign Minister Mock, and I know that he had lengthy negotiations with the Germans. So Austria was an important mediator at that time, too. I can only be grateful to our neighboring country for its openness and constructive cooperation, and I trust that it will preserve this attitude toward us in the future.

Foreign Minister Comments on Minorities Policy

LD0209223194 Budapest MTV Television Network in Hungarian 1940 GMT 2 Sep 94

[Interview with Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs by unidentified Budapest MTV correspondent; date, place not given—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Correspondent] The executive presidium of the HDUR [Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania] has made clear its stance in a working document prior to the visit of Romanian Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu [to Hungary on 5 September]. They have drawn attention to the fact that in order to work out the basic treaty, there is a need on both sides for a whole series of confidence-building gestures. What confidence-building steps are we planning?

[Kovacs] In my firm belief, the new Hungarian Government has already taken confidence-building steps. The first is that we have qualified as one of the main tenets of

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foreign policy activity the settling of relations with the neighboring countries, the historic reconciliation with Slovakia and Romania.

The second is that we have expressed readiness to draft and conclude the basic treaty, and that in this framework, we are ready to reaffirm the inviolability of borders in this basic treaty.

We can also consider it a confidence-building step that the Hungarian Government has stated that it is ready to coordinate the draft of the basic treaty with the Romanians of Hungary as well. I met the representatives of Romanians in Hungary in recent days and we exchanged opinions on the issues of the basic treaty.

Naturally, in minority issues it is not Hungary that needs first and foremost to take confidence-building steps and gestures, but much rather it is the Romanian side.

[Correspondent] To what extent are relations between our countries burdened by the fact that Gheorghe Funar's Romanian National Unity Party has obtained four portfolios in the Vacaroiu cabinet, and it seems that the Greater Romania Party of Vadim Tudor, who is also known for his anti-Hungarian views, has also announced its demand to participate in the government. According to certain opinions, the Hungarian party in Romania could become a hostage of the prevailing parliamentary balance of forces.

[Kovacs] This transformation of the Romanian Government did indeed arouse serious concern among Romania's Hungarians; but even in Western Europe, reactions to it were not favorable. Hungary, the Hungarian Government, naturally must take as its starting point that its negotiating partner, whether in the issue of the basic treaty or in any other concrete issue of bilateral relations, is the Romanian Government, which is in power by virtue of the confidence of the Romanian people, the confidence of the electors.

I believe that a certain amount of time has to elapse after a government transformation for it to be able to assess what change has occurred in policies. In this case, in fact, two things could happen, in theory at least. One is that the Funar party will adjust to the existing policy of the Romanian Government, which in this case would mean that it would politicize more moderately than hitherto. The other possibility, and one has to reckon with this too, unfortunately, is that the Romanian Government will shift in a more extremist direction, in the direction hitherto represented by the Funar party. The next weeks and months will show which version, which scenario, will hold true.

[Correspondent] It could be included in the series of confidence-building measures that Hungary supports Romania's efforts at European integration. What kind of policy is Hungarian diplomacy pursuing, for example, in the Council of Europe? [passage omitted]

[Kovacs] In the Hungarian government's opinion, our neighbors' integration in Europe would only help bilateral relations and it would also help the situation of the Hungarian minority living in the neighboring countries, because it is inconceivable that European norms would then not be asserted there.

With regard to the Council of Europe, it is to be recalled that Hungary did not impede Romania's admission to the Council of Europe. [passage omitted]

[Correspondent] A cardinal point in the basic treaty is the minority issue, on the assessment of which the two sides' stances radically diverge. [passage omitted]

[Kovacs] We also do not think that in finalizing the basic treaty, in the discussion of the basic treaty, the representatives of the minorities should be seated in the ranks of the government delegations. Not that Hungary has any objection to this, but we know that it is not realistic, because the Romanian side will not accept this. On the other hand, we consider it indispensable that in the course of working out the text of the basic treaty, the minorities should be able to express their opinions about it, both the Hungarians in Romania and the Romanians in Hungary. We have stated that we want to take their opinion into consideration in all events, since it is not possible to make decisions about them without them.

[Correspondent] Hungarian minority policy is built on the principle of autonomy and self-determination. These thoughts, however, cannot be found in the CSCE's minority charter. [passage omitted]

[Kovacs] In the case of minority agreements, be they a part of the basic treaty or a separate agreement on minority protection, two really sensitive issues arise, in our experience. One is the question of collective rights and the other is the enunciation of the principle of autonomy. As regards collective rights, here it is possible to find a bridging solution. We are aware that indeed, the large majority of European countries do not accept the idea of collective rights, and neither is it accepted by those of our neighbors with whom the elaboration of the basic treaty is under way.

However, it is possible to find a bridging solution such as, for example, the formulation that the minorities, those belonging to minorities, should be able to exercise their rights as individuals and in community with others. According to our knowledge, this formulation is acceptable to our partners; and in fact, with respect to its content, it accords with the concept of collective rights.

As for the question of autonomy: here we are looking at the question of cultural autonomy, autonomy in self-adminsıration or public administration, and territorial autonomy. And indeed, this is perhaps the hardest nut to crack. However, there is the precedent of South Tyrol. With long, patient discussions, the question of autonomy can also be resolved.

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[Correspondent] How does the government support the Hungarian minority beyond the borders, in view of the fact that the minority there is becoming pluralized, in accordance with the democratic processes—that is to say, splitting up into several parties?

[Kovacs] The Hungarian Government has stated - it is laid down in the government program - that the support of Hungarians beyond the borders is an all-national matter and does not depend on party political considerations. This means that the government maintains relations in the same way with every Hungarian organization and party beyond the borders, regardless of the kind of political trend it represents. We consider it unacceptable to make distinctions either in maintaining relations or in support.

In connection with support, we generally stress one thing. Support—and here I am thinking first and foremost of financial support—must in all events be made democratic, transparent, and controllable, so that it should not provide a possibility, an opportunity, for abuse, and so that it might not be a tool for the break-up of some Hungarian party or organization beyond the border, as did unfortunately happen in the past.

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Walesa, Pawlak Reportedly Discuss Alliance

WS0609100994 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 6 Sep 94 p 1

[Article by Piotr Smilowicz: "The Presidency; Prime Minister's Secret Alliances; Pawlak May Back Walesa in 1995 Election"]

[Text] Prime Minister Pawlak is rumored to have held secret negotiations in recent days with the President's office on the possibility of reaching agreement concerning the presidential election, ZYCIE WARSZAWY has learned unofficially.

According to our information, the meeting was held at the president's initiative. Our interlocutors say that he was represented in the talks by his aide Andrzej Zakrzewski, who used to be closely linked to the United Peasant Party.

Walesa is said to have proposed an election alliance with the leader of the Polish Peasant Party [PSL]. In exchange for leaving the government "alone" and for guaranteeing support for Pawlak as prime minister, the PSL would have to back Walesa in some way. The PSL might either give up the idea of fielding its own candidate or field someone "to lose." This information has not been borne out by Zakrzewski. "I have not heard about anything like that," he told ZYCIE WARSZAWY.

It is worth recalling that Pawlak has given up the idea of running in the election. Right now, the most serious PSL candidate is believed to be Sejm Deputy Speaker Jozef Zych. The name of Senate Speaker Adam Struzik is also mentioned increasingly often. Among people linked to the PSL, one can hear opinions that he would be the ideal "mock" candidate.

Daily Analyzes Walesa's Election Chances

WS0209133094 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 2 Sep 94 p 3

[Analysis by Robert Krasowski: "Walesa's Chances Are Increasing"]

[Text] Lech Walesa's election strategy has already taken on a concrete shape. It can be seen very clearly where the president wants to seek support in his campaign.

This strategy, as it has been described in ZYCIE WARSZAWY by a high-ranking Belweder official, boils down to three slogans: abortion, Concordat, Constitution. Thus, a fight against the liberalization of the abortion law, a fight for the ratification of the Concordat, and support for the draft constitution drawn up by the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union "Solidarity" ["S"].

These increasingly obvious directions of political activity indicate quite clearly that Walesa's goal is to win the support of the church and "S." From Walesa's point of view, these are indisputably the two most efficient election apparatuses—church pulpits and union plant committees are everywhere.

Walesa has already taken steps to remove any possible obstacles. The present political context also seems favorable to the success of this strategy.

For several months now, the church has been quite forcefully pushed toward the Belweder. The successes of the parliamentary initiatives launched by the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] and the Labor Union [UP], parties that do not envision room for the church in the public sphere, concerning abortion and the Concordat have proved that neither the Freedom Union and the Polish Peasant Party [PSL], which lack self-definition, nor the right wing, which will not be able to come to power for another three years, are capable of doing anything to effectively defend the religious, let alone prestigious, interests of the church. Among those political forces that are in power, only the president firmly supported the church; only he has the political resources that allow him to defeat the influences of the antichurch left wing.

The church may support Walesa also for another reason: The defense of the church is probably the only item in Walesa's political program that has never been changed over all the years of his activity.

Bishops may not support Walesa only in two cases: if the right wing fields a candidate that has a good chance of winning and if the church ignores the presidential election.

The first option is possible, even though the president has already taken steps to avert such an alternative. The purpose of the coaxing of the right wing, which has been going on for several months now, is not to reconstruct the anticommunist and conservative pro-Walesa camp that existed four years ago; the nature of these activities is purely destructive. Today, the support for Walesa declared, for example, by the Christian-National Union or the Movement for the Republic will not directly influence election results. It will definitely decrease the importance of, and as a consequence, the social support for, a rightist counter-candidate. Therefore, the church would probably not decide to support such a rightist weakling (or, perhaps, several weaklings). Thus, only a strong candidate fielded by a possibly broadest rightist camp can win the support of the church (or it can be a common Solidarity candidate, although this is probably political fiction [last two words in English]); probably even such a candidate would also share the support with Walesa.

The possibility of the church ignoring the election can probably be ruled out. For three years now, Poland will have a leftist parliament, in which the SLD and UP have half the seats. It must be admitted, though, that Kwasniewski, who has remarkable political imagination, and Bugaj, who is free from anticlerical emotions, are doing their best not to exacerbate relations with the church. However, pressure from lower levels of the parties is so strong that everything, including Walesa's political interest, seems to indicate that the election campaign will be waged in the atmosphere of a religious war. One cannot expect that the church will watch all of this passively.

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Whereas the logic of developments is sentencing the church to support for Walesa, in the case of "S," the situation is more uncertain. There are many politicians in the rightist Alliance for Poland [PdP] who can see "S" as its election partner. The center-right Secretariat, which cocreated the "S" draft constitution and then helped collect signatures for it later on, links all of its political plans to an alliance with the union.

However, the Secretariat is politically weak, and the PdP's behavior toward the union is equivocal. Lech Walesa is trying to take advantage of this situation. He supported the draft constitution, and he will certainly support it very firmly in the Constitutional Committee, even though in many places it is in contradiction with his own draft.

For the union whose position was still very strong not long ago, even this little success may be quite attractive. Closer links to Walesa offer a hope that the process of pushing "S" to the margin by the postcommunist coalition will at least be stopped, if not reversed. Even the risk that in the future Walesa may once again turn his back on "S," just as he has done to all of his other former allies, may be evaluated by success-hungry Krzaklewski as the smallest cost of the fight of "S" for political survival.

If Walesa's plans were successful, the situation might look roughly like this: The left side of the political scene would be represented by Kwasniewski and Kuron. Walesa would head the conservative, moderately anticommunist camp (anticommunist, thanks to the presence of "S"). The right wing could only represent the definitely anticommunist and politically skilled electorate, which does not approve the cadre policy that is today pursued by the Belweder.

Such a configuration will give Walesa a good chance of passing to the second round of the election. At this stage, regardless of who his countercandidate is, he will be supported by the PSL, which the peasants already say today.

Of course, further speculation does not make any sense.

One thing is certain: Support of the church and "S," as well as the growing opposition to the postcommunist authorities, will multiply Walesa's chances. This trend seems to be irreversible.

It can only be weakened—quite considerably—if a common candidate is fielded by 1) the right wing, 2) the right wing and "S," 3) the entire post-Solidarity camp. Each subsequent option decreases Walesa's chances, but it is at the same time increasingly less likely.

Possible Rightist Presidential Candidates Viewed

WS0609074894 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 5 Sep 94 p 3

[Article by Piotr Zaremba: "The Right Wing; Presidential Candidacies; Certainly Not Kuron"]

[Text] "We are closer to the parties of the right wing and to Solidarity ['S']," Ryszard Czarnecki, deputy president of the Christian-National Union [ZChN], commented on the proposal submitted by the leadership of the Freedom Union [UW] to hold negotiations on a common presidential candidate.

Strzembosz? Zoll?

"It is too bad that UW Spokesman Andrzej Potocki started with a statement that excluded Supreme Court President Adam Strzembosz as the compromise candidate," said ZChN President Wieslaw Chrzanowski. "It is true that we exclude Jacek Kuron; however, he is an extreme candidate. If we put forward Jan Lopuszanski, we would not be surprised at UW's opposition."

Unofficially, the politicians of the Alliance for Poland [PdP] (it is made up of, among others, Center Accord [PC] and the ZChN) say that the first contacts with UW representatives, before the official proposal to hold talks, were not satisfactory. "Politicians linked to Mazowiecki suggest that it would be best to support someone in the right wing of UW (for example, Hanna Suchocka) or Constitutional Tribunal President Andrzej Zoll, who is also close to UW," ZYCIE WARSZAWY was told by one of the PdP leaders.

The PdP takes into consideration one of the three following candidates: Adam Strzembosz, Constitutional Tribunal Judge Wojciech Laczkowski, and former Senate Speaker Andrzej Stelmachowski. Initially, the ones who most liked the idea of negotiations with UW were PC leader Jaroslaw Kaczynski and Conservative Coalition leader Kazimierz Ujazdowski. The reactions of ZChN leaders were more reserved. Today all of them are thinking primarily about a compromise with "S."

Conservative Party leader Aleksander Hall responded enthusiastically to the proposal by the UW Presidium.

"It is with satisfaction that we receive UW's decision to hold talks with the groupings of the Post-August Poland," he said on 3 September. As early as several months ago, this politician supported the idea of fielding a common candidate; now he can see "very real chances" of putting this undertaking into effect.

Wilecki? Walesa?

However, Hall will have difficulty trying to win over to his enthusiasm his allies from the other rightist bloc, "Accord of 11 November." Janusz Korwin-Mikke, leader of the Union for Real Politics [UPR], the strongest grouping in the bloc, is said to prefer General Tadeusz Wilecki, head of the General Staff of the Polish Army, who is linked to President Walesa. The candidacy has not yet been finally agreed upon either with the general or with the entire UPR. However, Korwin is already trying to gain support for this candidacy among his allies.

The steps taken by Walesa, however, seem to be much more real. First, at the meeting with the "S" National Commission, he is said to have made a favorable impression on some members of the "S" leadership, although not on

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Marian Krzaklewski. The "S" chairman has never been enthusiastic about inviting the president. However, politicians of the right wing fear that the union might reach an agreement with the Belweder, which would put an end to their idea of fielding a common candidate with "S."

In addition, National Security Office head Henryk Goryszewski is meeting and coaxing rightist politicians. For the time being, he is not very popular with the members of his own party, the ZChN. However, he is trying to win support of the leaders of the Party of Christian Democrats (who also belong to the "Accord of 11 November" and who have always been rather pro-Walesa). He also met with Movement for the Republic [RdR] leader Romuald Szeremietiew. "We discussed security issues," Szeremietiew assured ZYCIE WARSZAWY.

However, asked about a candidate for president, the RdR chief stated: "If 'S' reaches an agreement with Walesa, the right wing will have to reconsider its attitude toward him. Reaching an agreement with the Union is less likely."

Whereas Kaczynski and Ujazdowski do not really like Walesa, and the ZChN leaders are trying to remain neutral, Szeremietiew has always been considered to be the politician who has the best relations with Walesa of all of the PdP politicians.

UW To Talk With PdP About Common Candidate

WS0209120394 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 2 Sep 94 p 3

[Article by IGO: "Can UW and the Right Wing Reach Agreement?"]

[Text] On behalf of the Freedom Union [UW], Tadeusz Mazowiecki will hold talks on a common candidate for president with leaders of the rightist Alliance for Poland [PdP]. However, chances for agreement are rather poor. Each party claims that only its candidate is a compromise.

Both part of UW and part of the rightist PdP believe that, if they combined their forces, they would stand a better chance of defeating Lech Walesa and a candidate of the postcommunists or of the peasants in the election. The offer of talks on a common candidate was given by UW, on behalf of which the negotiations are to be conducted by Tadeusz Mazowiecki. One such meeting, on self-government coalitions, was already held following the June election. The UW leader spoke then with Wieslaw Chrzanowski, Jaroslaw Kaczynski, and Kazimierz Ujazdowski.

However, UW is dominated by the supporters of the concept of fielding a party candidate. Such a view is held, for example, by UW Presidium member Jan Litynski. He believes that talks with the right wing should have been held to sound out whether it would be willing to support a UW representative. UW has two candidates—Hanna Suchocka and Jacek Kuron.

The right wing, however, has its own favorite—Supreme Court President Adam Strzembosz. It does not think seriously about the idea that a compromise candidate fielded jointly by itself and UW should be a member of the latter.

Negotiations between UW and the PdP satisfy the Labor Union [UP]. It would readily support Jacek Kuron in the presidential election. However, it would do so on one condition: It cannot be a party candidate, fielded by UW; it must be a representative of an above-party social movement. According to UP politicians, the turnabout of UW in the direction of the right wing lessens the chances of Jacek Kuron, who is rather left-oriented, in his own grouping. Thus, it makes much more likely an election scenario that is very appealing to UP—the formation of social election committees for Jacek Kuron.

Litynski ignores such a possibility. According to him, Kuron will not run in the election without being anointed by the party. The UW politician can see the possibility of Kuron's attracting broader forces—on condition, however, that he is fielded by his own party and supported mainly by it. Such a scenario is not acceptable to UP.

SLD, PSL Still Lead in Opinion Polls

WS0609074194 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 5 Sep 94 p 2

[Article by Renata Wrobel: "Election Preferences: PBS Poll for RZECZPOSPOLITA; Voter Still Capricious"]

[Excerpts] Seven groupings in the Sejm, without the Confederation for an Independent Poland [KPN] but with Solidarity ["S"] and the Christian-National Union [ZChN]—this would be the configuration of the forces in the parliament if the elections had been held in August. In line with the results of the opinion poll carried out for our daily by the Public Opinion Research Institute, the groupings that won the September elections—the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] and the Polish Peasant Party [PSL]—would still be the strongest parties. The Freedom Union [UW] would occupy the third position, but its support would be rather small: It would only slightly exceed 10 percent. [passage omitted]

In most cases, the results obtained in August are very similar to the July results. This is what the results confirmed: the position of the SLD, stable for several months now; slowly increasing (or, rather, "recovering" after the May crisis) popularity of the PSL; lack of progress in UW in gaining new supporters (hopes to gain more voters, pinned on the unification of the Democratic Union [UD] and the Liberal-Democratic Congress [KLD], turned out to be false).

The Labor Union [UP] is maintaining a steady, 8- to-10-percent support level (except the sudden "increase" in June, which was not borne out in the next polls). The offensive of "S" (including the recent campaign of collecting signatures under the citizens' draft constitution) is turning out to be favorable to the union; it is visibly recouping its losses and increasingly often, just like in August, it exceeds

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the 5-percent level. The 5-percent requirement is also met by the Nonparty Bloc in Support of Reforms [BBWR] and the ZChN—this time fairly easily.

It can be seen, thus, how detrimental to the KPN were its internal disputes: It has been a long time since it managed to obtain more than 5 percent of the "votes." In August, its situation was really bad—it had only 3-percent support.

The Paradoxes of Unification

The ZChN is undoubtedly the strongest grouping in the right wing right now. The results achieved by the right wing in large towns and cities in the June self-government elections were hailed a success. However, there were many who cautioned against treating these results as the likely support in the parliamentary election. These warnings turned out to be true. Despite attempts to unite, the right wing is still seen by the average voter through the prism of disputes and splits, which are still quite numerous, and most of its groupings receive little support in opinion polls.

What is more, it may paradoxically turn out that, at least for the time being, the unification processes are working against the right wing. The Polish voter has difficulties trying to get used to new formations and names (this was also experienced by UW). If the election had been held in August, we might have seen a situation similar to the one that occurred after the September election, when the ZChN lost its chance to win parliamentary seats by running in the "Fatherland" coalition. It is not known whether the Alliance for Poland, a component of which is now the ZChN, would be able to exceed the 8-percent level the Electoral Law envisions for coalitions. [passage omitted]

The Polish voter is still capricious and unstable. In line with the poll, voters for the winners are the most faithful. The 85 percent of those who in September voted for the SLD would support this grouping once again; as for the September PSL voters, 72 percent of them would support the party. A large percentage of former UD supporters (70 percent) now supports UW. However, in the case of the former KLD, only 57 percent support the new party. Supporters of minor parties are more so than others inclined to abandon their former favorites. [passage omitted]

* * *

The poll was carried out on 13 and 14 August 1994 on a 1,025-person representative sample of adult inhabitants of the country.

Election Preferences (in percent)

	Aug 94	Jul 94	Jun 94
SLD	25	23	24
PSL	18	17	16
UW	13	12	14
UP	8	8	13
"S"	8	7	5
BBWR	6	6	5
ZChN	6	5	3

Minister Expresses Views on Zacharski Appointment

WS0509102294 Warsaw Radio Zet in Polish 0615 GMT 5 Sep 94

[Interview with Internal Affairs Minister Andrzej Milczanowski, by Krzysztof Skowronski, at the Radio Zet studio in Warsaw on the "Guest of Radio Zet" program—live]

[Excerpts] [Skowronski] [Passage omitted] Who will be the new chief of the civilian intelligence services?

[Milczanowski] So far preliminary steps have been taken; the initial verification of the candidates is continuing. However, it is too early to speak about this.

[Skowronski] Who are you going to consult with on the nomination?

[Milczanowski] We must say this clearly. It is the head of the Office of State Protection [UOP] who makes the appointment. However, I must naturally know about it, and it should be consulted with me. Now, in the situation that has developed, it must also be consulted both with the president and the prime minister.

[Skowronski] Why did you not do this when appointing Zacharski?

[Milczanowski] Well, you know, there is no such formal legal requirement. There is simply no such requirement. Now, let us not exaggerate as far as those consultations are concerned. Let me tell you that the issue of the *nomenklatura* system is coming back—in such a situation. Discussing means the return of the *nomenklatura* system. [passage omitted]

[Skowronski] Where did you get the idea to nominate Zacharski?

[Milczanowski] I believe he is a highly skilled professional. There is no doubt about his loyalty. He has proved his efficiency to many people both in Poland and abroad. The answer is simple and natural: the right man in the right place.

[Skowronski] However, did you not take into account the possible response not only in Poland but also abroad?

[Milczanowski] Yes, I certainly did, to a certain extent. I had to take it into account. However, I did not think there would be such a reaction. I heard such arguments: Well, yes, but for many people in the United States Zacharski is a symbol. My answer to this is simple: As you know, because Zacharski was handed over by the Americans to Poland in return for quite a significant number of agents who had been detained in Poland and not only in Poland, the reality has changed. I believe that certain symbols, also in the United

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States, should lose some of their glamour, or they should, in fact, disappear. [passage omitted]

[Skowronski] Do you control UOP?

[Milczanowski] Well, the law obliges me to exercise control over this office.

[Skowronski] However, do you actually exercise it?

[Milczanowski] I certainly do, to a certain extent.

[Skowronski] The nomination is said to have been leveled against Czempinski...

[Milczanowski, interrupting] No, no, it was not against Czempniski. You know, I smile when I read information in the press that, at the session of the Political Advisory Committee, Minister Milczanowski did not say a word to Minister Czempinski, which was supposed to mean a conflict. I want to declare the following: There is simply no such conflict. [passage omitted]

Ministers Differ, Break Off Council Session

WS0609101794 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 6 Sep 94 p 7

[Article by J.Cz.: "Council of Ministers Breaks Off Session; Pensions of Contention"]

[Excerpts] The Council of Ministers broke off its session yesterday during which a set of 14 laws concerning the "Strategy for Poland" was to be accepted. We have learned unofficially that the issue upon which the ministers disagreed [passage indistinct] of the Council of Ministers was the law on retirement and other pensions. The Government's Press Office, however, neither confirms nor denies this information. It also refuses to reveal any details of the session.

Before the Council of Ministers decided to put off the session until the following day, three bills as well as main points of yet another bill were accepted. These main points are the initial proposals of the Council of Ministers on the regulation of collective labor relations. The law will specify the scope of duties and powers of the tripartite commission for economic and social affairs.

The law on collective labor relations will also specify methods for resolving disputes between trade unions and employers. Strike actions are to be the last tool of struggle, used after all other forms of resolving controversial issues have failed. [passage omitted]

The official reason for breaking off yesterday's Council of Ministers session was the need to hold consultations with heads of the interministerial teams that are working on the bills concerning the implementation of "Strategy for Poland." [passage omitted]

Walesa Extends Greetings to Polish Farmers

LD0409164994 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1451 GMT 4 Sep 94

[Excerpts] Warsaw, 4 Sep—Here is the text of the speech made today by Polish Republic President Lech Walesa during the Harvest Home ceremonies on Jasna Gora, received from the president's Press Bureau:

The Polish countryside celebrates Harvest Home today, as is the old Polish custom. A day of joy at the completion of the harvest toil. A day of gratitude for the crops. To God and the land. Our own land. Polish land. [passage omitted]

May God repay you for your hard work, for your farmer's care of the Polish soil. For your love of it. For the harvest in this difficult year. These are not banal and ceremonial words. [passage omitted]

The Polish countryside lacks good, friendly words today. The Polish farmer hears more bad words. About obscurantism and backwardness. About not meeting the challenges. About lagging behind. About not understanding the spirit of the times and economic mechanisms.

These words are not new. The Polish peasant has been hearing them for years. Often from the same lips that called loyalty to traditional values "obscurantism." They make the peasant the sacrifical goat for their own incompetence. Ineffective ideas. Idiotic concepts. The peasant is today to blame for the bad agricultural structure, technical backwardness, and high food prices. As if the whole economic environment did not exist. As if there were no long-term "agricultural policy" and a processing industry weighed down by all of the mistakes of the socialist economy. As if the countryside were a Skansen museum in a thriving, industrial, modern country.

Not many people today perceive how much the countryside has contributed to the success of the Polish reforms. It was the Polish peasant who guaranteed the nation's bread at the critical time. The hardworking countryside did not collapse under the weight of the reforms, though it paid for them dearly. And it is still paying. This has to be remembered. And at least a "thank you!" should be said. [passage omitted]

The Polish farmer's prosperity does not depend on decisions by civil servants as much as on his competitors: French, Danish or German farmers. They must be taken on. They must be fought for customers. For your own livelihood, for your own prosperity. I believe that the Polish countryside will meet this challenge. But it must get support. [passage omitted]

Your have your own government. A peasant prime minister. Demand that your voice be heard in Warsaw. Demand of the government rational and logical actions, which will enable you to work effectively, which will make your effort and husbandry bear full fruit. As Churchill said during the war: "Democracy is the worst system—but nobody has thought of anything better." [passage omitted]

On the day of the Harvest Home festival, I sincerely thank the Polish countryside for its year-round toil. May God reward you!"

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Polish-EU Trade in Food Products Detailed

94EP0081A Warsaw RYNKI ZAGRANICZNE in Polish No 84, 14 Jul 94 p 6

[Article by Marian Zarzycki: "Polish Trade With the European Union in Food Products"]

[Text] The countries of the European Union are Poland's principal economic partner in trade in food products. Last year, they absorbed $953 million in Polish food products, which accounted for 57.9 percent of all Polish exports of such products, and they themselves accounted for 57 percent—that is, $1,286 million of Poland's imports of these products.

The volume and balances of such trade as well as the share of individual member countries of the EU therein are reflected in the data shown in the table below.

Trade in Food Products Between Poland and EU Countries

Country	Exports	Imports	Balance	Percentile Share	
				Exports	Imports
Germany	449,732	564,805	- 115,072	47.2	43.9
Netherlands	147,620	298,776	- 151,156	15.5	23.2
Italy	146,800	37,265	109,534	15.4	2.9
France	82,594	130,060	- 47,466	8.6	10.1
Great Britain	48,563	33,250	15,212	5.1	2.6
Denmark	26,364	87,221	- 60,587	2.8	6.8
Belgium	37,095	43,344	- 64,487	3.9	3.4
Spain	6,204	51,858	- 45,654	0.6	4.0
Greece	2,556	26,090	- 23,553	0.3	2.0
Ireland	3,993	12,933	- 8,939	0.4	1.0
Portugal	1,319	109	1,210	0.1	0.0
Luxembourg	214	122	92	0.0	0.0
Total EU	953,009	1,285,833	- 332,824		

The first four countries in the table (Germany, Netherlands, Italy, and France) accounted for 86.7 percent of the exports and 80.1 percent of the imports of food products. In contrast, trade with the last four countries in the table (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Luxembourg) has been insignificant (0.8 percent of exports and 3 percent of imports). Thus, in practice, trade takes place with the first eight countries and is dominated and fully represented, as regards trade structure, by the first four.

Germany

That country is Poland's principal partner in trade in food products. It accounts for 47.2 percent of Polish exports of these products and 43.9 percent of their Polish imports. The structure of the exports is quite diversified, with exports of commodities exceeding $1 million ranking first to 52d.

Ranking first in value of exports are fruit juices ($62 million). Frozen fruit ranks second ($55.3 million), followed by poultry meat and giblets, fresh, refrigerated, and frozen ($45.4 million), meat and cured meat products as well as products processed from meats other than poultry ($43.8 million), fresh vegetables other than onions ($16.2 million), and fresh fruit, other than apples and cherries ($15.8 million).

Other major exported commodities include condensed and powdered milk ($13.5 million), bird quills and down ($12.2 million), and frozen vegetables ($10.1 million). The eight commodities mentioned above account for altogether $213.2 million in exports or 47.4 percent of the total commodity exports to Germany.

The remaining commodities are: cattle on the hoof ($6.4 million); herbs for curative and cosmetic purposes ($6.0 million); seeds ($5.9 million); dried and shelled leguminous vegetables ($4.8 million); horses ($4.3 million); sheep and goats ($4.1 million); fresh fish ($3.9 million); dried, salted, and smoked fish ($3.5 million); live plants ($3.2 million); and alcoholic products ($2.6 million).

As can be seen from the above, the variety of commodities exported to the German market is extremely broad, with notable predominance of relatively unprocessed plant and animal products. The structure of these exports contains few processed food-industry products because that industry finds it difficult to compete with its extensive German counterpart, given the latter's longtime traditions and its manufacture of products of extremely high quality. In such a situation, the fact that the leading Polish commodity exported to the German market is fruit juices has a practically symbolic meaning because it points to the advances made in recent years in production and packaging.

As for imports from Germany, their range also is quite diversified (54 commodities in amounts worth more

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than $1 million each), although their structure differs from that of the exports. The dominant items in imports from Germany are feeds and grains. Imports of oilcake for feeds totaled $74.1 million, of barley $43.6 million, of wheat $31.2 million, and of rye $24.4 million. The value of imported coarse wheat flour and meat granulates as well as mixtures used to feed animals amounted to $29.9 million. Altogether, these five kinds of imports totaled $203.2 million—that is, about 36 percent of overall imports of food products from Germany.

The remaining commodities imported from Germany included chiefly coffee ($37.4 million); cheeses, yellow and white ($26.5 million); confectionery and chocolate products ($16.4 million); soups, bouillon, sauces, and spices ($16.2 million); processed and unprocessed tobacco ($11.4 million); fish fillets ($10.6 million); southern fruits ($10.4 million); soy oil ($8.4 million); yogurt and kefir ($6.9 million); and pork ($3.4 million).

A characteristic feature of the imports of food products from Germany is their exceptionally broad range and the predominance, aside from grains and feed mixtures, of processed food products. Thus, such imports indicate to Polish producers and exporters great opportunities for expansion on the international market on condition that the products offered are diversified and of attractive quality. The negative balance of this trade, which arose in 1993, was chiefly due to the drought in Poland and the attendant increased imports of grains from the German market.

Netherlands

The principal commodities exported to that market include (in millions of dollars) condensed and powdered milk (48.8); fresh, processed, and frozen fruits (25.2); fresh and frozen vegetables (14.6); butter (5.1); fruit juices (4.2); and cattle on the hoof (2.9). These six commodity groups account for $100.8 million or 68.8 percent of Polish exports to the Netherlands.

Imports from the Netherlands surpass Polish exports both in value ($151.2 million) and in diversity. As many as 54 of the commodities are imported in quantities exceeding $1 million each.

The principal commodities imported include soy oil ($27.8 million); animal feeds (24.9 million); confectionery and chocolate products ($15.2 million); fresh fish and fresh, refrigerated, and frozen fish fillets ($14 million); fresh and refrigerated tomatoes ($13.1 million); fresh, refrigerated, and frozen vegetables ($12.5 million); oilcake ($12.0 million; southern fruits ($12 million); live plants ($9.1 million); barley and rye ($4.9 million); fresh, refrigerated, and frozen pork ($4.5 million).

These 11 commodity groups account for $150 million in imports or 50.1 percent of overall imports of food products from the Netherlands. The remaining commodity groups include seeds and sowing material ($5.9 million); bulbs, roots, and tubers ($4.4 million); poultry ($3.2 million); birds' eggs ($3.0 million); yellow and white cheeses ($2.8 million); seed grain ($2.5 million); cacao beans ($2.0 million); peanuts ($1.9 million); and cut flowers ($1.8 million).

Italy

Polish exports to that country are mainly of horses ($68.1 million), cattle on the hoof ($35.6 million), and sheep and goats ($11 million). Thus, altogether, the exports of livestock totaled $114.8 million, or 78.0 percent of overall exports to Italy. Also exported were horse meat ($9.0 million), leguminous plants ($5.0 million), fresh and canned vegetables ($4.3 million), and fruits and nuts ($1.5 million). Noteworthy is the absence of processed food products from these exports.

Imports from Italy included southern fruits ($6.6 million), confectionery and chocolate products ($2.7 million), juices and extracts ($1.8 million), and fruit juices ($1.4 million). Unlike in the case of Germany and the Netherlands, we earned a positive balance of trade with Italy—$109 million.

France

The principal commodities exported to France in 1993 were: horses ($18.6 million), condensed and powdered milk ($16.0 million), poultry meat and giblets ($9.3 million), frozen fruit ($7.8 million), fresh fruit ($2.8 million), rape seeds ($2.8 million), fresh and canned vegetables ($2.2 million), and alcoholic beverages ($1.7 million). Altogether, these commodity groups accounted for $61.2 million or 73.7 percent of overall Polish commodity exports to France.

In imports from France, the principal commodities were: corn ($34.2 million), various processed foods not mentioned elsewhere ($21.6 million), wheat ($13.3 million), barley ($9.4 million), rye ($4.0 million), frozen beef ($5.3 million), refrigerated and frozen pork ($3.2 million), confectionery and chocolate products ($5.7 million), poultry meat and giblets ($2.0 million), alcoholic products other than wine ($1.5 million), and wine ($1.2 million). As can be seen, imports from France were dominated by grains (altogether $60.9 million), which accounted for about 47 percent of all such imports and was the principal reason that Poland's balance of trade in food products with France was negative, - $47.5 million. These increased imports of grain in 1993 were due to the drought in 1992.

Other Countries

In addition to the four countries considered above, Great Britain, Denmark, Belgium, and Spain were also of some importance as Poland's trading partners in food products. The exports to that "Other Four" last year totaled $118.2 million, and imports $215.7 million, thus resulting in a negative balance of trade for Poland ($97.5 million, of which Denmark accounted for $60.8 million and Spain for $45.6 million).

The principal commodities exported to these countries were as follows:

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—To Great Britain: frozen fruit ($10.4 million), condensed and powdered milk ($10.3 million), molasses of sugar refining ($6.6 million), processed meat products ($2.9 million), fresh and frozen vegetables ($3.1 million).

—To Denmark: frozen fruit ($9.6 million), oilcake ($2.5 million), fruit juices ($2.3 million), condensed and powdered milk ($1.2 million).

—To Belgium: condensed and powdered milk ($12.0 million), fresh and frozen fruit ($9.0 million), sheep and goats on the hoof ($3.1 million).

—To Spain: condensed and powdered milk ($1.5 million), dried and shelled leguminous plants ($1.2 million).

The principal commodities imported from these countries were as follows:

From Great Britain: frozen fish ($3.9 million), sugar ($3.0 million), palm oil ($2.5 million), wheat ($2.2 million), tea ($1.5 million).

From Denmark: fresh, refrigerated, and frozen pork ($31.6 million); meal, coarse flour, and meat granulates ($14.6 million); fresh, refrigerated, and frozen fish fillets ($7.7 million); poultry meat and giblets ($3.8 million); barley ($2.8 million); live plants ($2.4 million).

From Belgium: soy oil ($6.3 million), oilcake ($4.8 million), rice ($2.8 million), bananas ($2.7 million), feed mixtures ($1.9 million), fresh and refrigerated tomatoes ($1.7 million).

From Spain: citrus fruit, fresh and dried ($40.1 million); confectionery and chocolate products ($4.4 million); wine ($1.1 million).

* * *

An analysis of trade with the above four countries indicates that the principal reasons for its negative balance were the imports of citrus fruit from Spain and meat and feed mixtures from Denmark.

Noteworthy is the fact that the range of Polish food products offered for export is relatively limited and that they include few highly processed food products. It looks like we adapt ourselves to the markets (e.g., sheep and goats to Belgium and leguminous vegetables to Spain) instead of invading them with new attractive products based on a deliberate and long-term marketing strategy. The large number of outfits participating in Polish foreign trade is resulting in a lack of coordination between the volume of exports and imports, while the negative balances of trade with individual countries seem an elemental factor on which we exert no influence.

The conclusions ensuing from the German market are highly instructive: The considerable volume of our exports to that market and their unusually diversified range point to a huge latent potential for sales to other markets—on one condition, however. There is a need for a marketing analysis of markets, for selection of products to be offered to discrete markets, and for a marketing strategy for their sales. Without that modern approach, it will be difficult to augment our exports and eliminate our negative balance of trade with most of the countries of the European Union.

'SRP' Program: Help for Midsize State Firms

94EP0080A Warsaw POLITYKA (Privatization supplement) in Polish No 32, 6 Aug 94 p I

[Article by Joanna Solska: "Privatization: A Lifesaver: Every Third State Firm Is a Money Loser"]

[Text] Every third state firm operates in the red and, instead of making a profit, is piling up losses. None of the existing approaches to privatization offers such firms an opportunity to dig themselves out of the abyss. Such firms cannot be sold because no businessman is anxious to woo candidates for bankruptcy with the albatross of a growing debt slung around their necks. The poor performance of these firms also has disqualified them from the Mass Privatization Program. It could thus be said that the sentence on them has been pronounced, except that it is not known when it will be executed.

Yes, there is a delay because right now an opportunity has arisen for at least some of these enterprises to find their place in the market economy. This last-minute lifesaver is to be the SRP, or the Stabilization-Restructuring-Privatization Program.

A Drop in the Bucket

Ewa Freyberg, under secretary of state at the Ministry of Privatization, stressed that this program does not compete with the Program for Capitalized Privatization and the Mass Privatization Program but, rather, complements them because it is designed solely for the firms that do not qualify for those two other programs. The minister of privatization shall, on behalf of the State Treasury, make sure that this principle is adhered to.

Of course, it is not enough to be a candidate for bankruptcy in order to automatically qualify for the opportunity provided by participating in the SRP. Also decisive will be other, more difficult criteria.

By now it is known that this lifesaver will not be available for debt-laden giants of industry such as steel plants, shipyards, and mines. That is because the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which will be a coparticipant in the program, has specified that it is designed for midsize enterprises—that is, those with an annual volume of sales reaching 115 billion zlotys (about $5 million).

Candidates for the program are expected, above all, to provide a realistic plan for the recovery of their enterprises, to convince the "selectors" that, once that plan is carried out, the firm will perform well financially, meaning that its value will increase within five years to such a considerable extent that it will be easy to privatize and thus to earn a substantial income. The recovery program must also be accepted by the bank that is the

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enterprise's creditor. Thus, eligibility for the SRP will matter not only to the debtor but also to the creditor whom it still owes money.

The program also offers an opportunity for the banks, especially considering that the Law on the Financial Restructuring of Enterprises has not rescued all creditors from their troubles. For what of it if they reduced a substantial part of the debts owed them, considering that this has not helped the debtor much and he still cannot cope? Other banks that have become co-owners of the firms to whom they had loaned money often do not know what to do with their new possession.

The First Injection

The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development is pursuing programs similar to the SRP in Russia and Latin America. Their common feature is that they offer a substantial injection of capital to enterprises that no longer can find any other source of credit, even if their ideas on how to dig themselves out of the hole offer considerable chances for success.

Thus, first the enterprises with such ideas have to be identified. This will be handled by the EBRD, the Polish banks wishing to participate in the SRP, and the Agency for Industrial Development, Inc. The right to approve the candidates they identify belongs to the Minister of Privatization (who may withhold approval if a firm has already earlier been declared eligible for one or another of the National Investment Funds).

The pilot group is to consist of 20 to 40 enterprises, but, if the number of candidates meeting all of the required criteria is greater, there is no reason for disqualifying any.

Once the selectors say yes, the concerned enterprise will immediately afterward receive its first capital injection for performing its own "cure." That injection may be significant; it may amount to some 30 percent of an enterprise's annual sales volume. This money is provided by the EBRD, which also takes the risk of its becoming misused.

But financial support does not end therewith. An equivalent amount may be borrowed by the enterprise from the EBRD. These loans will be guaranteed by the State Treasury, meaning that both parties bear the risk.

Guarantees of Success

What are the guarantees for the success of this entire undertaking? Of course, there are none. But if we consider the chances for success, they are considerable.

The two principal reasons for the financial problems of enterprises are lack of funds and poor management. The SRP program eliminates or reduces to a minimum the former reason already at the outset, and thereupon it does the same to the latter reason.

The funds to be allocated by the EBRD for implementing this program are to be not just repaid to it but to be repaid with interest. The SRP is not a charitable project but an investment expected to make a profit.

That is, every enterprise qualifying for this program will simply be watched over, and its expenditures will be scrutinized for rationality.

The implementation of the Stabilization-Restructuring-Privatization Program is expected to take five years.

Technically, it will mean that the firms participating in the SRP will be grouped into joint-stock investment companies, whose charter founders will be the EBRD and the participating Polish bank or banks.

Shares in these companies can also be held by the State Treasury or the Agency for Industrial Development, Inc. And precisely such companies will attend to placing the bankrupt firms on their own feet, to managing them. As the need arises, they also will attend to locating qualified managers.

Following that period, the enterprises covered by the program should not only free themselves of the threat of bankruptcy but also stand solidly on their own feet. The EBRD and the Polish implementers of the program expect that the evaluation of these firms by the market will increase in measure with their recovery. Thus, these firms will become a commodity that can be easily sold for a good price. In other words, privatization will be the last stage of the program.

The bankrupt firms have run out of time. The sooner the pilot group is identified, the earlier the first score or two of sick enterprises will be given funds for their cure. Unless bureaucratic obstacles accumulate, this may happen as early as at the beginning of next year.

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Melescanu Interviewed About Ties With Hungary

AU0209162594 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 2 Sep 94 pp 1,3

[Interview with Romanian Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu by Peter Mag in Bucharest; date not given: "The Hungarian-Romanian Treaty Might Be Signed Next Year"]

[Text]*Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu does not see his imminent first official visit to Hungary as a thankless mission. He expects it to give positive momentum to the development of bilateral relations. He is not bringing a new Romanian draft text for the planned basic treaty, but he believes that, essentially, only "editing tasks" are left to do in connection with the passages that are still pending. According to Melescanu, rather than being a burden, the Funar party's [Romanian National Unity Party, PUNR] participation in the recently reshuffled Vacariou government can actually have a positive effect on the cabinet's work. Melescanu said all this in an exclusive interview to NEPSZABADSAG's Bucharest correspondent on the occasion of his visit to Budapest.*

[Mag] Do you share the view of Romanian press reactions that term your forthcoming visit to Budapest a "thankless mission?"

[Melescanu] No, not at all. To the contrary, I believe that I am facing a very pleasant mission. Especially because this will be the first official visit to Hungary of a Romanian foreign minister since the 1989 December revolution. In my view, this is a very important momentum in bilateral relations. In addition, the developments of this relationship enable me to say with moderate but well grounded hope that this visit can be a positive momentum in bilateral relations. As for the view presented in the same place for my benefit, claiming that Hungarian Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs's task is even less rewarding, well, I can say that I have had serious discussions with him on at least two occasions and even these occasions convinced me that he is a well qualified person who is able to meet any kind of difficult task with success. However, I emphasize that this is not such a difficult and especially not so unrewarding a task, either as regards bilateral relations or in connection with international conditions. In my view, the international context is favorable. The countries of the European Union are very much interested in encouraging the associated member states to have closer dialogue with the European Union and with one another. This is also reflected by the fact that the Balladur Plan—as the European stability pact was first called—was the European Union's first joint foreign policy. Encouraging dialogue among the associated members was its precise goal as well as the promotion of good-neighborly and cooperation agreements. In my view, in the field of domestic policy, political developments that can serve as a definite basis for this dialogue have taken place both in Hungary and Romania. Therefore, both the international and domestic conditions tend to be favorable rather than conducive to obstacles.

[Mag] You are accepting an invitation that was made a year ago. In your view, what developments have taken place in bilateral relations in this period?

[Melescanu] First of all, good progress has been made in the area of economic relations; Hungary is one of our most important partners. This has an undoubtedly positive effect. Our military relations have also been good and this is another positive element of bilateral relations. Internationally, I would like to mention two or three factors that, I am convinced, also have positive effects on bilateral relations. I have already mentioned the European stability pact. Similarly, I find Romania's membership in the Council of Europe and the Romanian ratification of the European Convention of Human Rights very important. It is also a noteworthy development that very significant progress has been made in drawing up the Council of Europe's national minority general agreement to which Romania has also contributed. In my view, all these factors create a good basis for speeding up the talks on the basic treaty and for approaching the several other problems in bilateral relations.

[Mag] If they have been drawn up, do you have with you the new Romanian version of the basic treaty or the two important sections in it that are still pending?

[Melescanu] First of all, I would like to use this visit for confirming and clarifying the Romanian Government's political determination to improve bilateral relations. This is a goal of my visit that has the political support of the Romanian parties—including the PUNR. On the other hand, on this occasion, we can outline the program of bilateral relations on issues in which we have a mutual interest. In addition to the basic treaty, we have many other issues to settle, including border crossing points and cultural and social cooperation. Actually, the memorandum or "record of tasks" that the two foreign ministries prepared earlier and which covers a broad range of the above issues can be a good starting point for preparing this program outline. And finally, although it might be too much to set deadlines, it would be good to mark certain time limits for solving issues that are to be included in this. In other words, it would be beneficial to establish a mechanism so that we know where we will meet, what issues we will discuss, and how we will act. I am not taking a new version of the text with me for the clauses that are still pending. A few months ago, we forwarded our proposal, our version, for the two pending clauses, and we are waiting for an answer, if there is one, without creating an issue out of it. I do not believe that we will discuss the text proposals on this occasion but an overall discussion in connection with them is possible.

[Mag] Is there any compulsory deadline for the completion and signing of the basic treaty?

[Melescanu] I do not think that there is such a deadline, but I think it would be very good to be able to sign the

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treaty by next spring, because, according to the plans, there will be a conference of countries participating in the European stability pact in Paris in 1995, a conference that will probably sum up developments connected with the stability pact. In my opinion, it would be very useful for both Romania and Hungary to come up with such a treaty in this perspective. I do not think that this is impossible because at the moment one can say that there are only formulation tasks left regarding the issues still open, both the border clause and the article regarding national minorities.

In view of the positions voiced recently, at this moment neither side has any serious reservations regarding the inclusion of these two provisions and regarding their stipulations. The only problem left is their formulation and finalization. This is only a matter of drafting, even though we are not talking here about simple matters. However, our expert colleagues can draft them quite rapidly. Even if, let us say, they do not reach the final solution, at least they can come up with certain versions and we could decide on these versions by the beginning of next year.

[Mag] At least three valid international agreements also signed by Romania and Hungary clearly declare the inviolability of the existing European borders and the ban on any modification of these borders by force. Why is then Romania sticking to the so- called border provision of the basic treaty?

[Melescanu] This is an important point of the treaty, even if the reference to these treaties is valid. I think that multilateral and general documents, some of them quite old, are one thing, and it is another thing to have a bilateral legal commitment included in an internationally valid treaty. Here we are primarily speaking about the ceremonial nature of accepting this commitment. Besides, in my opinion, the inclusion of such a stipulation in a treaty can be a rather important key to solving other issues. A clear recognition of the renunciation of territorial demands could remove many other things that some people are still interpreting in the light of possible future territorial demands. In any case, the inclusion of such a legal-political provision in the treaty is extremely important in terms of the mentality with which Romanian- Hungarian relations are regarded by Romanian society. The Romanian public wants to see these relations as secure and guaranteed. I repeat: Such a provision could psychologically solve many small questions, such as the issue of consulates.

[Mag] You have recently held consultations with two Romanian parliamentary parties about your visit to Budapest and issues connected with the basic treaty. How do you evaluate the positions of the two parties, namely the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [RMDSZ—UDMR in Romanian] and the PUNR regarding the issues discussed?

[Melescanu] In my opinion, both political forces support the cause of the basic treaty and both of them are striving to stress the positive role that this treaty could play in bilateral relations and in events within the two countries. The position of the PUNR has a general character and that of the RMDSZ covers a lot of concrete elements that, in my opinion, cannot be included in a 10- page treaty.

[Mag] Mr Melescanu, do you think that the inclusion of the PUNR in the Vacaroiu cabinet overly burdens your diplomatic luggage?

[Melescanu] I am aware of the relevant foreign speculations. However, I greatly rely on two foreign reactions: One of them is an American and very neutral opinion that "this is their business, and we will judge them according to their deeds and not according to their words." The other is the opinion of a Hungarian public dignitary whose name I cannot disclose because he gave his opinion unofficially. This Hungarian opinion is approximately the following: We are a pragmatic government and we will judge you according to how you develop and advance.

Chamber of Deputies Elects Standing Bureau

AU0509195194 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1900 GMT 5 Sep 94

[Text] The Chamber of Deputies met today in its first plenary meeting of the second ordinary session this year. It elected the composition of the new Standing Bureau, in accordance with the provisions of Article 61, paragraph two, of the Constitution. Messrs. Dan Martian, Social Democracy Party of Romania [PDSR]; Ion Ratiu, National Peasant Christian Democratic Party [PNTCD]; Radu Berceanu, Democratic Party [PD]; and Ioan Gavra, Romanian National Unity Party, were elected to the position of vice presidents of the Standing Bureau. Messrs. Ovidiu Petrescu, PDSR; Emil Putin, Social Democratic Party of Romania; Ladislau Borbely, Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania; and Mircea Musat, Greater Romania Party were elected as secretaries. Messrs. Emil Stoica, PDSR; Ioan Muresan, PNTCD; Cristian Radulescu, PD; and Gheorghe Raducanu, from the Parliamentary Group of the National Minorities Other Than the Hungarian One, were elected as questors.

According to our parliamentary correspondent Ioan David, late in the evening, the Standing Bureau of the Chamber of Deputies, chaired by Speaker Adrian Nastase, met in its first session to establish the agenda and working schedule for this week.

The deputies will meet tomorrow morning to approve the activity schedule and the agenda, after which they

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will carry on their activity within the various standing commissions.

The next plenary session will take place on 7 September.

Spokesman Says Iliescu Feels Well, Resumes Work

AU0209132994 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1000 GMT 2 Sep 94

[Text] At the beginning of a news conference at Cotroceni Palace today, Ambassador Traian Chebeleu, the Romanian Presidency spokesman, told reporters that after his convalescence and vacation, President Ion Iliescu is feeling well and has a very intensive schedule for the coming period.

Yesterday the head of state started meetings with the presidents of the two chambers of the Romanian Parliament, with the prime minister and members of the government and soon he will resume consultations with political leaders. As far as his foreign activity is concerned, President Iliescu will receive important foreign delegations.

Regarding the head of state's visit to Asia scheduled for this month, Mr. Chebeleu said that it had been postponed until the beginning of next year, but the rest of his schedule connected with foreign affairs has not been changed.

Questions by several reporters referred to the recent government reshuffle. The presidential spokesman said that, according to the president, this is basically the same government that proposes to apply the same program. The reshuffle is aimed at making the government's work more effective.

[In a later report, Bucharest Radio says Iliescu received at Cotroceni Palace the Vietnamese deputy prime minister, Tran Duc Luong, and the secretary general of the Club of Rome, Bertrand Schneider.]

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Sniper Fire Reported Near Papal Mass Site

LD0409174094 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 4 Sep 94

[Text] Snipers opened fire today on UN soldiers who were working in a location a few hundred meters from the stadium where the pope is expected to celebrate mass, UN Spokesman Dacre Holloway says. This morning fire was opened on the headquarters of the Danish unit which was working near Zetra stadium, he added. They came under fire between 0900 and 1100 this morning. The Danish soldiers returned fire. No casualties or damage have been reported. The incident took place at the northern side of the stadium where skating events were held during the 1984 Olympics. The pope is expected to celebrate mass at the southern wing of Zetra stadium on Thursday. The UN spokesman could not say which side fired.

Serbs Increase Provocations

AU0609104794 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 6 Sep 94

[Text] As the visit to Sarajevo by the Holy Father, Pope John Paul II, is drawing closer, the Chetniks on the hills around the town are becoming increasingly vicious and nervous. They are frequently targeting with antiaircraft and infantry weapons both the defense lines and the residential areas on Sarajevo's outskirts.

In the most recent attacks on the Jewish Cemetery, a Jewish chapel was visibly damaged with a grenade. As usual, UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] again silently ignored the Chetnik orgies in the town, which is awaiting for the proven peacemaker and friend with open arms.

Shots Fired at Airport

AU0609101794 Paris AFP in English 0940 GMT 6 Sep 94

[Text] Sarajevo, Sept 6 (AFP)—Gunmen from both the Serb and Bosnian government armies fired into the air as planes approached Sarajevo airport to land, in an act of provocation ahead of the pope's visit, UN officials said Tuesday.

UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) spokesman Lieutenant Sebastien Paquier said that the shots, fired Monday, were the first at the airport since the begining of the month and were considered "provocation" ahead of Pope John Paul II's planned visit to the Bosnian capital Thursday.

"Various gunmen of the two sides shot in the air during aircraft movements. It is the first time (this has happened) since September 1," Paquier said.

The airport stayed open during the incident, allowing all flights, including UNPROFOR humanitarian aid planes, to take off and land.

UNPROFOR troops are to take part in general security exercises Tuesday to prepare for the papal visit.

Bosnian government and Serb forces agreed August 14 to stop threatening flights at Sarajevo's airport, but the accord has been violated several times.

Serbs Refuse To Guarantee Pope's Security

LD0309141094 Rome RAI Televideo Teletext in Italian 1342 GMT 3 Sep 94

[Text] The Bosnian Serbs have refused to guarantee security during the visit which the pope is to make to Sarajevo next Thursday.

Buha, "foreign minister" of the self-proclaimed Srpska republic of Bosnia, today met the apostolic nuncio, Mgr. Monterisi, in Pale. The minister said that "the Serbs cannot take responsibility for any possible attacks carried out by Muslims."

Izetbegovic To Ask Pope for Catholic Support

LD0509222194 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2000 GMT 5 Sep 94

[Text] [Announcer] Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency, today discussed the pope's visit in an interview with the Italian TV studio Aperto. We have selected the following excerpt for our program.

[Begin recording] [Unidentified correspondent in Italian with superimposed translation] What is your opinion on the Catholic pope's visit to your country following 887 days of siege under the motto of: We are together with you?

[Izetbegovic] This is certainly a great day for Sarajevo and its people. We can be grateful to the pope for helping us not to feel lonely throughout this period of misfortune, these 887 days.

[Correspondent] Is the pope coming too late? What is your opinion.

[Izetbegovic] It is never too late to do a good deed. The pope has not really been absent throughout this period. It is a well-known fact that he has repeatedly mentioned Bosnia and advocated Bosnia's case. He has done this on several occasions from [words indistinct] and other places. Hence, his presence here in Bosnia.

[Correspondent] What are you going tell the pope when you meet him?

[Izetbegovic] First, I am going to thank him for everything he has so far done for Bosnia, this is something I have to do on behalf of Bosnia and its people. Second, I will ask him to call on the Catholic world, the world's Catholics to remain on Bosnia's side, to exert pressure on the public, and via the public on their governments, to support the future Bosnia and its just cause. [end recording]

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Leaders Brief Holbrooke, Izetbegovic Comments

AU0509092294 Paris AFP in English 0859 GMT 5 Sep 94

[Text] Sarajevo, Sept 5 (AFP)—Senior U.S. official Richard Holbrooke went into talks here Monday [5 September] with leaders of Bosnia-Herzegovina's shaky U.S.-backed federation, which is in danger of foundering amid mutual recrimination.

Holbrooke, assistant secretary of state for European affairs, met the federation's Croat president, Kresimir Zubak, and its Moslem vice president Ejup Ganic at the presidency building in central Sarajevo.

The U.S. official was due later to hold separate talks with Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic.

Holbrooke made no comment to waiting journalists on his arrival for the series of meetings, which was to include the heads of the generals joint staff, Croat General Ante Rosso and his Moslem counterpart Fikret Muslimovic.

During his trip Holbrooke—the most senior U.S. official to visit Sarajevo since Madeleine Albright, the US envoy to the United Nations—is expected to impress on the Croat and Moslem sides that only federation institutions will benefit from any future lifting of the arms embargo against the former Yugoslavia.

The federation is under severe strain at the moment with each side accusing the other of dragging its feet in implementing the federation agreement, the keystone of U.S. policy in the former Yugoslavia.

Meanwhile, Izetbegovic, in an interview with the Croatian daily SLOBODNA DALMACIJA carried by Sarajevo's OSLOBODENJE newspaper, blamed the Croats for the failure so far of the federation to take shape.

He said Croat political parties, humanitarian organisations and the largely Croat Roman Catholic church were free to operate in areas controlled by the Moslem-dominated Bosnian army, but charged the Croats had failed to reciprocate in areas they controlled.

"Our people and vehicles go through the Austrian and German border more easily than through the HVO (Croat forces) checkpoint south of Mostar," Izetbegovic complained, a reference to the southern city where Moslems and Croats fought a bitter war before the federation agreement was concluded in March.

"The HVO has kept under its control all border crossings between Croatia and Bosnia and has kept all the incomes of the custom duties which is an enormous amount of money," which is used to fund Croat military and political structures, he said.

"The only thing I know for sure is that it cannot continue like this anymore," he warned.

Izetbegovic said he would travel to the United States and Croatia to ensure they were still committed to the federation argeement.

Official Views Federation, Criticizes Croats

AU0509203894 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 5 Sep 94

[Text] Becoming acquainted with the work of the Zenica-Doboj cantonal coordinating committee for the implementation of the Constitution of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, the level accomplished so far, and planned activities were the topics of today's news conference by Bedrudin Salcinovic, chairman of the coordinating committee for the Zenica-Doboj Canton. [Name indistinct] reports from Zenica:

[Begin recording] The basic tasks of the cantonal coordinating committees and thus the Zenica-Doboj cantonal coordinating committee, comprised of Semsudin Mehmedovic and Franjo Bratic from Tesanj, Mirvana Hadzimurtezic, and Petar Alija from Vares and Sefik Zvekic from Zepce, is to accelerate the preparations for the setting up of the cantonal legislative offices, pass the cantonal constitution, elect other transitional authorities, and cooperate with the municipal coordinating committees, Bedrudin Salcinovic, chairman of the coordinating committee for the Zenica-Doboj Canton, said at the news conference today.

To accomplish one of the most important tasks—the completion of the cantonal constitution—a team consisting of top experts in this domain has been formed. However, what the correspondents were interested in most was the level reached in the implementation of the federation's constitution so far.

Regarding the transformation of municipalities, Mr. Salcinovic said that out of the 11 complete and three partial municipalities that this canton entails, transitional municipal councils have not been formed in three of them—Zepce, Vares, and Maglaj. The responsibility for the failure to fulfill these obligations in these municipalities lies in the lack of cooperativeness by the Croatian peoples, which Mr. Salcinovic supported with concrete data from Maglaj, where the Croatian Democratic Community until now showed no interest in taking part in the election of the transitional authorities, although, according to the report from Maglaj, their posts are still waiting for them.

One of the fundamental tasks and, at the same time, also a precondition for the resolution of the above problems is the return of expelled persons and refugees to their homes. Even though this is a difficult task, we will work on it continuously and persistently because the creation of a permanent dialogue between the Croats and the Bosniaks is our fundamental task, said Bedrudin Salcinovic, chairman of the Zenica-Doboj cantonal coordinating committee, at today's news conference. [end recording]

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Krajisnik, RSK's Vojnica Discuss 'Unification'

LD0409231994 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2112 GMT 4 Sep 94

[Text] Pale, 4 September (TANJUG)—This evening in Pale Momcilo Krajisnik, president of the people's assembly of the Srpska republic, and Branko Vojnica, president of the people's assembly of the republic of Serb Krajina [RSK] in Croatia, discussed the results of the recent referendum on the Contact Group's peace plan, the earlier initiative for the all-Serb unification, and the current situation.

"We are continuing work on the initiative for the unification of all Serb lands. We are very eager to see what we can do in that respect, to see which specific moves we can make now," Vojnica told journalists, briefly explaining why he came to Pale.

Explaining that the talks represent continued cooperation between the Srpska republic and the RSK, in reaction to the blockade and international pressures on the Srpska republic, Krajisnik expressed readiness to hold talks with both Serbia and Montenegro, recalling the initiative for all-Serb unification.

Expressing gratitude to the RSK for its unreserved understanding and support, Krajisnik noted that that the assembly of the Srpska republic had decided, regarding unification, to wait for a month for an answer, and if its answer is negative or if there is no answer the RSK and the Srpska republic will embark on a procedure for their international recognition.

Following this, "we can unite as sovereign and internationally recognised states in keeping with the people's will," Krajisnik explained. He pointed out that there was a readiness to "go independently" and said "we can no longer bow to pressure from the international community."

Krajisnik explained that if Serbia and Montenegro fail to accept the proposal for unification there "are a number of alternatives."

He made it clear: "The alternative is to unite all of the Serbian lands without federal units. If Serbia and Montenegro do not accept this we do not want to create a new nation of western Serbs."

He then went on to say that the Srpska republic and the RSK as internationally recognized countries would unite at a later stage with Serbia and Montenegro which, as Krajisnik stressed, "is pivotal for all-Serbian unification."

UN Plan To Retreat From Bosnia Confirmed

AU0209203894 Paris AFP in English 1942 GMT 2 Sep 94

[Excerpts] United Nations, Sept 2 (AFP)—UN Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali confirmed the existence of a UN plan for retreat from Bosnia, but said he could envision such a pullout only as a last resort.

In an interview with AFP, Butrus-Ghali underscored that there was currently no question of pulling UN troops out. UN personnel were first dispatched to the former Yugoslavia in 1991 when civil war broke out.

Confirmation of the pullout plan comes at a time when several European countries—primarily Britain and France which have ground troops in the area—have threatened to haul their forces out of Bosnia if the arms embargo against the Moslem factions in Bosnia is lifted. [passage omitted]

Butrus-Ghali said several months ago he asked UN military leaders in the former Yugoslavia to "prepare a plan, in case certain states decided to leave."

"This is not to say that we are absolutely going to use this plan, but the plan is there," he said. "It is a fallback position," he added, "so that the states themselves are not taken by surprise."

At the moment, Butrus-Ghali said, "I have decided on my own initiative to ask (Thorvald) Stoltenberg to continue negotiations and contacts with the principal protagonists among the Bosnian Serbs to try to convince them to accept the Contact Group plan" on Bosnia.

'About 700' Muslim Refugees Arrive in Bugojno

LD0309174394 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 3 Sep 94

[Excerpt] It has been announced from Bosanska Krajina that 700 Bosniaks have been driven out. Here is a report from the press center of the 7th Corps:

[Unidentified correspondent] The expulsion of Bosniak-Muslim people from the temporarily occupied areas of Bosanska Krajina is continuing. It was announced late this afternoon in Turbe that about 700 Bosniak-Muslim refugees from Banja Luka, Prnjavor, Kljuc, Prijedor, Ljubija, Sanski Most, Celinac, and other parts of Bosanska Krajina have crossed into the free area of the Travnik municipality.

After crossing onto the free territory of the Republic of Bosnia- Herzegovina and the implementation of the usual formalities, they were sent to a reception center in Bugojno. This is the fourth group of refugees from Bosanska Krajina in the last 30 days. [passage omitted]

UN Accuses Muslims of Shelling Sarajevo Airport

AU0509104694 Paris AFP in English 1029 GMT 5 Sep 94

[Text] Sarajevo, Sept 5 (AFP)—The United Nations accused Monday [5 September] the Moslem-dominated government forces of shelling Sarajevo airport last month, forcing a four-day suspension of the humanitarian airlift into the besieged city.

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Lt.-Colonel Pierre Ducros said an investigation by the UN Protection Force here showed the mortar shell had been fired from Bosnian government positions on August 18.

He said the mortar was fired from a Bosnian position south of the airport.

President's Office Responds

LD0509205794 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2000 GMT 5 Sep 94

[Text] We have received the following statement from the office of the president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency: We have been informed that the BBC reported in one of its programs today that UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] has accused the Bosnia-Herzegovina army for the recent shelling of Sarajevo airport. We resolutely deny this claim, aimed at compromising Bosnia-Herzegovina and its army and undermining the pope's visit to Sarajevo. We reiterate that Pope John Paul II is a welcome guest, and that the relevant institutions of Bosnia-Herzegovina will do everything for that visit to pass with absolutely no incidents. This is said in a statement from the office of the president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency.

TANJUG Report

LD0509172094 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1714 GMT 5 Sep 94

[Text] Belgrade, Sept. 5 (TANJUG)—The United Nations Protection Force [UNPROFOR] said Monday the Muslims were responsible for the August 18 shelling of Sarajevo airport, Bosnian Serb agency SRNA said on Monday.

SRNA quoted Milenko Indjic, the Bosnian Serb army's liaison officer with the U.N. troops, as saying that UNPROFOR had denied Muslim charges that the Bosnian Serbs had shelled U.N. troops at the airport.

SRNA quoted Indjic as saying that UNPROFOR's report had caused 'a storm of protests by the Muslims.'

UNPROFOR said the August 18 shelling of the airport had stopped all supplies to the population for four days.

The Muslims have many times unfoundedly blamed the Bosnian Serbs for the crimes in Sarajevo in an attempt to provoke a NATO intervention. However, international observers have almost always determined that the Muslims were responsible for the incidents.

Muslim Attacks on Serbian Residential Areas

LD0509173894 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1722 GMT 5 Sep 94

[Text] Belgrade, Sept. 5 (TANJUG)—The Bosnian Serb SRNA news agency said Monday that Bosnian Serb residential areas in Sarajevo were the target of Muslim fire late on Sunday.

The agency also said Muslim forces had continued a heavy offensive against Bosnian Serb localities on the Nisic plateau, 20 km north of Sarajevo.

Muslim troops continued Monday an overall infantry attack on Bosnian Serb defences on the Kupres plateau, western Bosnia, SRNA said.

Two Bosnian Serb soldiers were lightly wounded in an attack in this area on Sunday.

The agency also reported Monday Muslim artillery attacks on Bosnian Serb positions at Srbobran (formerly Donji Vakuf) and Mt. Vlasic in central Bosnia, and Novi Grad (formerly Bosanski Novi) in northwestern Bosnia.

In northern Bosnia, Muslim troops opened small arms fire late on Sunday and early on Monday, while Bosnian Croat troops opened fire from anti-aircraft weapons on Bosnian Serb defences around Orasje.

Bosnian Serb positions around the western Bosnian town of Krupa na Uni came under Muslim small arms fire late on Sunday, SRNA said.

SRNA quoted United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Spokesman in Belgrade Yoko Nashimura as saying aid had been sent Monday morning from Belgrade to Serbs in the eastern Bosnian towns of Srbinje (formerly Foca), Bratunac, Vlasenica and Sokolac.

The aid, about 100 tons of food supplies packed in eight UNHCR trucks, will also be distributed in the Herzegovina towns of Trebinje and Kalinovik, she said.

Nashimura said 70 tons of relief aid had arrived in the Muslim enclave of Gorazde in southeastern Bosnia from Belgrade on Sunday without any problems.

UN 'Silent Observers' of Continuing Serb Attacks

AU0609110694 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 6 Sep 94

[Text] The Chetniks are still violating the antisniping accord that was signed in Gorazde on 28 August in the presence of the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces]. Enes Musovic reports:

[Musovic] The sniper activities inside the 3 km zone continued this morning. The settlements of Dzindici, Stupi, Perjani, Potrkusa, Mravnjaci, and Vranici were subjected to particularly fierce sniper fire. In addition to snipers, the aggressor is also using antiaircraft and infantry weapons. The consequence of the Chetnik attacks on this region this morning is one seriously wounded person.

Apart from attacking civilian areas, the Chetniks are also attacking the lines of separation in this area using antiaircraft and infantry weapons. They are also using mortars of all calibers. All this is happening in front of UNPROFOR members, who are only the silent observers of the suffering of the people in the free territory of the Gorazde region.

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According to the UNHCR information, a convoy with food is expected to arrive today.

Serbs Intensifying Attacks on Brcko Front

AU0609093294 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 0800 GMT 6 Sep 94

[Report by Hamiz Deronjic and Nijaz Salihovic]

[Excerpts] After a brief period of relative lull on the Brcko front, the Serbian aggressor stepped up combat activities last night. The target of the enemy's infantry and antiaircraft weapons were all lines of the Brcko defense. The Chetniks attacked the Vranovca region from the direction of Cadjavac, using 60-mm and 82-mm mortars. Using 82-mm shells, the enemy also targeted the Bodariste area. [passage omitted]

The Serbian aggressor's attacks on free Brcko territory last night passed without any consequences.

'Horrific' Serb Shelling of Bihac Continues

LD0509204294 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2000 GMT 5 Sep 94

[Excerpts] Another day of war is coming to an end. The aggressors against Bosnia-Herzegovina have tried to push back the defense lines and kill as many people of Bosnia-Herzegovina as possible. Unfortunately, there have been casualties today, but the defense lines of the Bosnia-Herzegovina army are now impenetrable.

The attacks on the Bihac region have been stepped up. Karadzic's chetniks tried to push back the defenders south of Bihac and on the Grmusa-Srbljani plateau, while Martic's men and a few of Fikret Abdic's supporters tried to infiltrate sabotage groups into the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The 5th Corps did not allow them to take it by surprise, and, as General Atif Dudakovic recently said, the lines can now be changed only to the advantage of the Bosnia-Herzegovina army. In impotent rage, the aggressors targeted civilian areas and caused huge casualties among civilians. Frenzied attacks are still going on. Mirza Sadikovic reports:

[Sadikovic] According to still incomplete reports, around 100 civilians—mainly women and some children—have been wounded in today's horrific shelling of the Bihac area, the still formally UN protected zone. Artillery attacks (?using) Orkan multiple rocket launchers did not cease all day, but were stepped up in the late afternoon and early evening. The Cazin municipality and the Buzim area are being targeted. There is great damage to buildings.

Fresh protests were sent to the UN Protection Force this afternoon to no avail, demanding that the UN Security Council be informed about chetnik savagery directed toward civilians. [passage omitted]

The aggressor did not dare launch an infantry attack against the Olovo defense lines, but opened artillery and antiaircraft fire, killing one civilian and wounding another. [passage omitted]

Civilians Killed

AU0609090394 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 0800 GMT 6 Sep 94

[Report by Mirza Sadikovic]

[Text] (?After) the bestial and wild attacks by Karadzic's Chetniks on the Bihac region yesterday and last night, when nearly 100 civilians were killed by shells and missiles that landed on the settlements around [word indistinct] Cazin, and Buzim, the attacks resumed early this morning. Karadzic's Chetniks attacked the defenders lines on Grmusko-Srbljanski plateau, especially on the Grabez part of the front, carrying out combined artillery-infantry attacks.

Hundreds of howitzer, mortar, and tank shells landed on that region within a very short period of time. Then they started to shell Bihac and its outskirts, especially roads. The offensive on this UN protected zone has been going on with unremitting ferocity for five days, (?despite) the cries and protests to the world public to protect the civilians, of whom a fairly large number were killed this morning.

We do not have the number of casualties at present considering that the bestial shelling is still underway.

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Akashi Told of Willingness To Extend UN Mandate

LD0509154994 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1500 GMT 5 Sep 94

[Text] We have just received a report that Mate Granic, deputy prime minister and foreign minister, and Interior Minister Ivan Jarnjak have spoken with Yasushi Akashi the UN secretary general's special envoy, at the Foreign Ministry. They discussed the possible extension of the UN Protection Force's [UNPROFOR] mandate.

The Croatian ministers stressed that Croatia is willing to accept an extended mandate if the existing mandate is supplemented with provisions which will facilitate the gradual and peaceful reintegration of Croatia's occupied areas into the legal and constitutional system of the Republic of Croatia. The introduction of supervision on Croatia's borders with Serbia and the areas controlled by the Bosnian Serbs as well as the drafting of a concrete program for the gradual return of refugees to their homes in the temporarily occupied areas are of exceptional importance to Croatia.

Ministers Granic and Jarnjak discussed with Akashi the problem of refugees from Velika Kladusa. They agreed that the main aim is to send these people back to their homes and secure full protection and safety for them. Ministers Jarnjak and Granic pointed out to Akashi that in recent days there has been an increasing number of refugees from Velika Kladusa who have been persuaded by the local Serbs to move into the homes of the Croatians who were driven out, particularly in the so-called buffer zone controlled by UNPROFOR, a fact that is fueling justified protests among Croatian refugees.

Tudjman Receives Leaders of Bosnian Croats

LD0209153794 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 2 Sep 94

[Text] Croatian President Franjo Tudjman today received Kresimir Zubak, president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, and the political leadership of the Croats from the federation and the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna. The delegation informed President Tudjman about the pace and problems of implementing the Washington agreement while reiterating the resolve of the Croat people of Bosnia-Herzegovina and its political leadership to bring the federation as well as the confederation with the Republic of Croatia into being as soon as possible .

Expressing support for the efforts of the leaders of the Croat people in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Tudjman stressed in particular the need to consolidate the unity of the Croat people in Bosnia-Herzegovina as well as of all important political and other factors in securing strategic and national interests.

The talks were attended by Mate Granic, deputy prime minister and minister for foreign affairs; Defense Minister Gojko Susak; and Ivic Pasalic, adviser to the president of republic on internal affairs.

Silajdzic, Valentic Comment on Talks in Zagreb

LD0509192094 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 5 Sep 94

[Text] A working meeting between delegations of the governments of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina held this afternoon in Zagreb was yet another opportunity for the two countries to exchange views on their shared and open issues. Let us hear what the two prime ministers have told our reporter Sanja Kusec following their two-hour talks.

[Begin recording] [Kusec] Croatian TV, please could you briefly comment on today's talks in the light of the complexity of the problems between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. In this context, what is your comment on the development; i.e., the implementation of the federal constitution?

[Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic] The very fact that this meeting is being held means there are open issues we have to resolve. It is a good thing we have met. This meeting, we hope, is part of our preparations for a wider, top-level meeting in the near future. There are open issues regarding relations between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. We are resolving them in the best possible faith, with our best intentions. These questions are complex and multidimensional, as you yourself said.

Second, I could say there is an even larger number of open issues in the building of the Bosnia-Herzegovina federation. The federation is not materializing at the pace we would desire. We are here because we are aware relations between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia affect the emergence of the federation and the relations between the Bosniaks and the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina. We are here to resolve these issues in an open, constructive, and friendly way.

[Kusec] Are there any new details, information regarding Turanj, the refugees who are staying only three kilometers from Karlovac?

[Silajdzic] Unfortunately, at the moment there is no information. We, as Bosnia-Herzegovina's Government, have taken every step possible to explain to these people that, sadly, they have fallen prey to greater-Serbian propaganda, that in Velika Kladusa everything is prepared for their return, that there is an amnesty, declared by the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, covering everyone who took part in the fighting, and that people can safely return to their homes in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in Velika Kladusa, Cazin, and so forth.

[Croatian Prime Minister Nikica Valentic] Indeed, we discussed these serious problems, these consequences of Serb aggression. These talks are to continue, which only goes to show how seriously we began tackling these issues today. Unfortunately, the problems are so great that we could not expect to resolve them at one single meeting. It is important to outline our positions, to implement the

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Washington agreement, and to define relations between the Bosniaks and Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as relations between the Bosniak-Croat federation and Croatia.

Likewise, the problem of the refugees from Velika Kladusa is also unavoidable. As Mr. Silajdzic already said, we have agreed that the only solution for these people is to return to their homes. Mr. Silajdzic today offered the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government's guarantees for the safety of these people on their return to Velika Kladusa. We shall convene a top-level meeting to discuss these problems even more intensively and, we hope, resolve them. [end recording]

Deputy Prime Minister Views Refugee Crisis

AU0209165194 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 27 Aug 94 p 7

[Interview with Croatian Deputy Prime Minister Ivica Kostovic by Mirjana Priscan; place and date not given: "The Crisis Is Resolved Only by Their Return"]

[Text] "Last night they broke through an UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] barrier. Those from the column that was near the village of Turanj has now merged with a group of refugees that is accommodated in the rear, toward the occupied area. They are now applying the greatest pressure to enter Croatia." Such daily reports fill the days of the deputy prime minister of the Croatian Government, who is constantly following the human tragedy and concern weighing upon Croatia, caused by the exodus of refugees from Velika Kladusa. Some 40,000 or 20,000 refugees (depending on who, and at what moment, is estimating the situation at the hill near Turanj and in the UN Protection Areas [UNPAs], where open-air refugees camps have been put up) still do not want to go back to Velika Kladusa, despite all the appeals made by the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Croatian Government is advising them to accept the guarantees given for their safe return. In the meantime, at Turanj there are no longer 600 or 900 refugees, but as many as 5,000. How the Croatian Government will overcome this new refugee crisis, what is happening with the pilot projects for the refugees' return to the "blue zones," and what the reactions are to the refugees' action called Blockade, which has drawn attention to the quite concrete demands of those people without homes—we discussed these questions with Ivica Kostovic, deputy prime minister of the Croatian Government.

The Manipulation of Refugees

[Priscan] The refugees accommodated in the UNPas and in the demarcation zone near Turanj do not want to return to Velika Kladusa. Obviously, Babo [nickname of Fikret Abdic] and his people are in symbiosis.... Do you see any solution?

[Kostovic] The refugees who are politically clearly defined as Abdic's flock are not listening to any guarantees for their safe return given by the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the UNHCR, UNPROFOR, or the 5th Corps of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina [B-H Army]. They vehemently insist on being allowed into Croatia. They are being actively politically indoctrinated and they are being manipulated. It is precisely this that prevents us from adequately settling the humanitarian crisis that has been brought about by the mass exodus from Velika Kladusa.

Every refugee dreams about returning to his or her home. The French battalion stationed in Velika Kladusa is also guaranteeing safety to the refugees, while the 5th Corps has also withdrawn from the town, and only the police remain there. In addition, the return of the refugees is also a vital political interest of the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina, because thereby the intentions of the Krajina Serbs to saddle us by any means with yet another wave of refugees would be frustrated, as well as Abdic's political goals, on which I do not want to comment. We have provided the refugees at Turanj with everything that we could, with food and medical assistance, and I really do not know that any other refugee camp has been so well taken care of as this one. And now the refugees have even started moving into vacant Croatian houses in the demarcation zone! Our General Staff has lodged a protest. It is out of the question for the refugees to move into any of the houses in the demarcation zone, because it is precisely this zone around Turanj that is proposed for the return of our refugees by pilot projects that are being worked out right now.

I do not want to comment on Abdic's policy, but the refugees from Velika Kladusa are being extremely unfairly held on Croatian territory, where they are now being accommodated in open-air camps. We are proposing them a permanent solution, for them really the best one: to return.

Already in Croatia

[Priscan] In political and humanitarian terms, what would it mean for Croatia if the refugees from Velika Kladusa remained in the UNPAs if they were totally unwilling to go back home?

[Kostovic] Croatia cannot physically afford that. Look, we are going through a refugee crisis! It has been three years now since the refugees left their homes. They cannot return, while since Christmas refugees from Banja Luka have been arriving in Croatia in great numbers. There are already 6,000 of them, while, according to international estimates, by the end of the year we can expect some 5,000 to 15,000 more. At the same time, refugees with Croatian passports are being sent back from abroad.

According to international standards, that 10 percent of population has registered as refugees, as is the case with Croatia, is already a good enough reason for the greatest alarm. And what is now happening in the demarcation zone near Turanj is absolutely unacceptable! UNPROFOR should not have let the refugees from

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Velika Kladusa move into Croatian houses. All this probably has to do with Serbs' intention to cause an incident between the Croats and Muslims.... The refugees that are now accommodated in the UNPAs must go back to Velika Kladusa; there is no other solution! And there is no excuse for them still being there. The French battalion is in Velika Kladusa and the refugees' safe return is assured by all possible guarantees.

The Croatian strategy is clear: Even when in the UNPAs the refugees are still on Croatian territory. Let them make it possible for us to go into the UNPAs and settle the problem; we will take care of the refugees as long as it is necessary. Do they really think that Martic and Mikelic [Serbian Krajina leaders] should play the role of an international factor to refugees who are on Croatian territory? This is yet another situation where the Serbs have proven themselves incapable. They are not able to take care of the refugees from Velika Kladusa either in material terms or in medical terms, because they eat the UNHCR food themselves!

Nothing Will Be Done Forcibly

[Priscan] Is there a possibility that the refugees from Kladusa might be forcibly returned home?

[Kostovic] No! We are not allowed into the area where the majority of refugees are accommodated now, while the UNHCR has never sent any refugee back home forcibly. It is a humanitarian principle. The refugees ought to be returned to Velika Kladusa gradually, by reassuring them and giving them proof that they will be safe back there.

[Priscan] Why is the Croatian Government advising the refugees to trust the guarantees given by the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the staff of the 5th Corps of the B-H Army?

[Kostovic] In the first place, it is not a betrayal of those people or of our good relations with them. After all, throughout the war we were sending relief goods there. Put simply, we told all the international mediators and the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina in advance that we could not take in so many refugees. Then we analyzed the course of events; we did not make the decision precipitously or under any pressure. Also, the reports sent by the French battalion and UNPROFOR officials are extremely favorable: There is no danger to civilians in Velika Kladusa. The 5th Corps of the B-H Army has withdrawn and international observers are there.... For God's sake, we would not send those people to their deaths!

Documentation on Smuggling by UNPROFOR

[Priscan] What do you think the [Croatian] refugees have achieved by blocking the UNPROFOR checkpoints?

[Kostovic] I think that the most important thing is that they have shown everybody, as well as themselves, that they are capable of carrying out such a peaceful, but very significant action. Second, they have attracted attention to their problem. Not the attention of the Croatian Government, for it is quite familiar with it, but that of UNPROFOR and the international public. They have shown the depth of their crisis and their desires. Also, they have succeeded in proving themselves a trustworthy factor. Because, when they were given guarantees that the Croatian police would check everything that goes into the occupied regions, they turned out to be quite cooperative.

[Priscan] After the blockades, what did the government find out about cases of oil smuggling, as well as other goods, to the occupied regions?

[Kostovic] With the Croatian Government we have the Office for UNPROFOR, which observed the situation there very carefully, knowing all the time what was going on, however: We had to let through relief goods. We could not block relief goods intended for a part of our own country, where a part of the population is endangered.

The fact that fuel was also smuggled in there is the responsibility of UNPROFOR. Our government refused passage whenever it was not clearly stated that it was fuel needed by UNPROFOR to be able to distribute humanitarian aid, or, for instance, for hospitals or heating....

The entire documentation on abuses and smuggling has been given to supervisory officials as well as to UNPROFOR.

[Priscan] UNPROFOR's mandate also depends on the attitude of the Croatian Government. Is the request to the "blue helmets" to launch the process of the refugees' return by 15 September an opportunity for them to prove that they are capable of doing what they have not done so far?

[Kostovic] That is correct. UNPROFOR's mandate also depends on the president of Croatia, as well as on the Assembly. The Croatian Government will take a resolute attitude: We do not want the status quo; we want something to start happening. We insist on pilot projects for the refugees' return. Both the refugees and the government want the same: for their return finally to begin!

Trust in the Association of Refugees

[Priscan] If UNPROFOR fails to ensure the return of refugees at least in the blue zones, the Association of Refugees will announce a total blockade of the blue helmets. As they say, they do not need anybody's help to expel UNPROFOR or to organize their peaceful return to their homes, even if some of them should sacrifice their lives.... What do you think about this?

[Kostovic] The ultimatum by the refugees has a point that makes sense, which is that they want something finally to start happening. It is not an ultimatum aimed at completing something. The refugees' announcement

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that they are ready to expel UNPROFOR itself depends on whether something will finally start happening. The Croatian Government, however, will primarily concentrate on a long-term strategy of solving the problem, that is, how to gain access to the UNPAs. We cannot make a hasty decision just because of the ultimatum. We trust the Association of Refugees to monitor the further development of the situation. The development of the situation depends on events in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Neither the refugees nor the government know how the situation will evolve. Still, the refugees have already showed how extremely patient they are.

[Priscan] One of the demands that the refugees have been underlining after the Blockade action is that, by 15 September at the latest, the government should establish mixed commissions engaged in searching for missing persons and prisoners. Will you be able to meet this demand?

[Kostovic] The demand is absolutely unrealistic. It is the Serbs who reject the foundation of any such commission! The Association of Refugees will have to explain this at the meeting of their council, because it is impossible! At the level of local negotiations in different sectors they have rejected mixed commissions, and there is nothing we can do about it!

The central mixed commission for missing persons has never started working for political reasons as well. Since Minister Granic has not been in Belgrade yet, nothing is happening for the time being. In different sectors the situation looks like this: For instance, we appoint our commissioner for Banija, but the commissioner appointed by the Serbs never appears for the meetings or negotiations.

However, the search for those missing remains our priority task, and we shall demand that it be added to UNPROFOR's mandate. According to current data, Croatia is investigating 2,764 cases of imprisoned and missing persons, 1,183 of whom are from Vukovar.

[Priscan] The refugees expect the government to make a more dignified life possible for them until they return to their homes. Concretely: general medical checkups, free shares, better quality nourishment, and the closure of the so-called wagon-settlements where they are living.

[Kostovic] We shall endeavor to reorganize our budget in such a way that will make it possible to increase their monthly support from 100 to 125 kunas and their pocket money from 50 to 100 kunas. This proposal will be presented to parliament as well as the proposal that 400 to 600 kunas be additionally allotted to refugees for heating. When an act is passed, it will be possible to reconsider the refugees' demands to be given free shares. We shall make efforts to protect refugees if a hotel changes its owner, yet we cannot do anything that opposes the principles of privatization. The Ministry for Social Welfare proposes that compensation be given to refugee farmers. We shall monitor the refugees' nourishment better, but general medical checkups are not possible for the time being. For the more than 180,000 people such checkups would cost billions and billions! Still, every refugee has been provided with health care.

As for better accommodation, we intend to build settlements (with private yards) near their home towns. This does not mean that we are giving up on their return! In order to provide better living conditions for those refugees who live in wagon-settlements, while there are also the elderly and the sick who live in sheds in urban areas, of course with the help of UNHCR, we plan to renovate buildings chosen by local municipal offices, while settlements for refugees are planned to be built in the country. For instance, with the help of the Norwegian Government, one such settlement with private yards has been built in Kovacevac in the Nova Gradiska region, and there will be such settlements in Pisarovina, Dumace, and Sasina Greda.

[Priscan] Why is Sweden sending back refugees with Croatian passports right now, whereas other European countries are also announcing their return? What are you doing about this?

[Kostovic] In Sweden people think that the war in Bosnia- Herzegovina is coming to an end. In fact, the secret lies in the Croatian passport. For those refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina who own one, the Swedish authorities regard them not as refugees, but as ordinary travelers. We are explaining to them that they are wrong, that such actions are inhumane. We do no think that in Sweden there are more than 5,000 refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina. In Switzerland their number is even smaller but we have also informed the Swiss authorities that we are not able to take in those refugees at the moment. For the time being, they have given up the intention to send them back to us. We have also made a request to Denmark to take into consideration the current refugee crisis in Croatia, while with Germany, we made an agreement earlier on the gradual return of refugees to the free territory.

[Box, p 7]

[Priscan] At the time of the most severe aggression against Croatia, the Cazin Krajina took in refugees from Slunj, who have now fled together with the refugees from Cazin. Where are those people from Slunj?

[Kostovic] All the people of the Cazin Krajina and the Bihac region did a great thing in that desperate month, when Dubrovnik was being shelled, when Vukovar fell, and when Saborsko fell. Our refugees saved their lives by fleeing to those regions of Cazin and Bihac. Therefore I want to thank all their hosts. We very much appreciate it. Throughout the war we were sending humanitarian and any other aid to those regions. Now 54 refugees from Slunj, who fled Velika Kladusa together with others, have come over to Croatia. Unfortunately, the vicar of

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Cetingrad and all those families have been taken prisoner by the Serbs. This is an act of war, about which not only has the church protested, but also the Croatian Government. Everything has been reported to the Red Cross and we are making efforts to have these people released.

We are still ready to take in any refugee who is in possession of a Croatian passport, or works in a third country.

[Box, p 7]

[Priscan] Both the refugees and the Croatian Government expect that by the end of August Mr. Akashi might announce his opinion of the pilot projects for the refugees' return to those places in the demarcation zones that district prefects have approved as being possible. Have you got an answer from UNPROFOR yet?

[Kostovic] For the time being they have only given us some indications for the Southern Sector. We told them, however, that we did not recognize any sectors, because we have communes. That is, we want an integral pilot project for the refugees' return that will include all the communes. The district prefects have proposed 12 Croatian villages in the demarcation zones where UNPROFOR controls the situation. Those villages are: Ruzic in the Sibenik Commune, Maljkovo and Dabar in the Split-Dalmatia Commune, Tinj and Jurevici in the Zadar-Knin Commune, Gornje Mekusje and Donje Mekusje in the Karlovac Commune, then Stari Grabovac in the Sisak Commune, Gorice in the Brod-Posavina Commune, Lipovac in the Vukovar-Srijem Commune, Tenje in the Osijek Commune, and Dabar in Lika. Those are places in the blue zones that are purely Croatian (or with a few Serbian families and they are welcome to return!), where there are no military forces, and for which there exists no excuse that there are Serbs nearby, so the returnees may be endangered. It is UNPROFOR's job to guarantee their safe return and the implementation of the plan that will start with the disposal of mines. We insist that the program be added to UNPROFOR's mandate. In that point the demands of the government and of the refugees are the same.

Sarinic Predicts 'Smaller Greater Serbia'

AU0209172394 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 27 Aug 94 pp 10,11

[Interview with Head of Office for National Security Hrvoje Sarinic by Branko Tudjen; place and date not given: "The Superpowers Will Force a Compromise"]

[Text] [Tudjen] Mr. Sarinic, your statement that, after all that has happened, Serbia must get something in order to accept peace raised a lot of dust among the public, especially regarding your formulation "a smaller Greater Serbia." What did you actually mean by that?

[Sarinic] This was my view as published in a recent interview in VJESNIK. I think that the problem will nevertheless be resolved and that the world powers will impose a compromise solution. I base my reasoning on historical facts and experience gathered from history. The great world wars involving superpowers on opposite sides ended in the complete defeat and condemnation of one side. This happened in World War I as well as in World War II, which ended in the complete capitulation of Germany and Japan, and in the Nuremberg trials. There were world powers involved on the two opposing sides. In so called regional wars, where the superpowers are not directly involved but act as arbitrators—this is the case with former Yugoslavia—compromise solutions are reached virtually as a rule.

Let me again provide two examples from history. The Congress of Berlin, arbitrated by two superpowers, created a different configuration of Turkey, Bulgaria, Serbia, etc. The superpowers were not directly involved, but a compromise was nevertheless reached. Turkey was not satisfied with it, nor were the countries which gained more territory. And today, take the conflict between Israel and Palestine, which has been going on almost since World War II. Again, a compromise was worked out, albeit with all the concomitant growing pains. Not everybody is pleased this time, either. The same goes for the de facto peace between Israel and Jordan.

I try to find a common denominator from these historical examples and this reality of ours. I am convinced that, even though the war in Bosnia is still raging and that occupied areas of Croatia are still a problem, there will be a peaceful compromise solution. In my interview for VJESNIK, I talked about the fact that I do not believe that the Serbs will remain a part of Bosnia when it comes to demarcation. I still think that a compromise will be worked out, no matter how delicate the situation is today. Already 49:51 is a compromise that is being criticized even by those who have accepted it. The 49 percent for the Serbs is not based on the land registry, or ethnic or historical facts. And everybody has accepted it, including Mr. Izetbegovic. Silajdzic recently said that the Serbs can leave, if they do not want to remain a part of Bosnia- Herzegovina, but not with 49 percent, but with the territory in which they had an absolute or relative majority. Again, we are trading in percentages. I am not absolutely certain, but it could be about 35 to 39 percent. That is to say, Mr. Silajdzic—and he is an important figure in Bosnia-Herzegovina—has also relinquished the idea of an integral Bosnia. I have emphasized several times that the integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina is a strategic interest of Croatia's.

What I wanted to say with the phrase "smaller Greater Serbia" is that a compromise will most likely be worked out in the future and that it will be a result of trading in percentages.

[Tudjen] Of all Croatian politicians, it has so happened that you have most often had the chance to talk to the other side. What have been your impressions?

[Sarinic] In keeping with my duties, I have been in contact with Milosevic and others. I can tell you that the

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conclusion from those meetings is that the Serbs do not want to live with the Muslims. They do not want any form of coexistence. And that is my opinion as well. They will not want to remain part of Bosnia- Herzegovina. That means, if my predictions prove correct, Serbian territory, the territory of Serbia will become larger. Whether by 36 percent, or more or less, is beside the point. And that is the meaning of that phrase of mine that raised so much dust among the opposition and some political analysts, about greater and smaller Serbia. And finally, Kozyrev himself recently said—and he will be going to Belgrade tomorrow—that no one could make the Serbs agree to the proposal of the Contact Group if they could not secede from Bosnia-Herzegovina. No one from the Contact Group has confirmed this, but it was not denied either. Nor have there been any reactions to the statement of Kozyrev. Our political analysts did not react either. I can say that I dared speak about something that is realistic, and now I am prepared to handle the reactions to it.

[Tudjen] The question was whether that was just your opinion or were you actually conveying the view of the state leadership, i.e. President Tudjman himself.

[Sarinic] It is my personal opinion. However, when a man holds a post such as mine, then he closely monitors the situation and can draw his own conclusions. Let me repeat, this is my own judgment, a political evaluation. I did not say that we would be working for this. We must merely assess our chances. I admit that is effectively political speculation. However, there are other speculations inside and outside the authorities. My speculation is based on experience, contacts, and some historical parallels.

[Tudjen] After what you have just said, it would be interesting to hear your predictions as to the outcome of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Sarinic] Three outcomes are possible in Bosnia-Herzegovina. One is an integral Bosnia-Herzegovina plus a confederation with the Republic of Croatia. That was in the Washington Agreement. Second, there is an integral Bosnia-Herzegovina plus a confederation in the west and in the east. Because, after all, if the Serbs were to agree to stay in Bosnia-Herzegovina, they would surely not deny themselves the chance to form a confederation with Serbia and the so called Yugoslavia, if the Croat-Bosniak Federation could do the same with Croatia. The Federation in a confederation with the Republic of Croatia, and the Serbs leaving to join Serbia is the third solution. What percentage the Serbs will get remains to be seen.

[Tudjen] Being well-versed in the "other side," you probably have your own opinion about relations (or the conflict) between Milosevic and Karadzic.

[Sarinic] Generally, public opinion has it that the conflict is just another in a series of Serb games and tricks designed to buy time. The reality is much more complex and subtler than that, I would say. First of all, I do not think that time is any longer on Milosevic's side. Why should he be buying what is no longer of use to him? He now needs solutions that work faster than those used a year ago. Arming Knin and Pale is becoming an almost unbearable burden for the exhausted economy of Serbia. Milosevic is experiencing a rude awakening from his dream about Greater Serbia and he has woken up to the fact that this dream will never come true. The dream is unattainable for him in the framework provided in the SANU [Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences] Memorandum. Second, every aspect of Milosevic's activity and policy has been based on the myth about himself being the father of all the Serbs, whom he is supposed to unite into one country, a greater Serbia. Being a pragmatic politician, he has realized that this is not possible and is now trying to salvage whatever he can. And in addition to personal ambitions, this is the root of the conflict between Milosevic and Karadzic. The latter is obviously prepared to go to the end, while the pragmatic Milosevic feels the limits of the possible. A recent visit of Patriarch Pavle to Pale shows that the conflict is very real, as the patriarch gave unconditional support to Karadzic, while the sad state of relations between the Serbian Orthodox Church and Milosevic is common knowledge.

[Tudjen] But, with regard to this, the question is why Milosevic does not allow international observers to be deployed along the border between Serbia and the so called Serb republic?

[Sarinic] This is where we must remember the onset of the whole unfortunate affair. As the leader of all Serbs, he cannot form an alliance with foreigners against a part of the Serbian nation. And this shows the complexity of the situation and the limits to Milosevic's freedom of maneuver. The situation has influenced Knin as well, where Mikelic is 100 percent behind Milosevic, Babic opposes Milosevic, and Martic, though he was appointed by Milosevic, is starting to "flirt" with Karadzic as he awaits the outcome of the crisis. The referendum on the proposal of the Contact Group, which is to be held on Sunday [28 August] in the so-called Serb republic, will be a moment of truth for Milosevic as well. The cards are on the table and the outcome is near. Milosevic will be forced to take radical steps and we have indications that something like this is already under way.

[Tudjen] Speaking of this, it would surely help if a part of the public as well as many politicians became more realistic. Milosevic is a fact; our friends from abroad negotiate with him. Perhaps the public should be more clearly told that all this is a political game on an international scale in which there are many tricks and much bluffing, and we cannot stand aside and stick to principles that no one accepts. We were in a situation where President Tudjman was being accused of wanting to carve up Bosnia with Milosevic, and now the superpowers are doing just that, percentages being the only controversial issue.

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[Sarinic] It is easy to talk with one's friends, but sometimes we need to talk to our enemies with whom we are in conflict, for friendships must not be broken and conflicts must be resolved. We negotiate with Milosevic, with Karadzic, and with Knin, of course.

We will try to use every possibility to reach a peaceful solution. If we do not manage to reach one, we will have to resort to other, more radical methods. It is no secret that Croatia will not give up any part of its territory. But we will be patient, try to resolve it all, and then, if all else fails, resort to what any normal country would do. After all, right before our very eyes, the Sarajevo government has solved the problem of the so called autonomous province of western Bosnia [Fikret Abdic's self- proclaimed state around Velika Kladusa]. And not a single international protagonist reacted to this.

I leveled with the Serbian negotiators in Knin: "Gentlemen, any kind of state or para-state is out of the question." You can have high-level, high standards of autonomy, and international monitoring of that autonomy. We will agree to all that, but in the framework of Croatia, and no other way.

I attended the talks between President Tudjman and Milosevic in Karadjordjevo and Tikves and in Geneva. I negotiated in Dobanovci. I went everywhere and talked to them and I am not ashamed of that, and it does not mean that I personally or the Croatian authorities have betrayed the interests of Croatia. Quite the contrary, we are fighting for the interests of Croatia and we will continue to do so as long as there is so much as the slightest chances of solving the problem.

[Tudjen] Some condemn the Zagreb agreement.

[Sarinic] The agreement is positive for Croatia. We were aware that the Serbs would attempt to interpret it their own way. I hope no one thinks that, after all that we went through, after all our experience, we are so naive as to think it could all be solved overnight. But, for God's sake, people are no longer dying and they were dying before.

[Tudjen] And we also have 2 billion German marks from tourism.

[Sarinic] That too, and we are also able to drive across Maslenica with people no longer afraid of surprise mortar attacks.

Some say the Zagreb agreement is good for the economy but weak with regard to politics. What does that mean? Those two things cannot be viewed separately. They are one inseparable whole and, globally speaking, the agreement is not ideal, but it is positive for Croatia.

The campaign of the refugees demanding a consistent implementation of the Zagreb agreement was also positive. And we must give the refugees their due for they acted as responsible citizens. Having realized that their positive campaign had reached the level where it was interfering in state politics, they stopped it. However, it was a valuable eye-opener in that it pointed out, even to UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] itself, some anomalies that existed.

[Tudjen] We have been reading statements by our politicians who, if they were sitting across the table from Butrus-Ghali, Akashi, or Kozyrev, would "give them a piece of their mind" and say: We do not want this but that. What do you say and how do you feel when you get such a chance?

[Sarinic] Well, I present our views, but I am always aware of the limitations and define the limits of the possible, taking into account the balance of powers and interests. Politics is not sentimental; it is cruel. One must engage all one's patience and brains and try to exclude emotions. Unfortunately, criticism of the work of the leaders and our negotiations are mostly emotional and express declarative views. When I leave this office and think as a Croat and a citizen, I also agree that there should be no Serbia, no greater Serbia. But when I get back to the office, I face reality, data, and information, and I must put my emotions aside and think with a clear head. Regarding the opposition, it is its job to look for faults. I have taken their criticisms into account many times and they have helped me a great deal. What I resent, and sometimes even get annoyed about, is the constant fault-finding. Not everything is negative.

[Box, p 10-11]

NATO Forces on Croatia's Borders

Hrvoje Sarinic (59) is one of the most prominent officials around President Tudjman. At the time when the democratic changes were being introduced, and especially at the time of the struggle for international recognition for Croatia, his role seemed unimportant, while it was actually invaluable. Experienced, with many years spent abroad, a businessman, diplomat, and speaker of several languages, he played an extremely important role in establishing contacts for President Tudjman with statesmen and ministers of other countries.

Yours truly had the opportunity to follow his activities as a reporter. I remember February, 1991, in the Swiss town of Davos. It was then inconceivable: President Tudjman and Mr. Sarinic in an almost clandestine meeting with the NATO Secretary General, the late Manfred Woerner.

Sarinic remembers: "When we, when President Tudjman spoke about NATO a long time ago, we were almost a laughing stock. The president's predictions have nevertheless proved correct. NATO is already present in this region and, at the coming talks with the international community about extending the UNPROFOR mandate, we will require a form of cooperation between UNPROFOR and NATO.

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Several weeks ago, when the Serbs attacked Cilipi [Dubrovnik airport], I immediately contacted Akashi, General de la Presle, and others, and openly told them: You are the ones who can call in NATO involvement. The general replied that, for the time being, relations allowed NATO intervention only in the protected areas. However, they are here, monitoring everything from the air, and we must fight for a new form for their activity.

A future mandate for UNPROFOR is in the offing, and we will try to make it more active and less passive. And, on the other hand, to increase the activity and involvement of NATO forces on the borders of the Republic of Croatia with Serbia and with Bosnia-Herzegovina. I believe, therefore, that there will be a new UNPROFOR mandate, that it will be significantly changed, and that it will again be time-limited."

[Box, p 11]

I Am Not a Policeman!

[Tudjen] Sometimes you are reproached for your dual function: You are our main negotiator with the rebel Serbs, and at the same time, head of the Office for National Security.

[Sarinic] I think that it is useful for Croatia to have well-informed men—and, after all, my duties allow me to have access to a lot of information—acting as negotiators. Naturally, if we start interpreting my role as that of a policeman, then that is a different matter. However, you must be aware of the rating of people holding similar posts in the developed countries. My work does not include any kind of repression, but mostly analysis. And these analyses come in very handy in the negotiations that I lead.

Statement Criticizes New Italian Citizenship Law

LD0509185494 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 5 Sep 94

[Text] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Croatia today issued a statement on the new law on citizenship of the Republic of Italy. The statement reads:

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has learned that a certain number of citizens of the Republic of Croatia have shown interest in taking advantage of the opportunity offered by the new law on citizenship of the Republic of Italy, which envisages possibilities of acquiring Italian citizenship for people who did not exercise their right to choose on the basis of the agreement signed between the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [SFRY] and the Republic of Italy in Osimo in 1975. Most demands for dual citizenship have been submitted in the county of Istria.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Croatia believes that the law which Italy passed is a one-sided act, unusual in international practice, especially considering the fact that the issue was regulated by multilateral agreement—the peace agreement signed in Paris in 1947—and the bilateral interstate agreement between the former SFRY and Italy, i.e. the Osimo agreements of 1975, of which the Republic of Croatia is a legal successor and which regulate the issue without allowing the possibility of holding dual citizenship.

The Italian law on citizenship is not in line with Italy's international legal obligations under these agreements. The Republic of Croatia is trying to settle this issue through bilateral contacts with the Republic of Italy.

Hungarian Defense Chief Views Arms Embargo

LD0509151794 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1506 GMT 5 Sep 94

[Text] Zagreb, Sept. 5 (TANJUG)—Hungarian Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti said in Zagreb Monday he hoped the arms embargo on former Yugoslavia would be lifted soon.

In a meeting with Croatian Defense Minister Gojko Susak, Keleti also said that Hungary was respecting the embargo, said a statement issued after the talks.

It is therefore important to work on preparations for military cooperation between Hungary and Croatia, the statement said.

The U.N. Security Council imposed the arms embargo on former Yugoslavia in September 1991. The former Yugoslav federation army intercepted a large arms shipment from Hungary for paramilitary units of the former Croatia in late 1990.

Croatia's war for seccesion began in 1991. About 14,000 Serbs were killed and about 350,000 were expelled from Croatia during the war.

Keleti and Susak agreed that the Hungarian and Croatian chiefs of general staff would meet soon to discuss military cooperation and NATO's 'Partnership for Peace' program, the statement said.

Teams of experts should also meet soon 'to discuss common long-term strategic interests' of the two countries, said the statement.

Hungary supports a peaceful settlement of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, the statement quoted Keleti as saying.

Maintaining good-neighbor relations is among Hungary's priorities. As part of this policy, the Hungarian defense minister is meeting with defense ministers of neighboring countries, the statement said.

Hungary would do its best to maintain good relations with neighboring countries, not only on a political, but on a military level as well, the statement quoted Keleti as saying.

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Poll: Tudjman Increasing Lead Over Budisa

AU0209161994

[Editorial Report] Zagreb GLOBUS in Serbo-Croatian on 2 September on page 11 carries an approximately 400-word report on the results of the regular GLOBUS weekly opinion poll on the popularity of Croatia's politicians and political parties.

The report, entitled "President Tudjman Enjoys the Increasingly Firm Support of the Electorate," does not provide any information on how the poll was conducted.

"The results of 775 respondents' answer" to the question "Who would you elect as the president of the republic?" are expressed in percentages and summarized as follows:

	20 August 94	28 August 94
Tudjman	40.9	43.7
Budisa [leader of HSLS]	29.2	29.4
Others	3.6	5.1
Mesic [HND leader]	5.0	4.0
Djapic [HSP leader]	3.7	3.5
Kucar	3.7	4.4
Tomac	3.4	2.6
Valentic [prime minister]	2.4	2.2
Racan [SDP leader]	2.6	1.8
Granic [foreign minister]	1.8	1.6
Gotovac	1.2	1.4
Kramaric	1.1	1.3
Pankretic	1.4	—

"The results of 791 respondents' answer" to the question "Which party would you vote for at the parliamentary elections?" are expressed in percentages and summarized as follows:

	20 August 94	28 August 94
HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community]	34.0	37.4
HSLS [Croatian Social Liberal Party]	31.8	34.0
HSP [Croatian Party of Rights]	5.8	7.3
HND [Croatian Independent Democrats]	6.8	4.2
HSS [Croatian Peasants Party]	4.9	3.7
SDP [Social Democratic Party]	4.9	3.7
IDS [Istrian Democratic Congress]	3.7	3.2
DA [Dalmatian Action]	2.1	1.7
Others	0.4	1.4
SSH [expansion unknown]	1.1	—

The report also carries a pie chart depicting the results of the respondents' answers to the question: "Will you vote FOR or AGAINST the confederation [with Bosnia-Herzegovina] at the referendum?"

Against	48.6
For	21.4
Do not know	22.5
Will not take part in the referendum	7.5

Daily Profiles New Commander of Zagreb Corps

AU0209184294 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 2 Sep 94 p 6

[B.Ko.-attributed report: "General Basarac Is New Commander"]

[Excerpts] Zagreb—Major General Petar Stipetic yesterday handed over his post of commander of the Zagreb District Corps to Major General Ivan Basarac, as he is assuming new duties. [passage omitted]

The new commander of the Zagreb District Corps, Major General Ivan Basarac, was born in Karlovac. After graduating from the military academy, he held many posts. He commanded the 1st Armored Mechanical Brigade of the Croatian Army in Varazdin, the 3d Guard Brigade on the Slavonia front, and then worked in the General Staff of the Croatian Army as the chief of staff of land forces.

"We face much work on strengthening the combat readiness of all areas in the Zagreb Corps District," General Basarac stressed on taking up his new post.

UNPROFOR Accused of Supporting Serbs

LD0209162694 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1500 GMT 2 Sep 94

[Text] The Serb side in the UN-protected area of Sector South is openly violating the Zagreb cease-fire agreement. Colonel Ivan Zelic, deputy commander of the

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political department of the Croatian army's Split operational zone, claims that the UN Protection Forces [UNPROFOR] are not only failing to prevent them from doing this, but are in some parts of Sector South giving them open support in their unacceptable actions.

Abusing the fact that Croatia has been observing the agreement, the Serbs have entrenched their forces, with no obstacles in their way, in the Sinj part of the front, Zelic warns. While the front line was there, they did not dare dig trenches. Serb paramilitary units are digging trenches under the UN flag, with the help of the blue berets. UNPROFOR's trucks are even bringing sand and other materials for the Serbs to entrench their forces, and are also lending them equipment, Zelic said. The Croatian army is in possession of reports that UNPROFOR and the occupation army are cooperating, Zelic said, and considers such behavior extremely unfair.

Serbs Use Bihac Refugee 'Commotion' To Advance

AU0209191294 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 2 Sep 94

[Report by Nada al-Isa from Zagreb]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] Abdic has coolly rejected the plan for the return of the refugees that was made by the United States and the United Nations. With this rejection, Abdic has created great problems for the Republic of Croatia. The Serbs from Knin have taken advantage of the commotion with the refugees to move their lines from the Plitvice road to the Slunj hills, that is, even closer to the free parts of the Republic of Croatia. Information has come our way that the Serbs are already digging new trenches inside the buffer zone. [word indistinct] has taken a dangerous course, and it is all the fault of Fikret Abdic and his insane policy.

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Foreign Ministry Protests FRY Border Incident

LD0409124894 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1122 GMT 4 Sep 94

[Text] Skopje, 4 Sep (TANJUG)—The Macedonian Foreign Ministry sent a note to the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry last night in connection with an incident which took place on 1 September in the border region near the village of Tanusevci in Skopska Crna Gora when, allegedly, a Yugoslav army patrol wounded the Macedonian citizen Bajam Saciri.

The note protests sharply against the unauthorized entry of the Yugoslav military patrol onto the territory of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] and the wounding of one of its citizens.

The Ministry in Skopje requests that commissions from the two states go to the place where the incident took place as a matter of urgency in order to establish all the facts in connection with this border incident.

Site Inspection Urged

AU0509133794 Skopje MIC in English 5 Sep 94

[Unattributed report: "Macedonia Sends Note to FRY"]

[Text] The Macedonian Foreign Ministry has sent a sharp protest to the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] Foreign Ministry concerning the incident on September 1. Due to the unauthorized presence of the Yugoslav military patrol on the territory of the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] and the wounding of a Macedonian citizen, the note asks for an urgent inspection by a joint commission, on the very spot where the incident occurred, in order to determine all the relevant facts regarding this border incident.

Annual Inflation Rate Reported at 170 Percent

LD0609112094 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1048 GMT 6 Sep 94

[Excerpt] Skopje, 6 Sep (TANJUG)—According to official indicators of the Macedonian Republic Statistics' Institute, retail prices in August this year were up 0.6 percent on the July figure.

After the deflation of July, August's inflation of only 0.6 percent is the result of the further decline in the price of agricultural products by 11.5 percent and primarily of the fall in the price of vegetables by 16.4 percent and fruit by 9.8 percent.

Over the last eight months of this year, prices have risen by 32.4 percent compared with price levels in December, while compared with the same period last year they are up by 170 percent. [passage omitted]

Albanians Ordered To Use Only Cyrillic on Signs

AU3108145494 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1800 GMT 30 Aug 94

[Text] Decisions have been taken in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] against the use of the Albanian language in the signs of shops, streets, and various private firms. Over to Bujar Muharremi:

[Muharremi] The shops you are viewing on the screen are in the streets and markets of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. These shops are owned by Albanians living in Skopje. What strikes one is the use of the Albanian and Cyrillic alphabets. It has recently been learned that, through the Macedonian Interior Ministry, the Republican Inspectoriate has issued orders demanding that, from now on, the signs of shops, firms, and enterprises be written only in the Cyrillic alphabet, i.e. in Macedonian.

[Unidentified interviewer] How much time were you given to remove the sign, and were you threatened? What will they do if the Albanian sign is not removed?

[Unidentified shop owner] We were given a deadline of eight days. When the deadline was passed, they came again. The persons who had changed their signs suffered nothing, while documents were seized from those who did not do so. We still do not know whether we will be punished or not. [end recording]

Albanians are thus only allowed to use Macedonian in the signs of shops, streets, and firms. This is happening at a time when the high officials of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia are talking about respect for the rights of Albanians in conformity with European standards. However, the Albanians are not currently judging words, but deeds, when it is a question of applying international norms regarding their linguistic rights. The republican decisions banning the use of the Albanian language in the inscriptions of shops, streets, etc. run counter to the constitution of the Former Yugos av Republic of Macedonia, which nowadays, at least formally, sanctions bilingualism, including the languages of the nationalities. The use of the Cyrillic alphabet only seems to follow other tightening steps that the Macedonian authorities are undertaking against the Albanians living on their historic territories.

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Federal

Jovanovic, Russia's Gaydar Discuss Sanctions

LD0209181694 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1444 GMT 2 Sep 94

[Text] Belgrade, 2 Sep (TANJUG)—Yugoslav Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic today received Yegor Gaydar, a deputy to Russia's Federal Assembly and leader of Russia's Democratic Choice. Gaydar is paying a visit to Yugoslavia at the invitation from the Democratic Party.

In lengthy and friendly talks, Jovanovic informed Gaydar about the current situation and the prospects for peaceful regulation of the conflict in former Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as fresh political moves necessary by the Contact Group and certain international players to maintain achieve success in the peace process, Jovanovic's office announced.

Jovanovic expressed pleasure over Russia's extensive and active involvement within international fora, within the Contact Group, and in its contacts with all important international players in the creation of a new, unbiased approach towards this phase of the peace process, particularly towards realistic understanding and appreciation of the peace role and active constructive policy of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY].

The talks were also focused on the current issues of bilateral relations between former Yugoslav republics and the strengthening of stability and cooperation in the Balkan region.

Gaydar highly praised the constructive role played and contribution made by the FRY in seeking a peaceful and just solution for former Bosnia-Herzegovina and reaffirmed the position on the need to lift sanctions against the FRY as an important step, the statement says.

The talks were also attended by Democratic Party chairman Zoran Djindjic and Russian Ambassador Gennadiy Shikin.

Gaydar Lauds FRY's Acceptance of Peace Plan

AU0309200694 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 3 Sep 94

[Interview with Yegor Gaydar, leader of Russia's Democratic Choice, by an unidentified correspondent in Belgrade; date not given—recorded, Gaydar speaks in Russian with superimposed Serbo-Croatian translation]

[Text] [Gaydar] We are convinced that there is no reason today that could justify the war and its continuation. We understand perfectly well that the road to stable peace is not simple and that many problems still need to be solved along the way. They need to be solved as soon as possible. In connection with this, I believe that the Yugoslav Government has done the right thing by accepting the Contact Group plan, regardless of the fact that it may seem imperfect to some; we are fully aware of its shortcomings, that it is inadequate for solving all the problems, but it represents an indispensable prerequisite; we must start with it. I sincerely hope that the other parties involved in this conflict will come to the conclusion that it is essential to take the step toward realistic peace. I would once more like to reiterate that the Russian Government—and I am convinced of this, although I am not a part of it at the moment—will support the speedy lifting of sanctions and will be categorically opposed to unilateral action regarding the lifting of the arms embargo for Bosnia. However, we need to keep in mind that the world is very complex and that we must also take into account the stances of the other players in this big political game.

[Unidentified correspondent] Yegor Timorovich, one more question. You are a well-known businessman, a man who has so far devoted his entire life to the economy. You met here with [Yugoslav National Bank Governor] Professor Avramovic. I am interested in how you see this world miracle?

[Gaydar] In a certain sense this is not a miracle. It is a big success and a foreseeable calculation. This once more proves that if the political will exists to implement the stabilization program and if the essence of those specific problems facing Yugoslavia in conditions of hyperinflation and steep decrease of the real money mass is understood, then a lot can be accomplished.

Lilic, French Delegation Discuss Sanctions

LD0209143894 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1227 GMT 2 Sep 94

[Text] Belgrade, 2 Sep (TANJUG)—Zoran Lilic, president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, said today during a meeting with a delegation of the Commission for Foreign Affairs of the French National Assembly that "the most important question is what to do now, i.e. what steps the international community should take at this crucial moment for the peaceful resolution of the conflict in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina."

In talks with the delegation, led by Francois Guillaume, Lilic added that "France could play an important role in this."

According to a statement from the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] president's office, the two sides said that historically close relations between the French and the Serbs have deteriorated over the past few years, and therefore they ought to be improved and raised to a higher level. President Lilic expressed the conviction that this visit, motivated by an intention to discover the truth, will contribute to achieving this goal, and explained that his personal wish is that the guests convey to the French government, the media, their colleagues in the parliament, and French President Francois Mitterrand personally only what they have seen for themselves, because we in Yugoslavia have no intention of exposing anybody to the sort of propaganda to which we have been exposed for years.

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The talks focussed mainly on sanctions and the work of the Contact Group. The statement says the guests from France said the sanctions are immoral because their victims are those socially most threatened and therefore they should be lifted. As regards international observers, they said it was clear to them that such a gesture by the international community is offensive to the dignity of the entire nation, but a step in that direction might strengthen the conviction about the resolve of the FRY to fully implement a very courageous decision by the federal government in connection with their brothers across the river.

President Lilic said that the observers are a secondary, to be more precise, a marginal issue, which delays the restoration of peace and the lifting of sanctions. The key issue is whether Europe and the entire international community wants peace in this former Yugoslav republic or not. Our country has in the past three years been pursuing a policy of peace, demanding nothing more than equal treatment of all three warring sides in Bosnia. We abide by these principles also today and we shall accept anything that the Bosnian Serbs accept in agreement with the other two sides. The international community has responded to this policy of ours only by punitive measures for all Serbs. We have accepted the contact group plan not as an ideal, but as an honorable solution for the Serbian side. The international community even now has at its disposal all the means to control the implementation of the FRY Government decisions, if that is what it really wants, President Lilic said. Otherwise, it would mean that it is physically siding with those who are interested in the continuation of the war.

One thing is certain, President Lilic stressed, the mistakes which have been made so far must by no means be repeated. Their consequences would include not only an escalation of the war in former Bosnia-Herzegovina but also conflicts of wider proportions in the unstable area of Balkans. There is no alternative to a policy of peace. Sanctions were imposed on the wrong side and innocent people. They fuel nationalist passions and have inflicted a great deal of damage on our neighbors whereas it certainly cannot be in Europe's interest to turn one of its parts into an economic and cultural ghetto characterized by such a difference in the level of development which would inevitably bring about new conflicts and incidents, President Lilic said.

We maintain that peace is in everyone's interest; the international community's, Europe's and France's. France's interests also rest with the major projects launched before the imposition of unjust sanctions, President Lilic said, pointing out the case of ALKATEL and the building of the Belgrade-Novi Sad-Subotica motorway and fast railways, all of which is in the region of several billion U.S. dollars. This is why we expect France to be even more actively involved in the peace process and more resolved in giving the Serbs in former Bosnia-Herzegovina guarantees that their rights will be respected to the same degree as the guaranteed rights of the Muslim-Croat federation, President Lilic said at his meeting with the French parliamentarians.

Price Increases Threaten Economic Stabilization

LD0309105494 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1042 GMT 3 Sep 94

["Ecopool" item]

[Text] Belgrade, Sept. 2 (TANJUG)—A recent poll conducted by the Belgrade-based Institute for Market Research shows that the Yugoslav industry is gradually coming out of depression.

Out of the 200 companies polled, 37 percent predict good business results in the next three months, 14 percent say the prospects are bleak, while as many as 49 percent foresee average results.

Economic analysts expect a revival in the economic activity in the second half of the year because the situation concerning raw and production materials has improved.

One of the priorities of an economic reform program launched by the Yugoslav Government on January 24 is to start a new investment cycle.

The program has helped avert a monetary and economic collapse that loomed before Yugoslavia after the United Nations imposed draconic sanctions against it on May 30, 1992.

Although the last few months have seen prices go down, nearly a quarter of the polled companies say they plan to increase prices over the next three months.

Toma Milosavljevic of the market research institute says that the price increases could seriously undermine the economic stabilization program.

Nearly 30 percent of the companies polled place flagging demand as the major cause for poor business results, followed by low prices and the lack of bank credits.

In 1992 when the economic sanctions against Yugoslavia were imposed, the country's industrial output dropped 20 percent on the 1991 figure, and a further 37.3 percent in 1993.

In the first half of this year, industrial production, without the power industry, rose by 105 percent on the same period last year.

Customs Prevents Medicine From Entering B-H

AU0109200494 Belgrade VECERNJE NOVOSTI in Serbo-Croatian 1 Sep 94 p 20

["Z.T.M.-R.G."-attributed report: "Medicine Stopped"]

[Excerpt] The humanitarian gift of 13 packages of medicine intended for the people of Herzegovina, which the

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representatives of the Serbs from Herzegovina in Vojvodina tried to take across last week to the Srpska republic, has remained stranded on the Yugoslav border crossing of Karakaj in Zvornik.

The customs officers fiercely opposed the attempt to take the medicine across, saying that the question of customs had not been regulated and that the deadline for taking the medicine across had expired. [sentence as received]

"I think it is the question of rigorous rules rather than the malice of the customs officials," says Zarko Ruzic, professor from Novi Sad and chairman of the Association of Serbs from Herzegovina in Vojvodina. [passage omitted]

Serbia

Owen on Progress in Talks With Milosevic

AU0509152994 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 5 Sep 94

[Text] Cochairmen Owen and Stoltenberg held talks with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic in Belgrade yesterday. Prior to his departure for Podgorica, David Owen made a statement for correspondents at Belgrade airport. Jelena Vidic reports:

[Vidic] Lord Owen said that in his talks with President Milosevic, they discussed two issues: how to help the Serbian president concerning his relations with the Serbs from Bosnia and how to improve Serbian-Croatian relations in general. We discussed various aspects, especially the opening of the Belgrade-Zagreb highway, Lord Owen said. He then commented on the new position of Andrey Kozyrev and the Russian diplomacy.

[Begin Owen recording in English fading into Serbo-Croatian translation] We are in very close touch with the Russians. We have worked with them very constructively. We are cooperating within the framework of the peace conference and the Contact Group. In other words, we are cooperating very closely and I think that their contribution is of great help. In the Contact Group, the governments of each country are taking steps whenever they see that they can make a certain contribution. It is obvious that Kozyrev, Churkin, and Nikiforov hold the view that they can make a contribution here, just as Christopher, Redman, and his assistant Thomas hold the view that they can be more productive in Sarajevo. Members of the European Union can help in other ways. [end recording]

[Vidic] Lord Owen then answered questions on differing views of Russia and the West European countries:

[Begin Owen recording in English fading into Serbo-Croatian translation] I do not think the differences in these views are so different. What you have to understand here in Belgrade is that the most important thing is that the Bosnian Serbs accept the latest peace proposal. We are pleased that Serbia and Montenegro have taken a positive and constructive stand. We are cooperating with them, and this confirms what I have been saying all along: The world is not against the Serbs. The complaints in this specific case refer to the Bosnian Serbs and not Serbia and Montengro. We will meet President Bulatovic and will discuss the same issue with him. These are complex issues that [word indistinct] and we will see what can be done. [end recording]

[Vidic] This was stated by Lord Owen prior to his departure for Podgorica, where he is to hold talks with Montenegrin President Momir Bulatovic.

According to the Republican Secretariat for Information of Montenegro, David Owen and Momir Bulatovic are expected to address correspondents after their talks.

Removal of Sanctions Stressed

LD0409183594 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1815 GMT 4 Sep 94

[Text] Belgrade, 4 Sep (TANJUG)—Slobodan Milosevic, president of the Republic of Serbia, received David Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg, cochairmen of the Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, who arrived in our country this afternoon, accompanied by their aides.

During lengthy and frank talks, they exchanged opinions on the current issues and steps that are being taken to end the Yugoslav crisis by peaceful means.

They focused their attention on the concentrated efforts by Serbia, or rather, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, to establish a just and stable peace in the territory of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina. In connection with this, they stressed the need to lift the sanctions against the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia], which would be the international community's best contribution to restoring peace in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina, and a sign of true support for peace and stability in this part of Europe.

They gave their support to the resumption of the talks between Knin and Zagreb on the reopening of communication lines, which is in the interest of both sides and would further ease tensions between the two sides.

The talks were also attended by Yugoslav Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic, the president's office announced this evening.

SPO Vice President, Secretary Resign Posts

LD0309151194 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1416 GMT 1416 GMT 3 Sep 94

[Excerpts] Belgrade, 3 Sep (TANJUG)—Mihajlo Markovic, vice president of the Serbian Renewal Movement [SPO], and Vladimir Gajic, SPO general secretary, today announced they had submitted irrevocable resignations from their respective posts.

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Giving his reasons for this decision, Mihajlo Markovic told TANJUG that "events and relations within the party's leadership have assumed such proportions as to render adherence to the code of practice and democratic principles meaningless." [passage omitted]

Markovic and Gajic, who are also federal deputies, will retain their posts as members of the SPO main committee.

Sandzak SDA Extends Support to Exiled Leader

AU0509193794 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 5 Sep 94

[Text] A festive assembly marking the 4th anniversary of the existence and successful work of the Party of Democratic Action of Sandzak was held in Novi Pazar on Saturday [3 September].

During the working part of the assembly, the participants discussed the introduction of emergency measures in the party in order to protect the party from the activities planned by the Serbian regime, which is trying to destroy the party from within. The general view was that the ultimate goal of the Serbian regime is to (?frustrate) the legitimate political demands of the Bosniak Muslims, especially calling for a special status for Sandzak.

They also discussed the destructive activities of some individuals and deviations from the party's program principles. The participants in the assembly presented demands that the Bosniak-Muslim interests no longer be represented by individuals who are abandoning the political demands of the Bosniak Muslim people and are playing into the Serbian regime's hands. It was stressed that the vital interests of the Bosniak Muslim people in Sandzak are an indivisible and integral Bosnia-Herzegovina as the mother country of all Bosniaks from the former Yugoslavia and a special status for Sandzak. This is the only solution for Sandzak and the survival of the Bosniak Muslim people in this region.

The assembly unanimously adopted a resolution extending support to the Bosnia-Herzegovina leadership and authorizing President Alija Izetbegovic to represent general Bosniak Muslim interests. The Muslim National Council of Sandzak and Sulejman Ugljanin, president of that Council and the Party of Democratic Action, were extended support in representing the interests of the Bosnian Muslim people of Sandzak.

The Serbian and Montenegrin authorities were asked to remove President Sulejman Ugljanin's name from the wanted list and to allow him to return to the country. The assembly also called for the end of terror and rigged political trials and the release of all those arrested. This was reported by the Information Center of the Muslim National Council of Sandzak.

Montenegro

Bulatovic in Talks With Owen, Stoltenberg

LD0509164994 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1607 GMT 5 Sep 94

[Text] Podgorica, 5 Sep (TANJUG)—Montenegrin President Momir Bulatovic received Lord Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg, cochairmen of the conference on former Yugoslavia, in Podgorica today.

In talks lasting just under two hours, as it was announced, most of the attention was focused on the current phase of the peace process on the territory of former Yugoslavia. The collocutors agreed in their conclusions that the Contact Group peace plan represents a good basis for the restoration of peace in former Bosnia-Herzegovina, with the main precondition being the resolution of all outstanding issues by exclusively peaceful means.

Peace and the protection of vital interests of the Serb nation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, it was announced, constitute the main political interest of both Montenegro and Serbia, i.e. the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY]. In the given circumstances and with the current balance of forces, President Bulatovic stressed, the peace plan on offer represents the most favorable solution and it therefore enjoys the FRY's support.

The cochairmen positively assessed the constructive and peace-making policy pursued by Montenegro and the FRY. Therefore, according to them, the international community must find a way to extend direct support to its peace policy and efforts.

After the talks Lord Owen told journalists that their attention was focused on issues most directly connected to Montenegro.

We were told, as far as the easing of the sanctions against Montenegro regarding air traffic was concerned, that Montenegro does not have its own airline, and therefore one should consider easing the sanctions connected to its maritime traffic, Owen said. He went on to say that the easing of the sanctions cannot be discussed until some peace agreement has been reached and unless Montenegro and Serbia prove that they do not approve of the rejection of the peace plans for Bosnia.

Asked to comment on the talks with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, Lord Owen said that he and Stoltenberg discussed with Milosevic in Belgrade last night the same issues that were discussed with Bulatovic today. Owen said that there is no difference between Milosevic and Bulatovic concerning the issues directly related to an overall peace.

We want and must convince the Serbian nation that there is no anti-Serb feeling in the world. The problem is the Bosnian Serb stances on the peace plan, he added.

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Lord Owen added in conclusion that, if the circumstances are what they should be, he and Stoltenberg will propose the lifting of the sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro. If Montenegro and Serbia make a contribution to peace, we would like that effort to be recognized, he said.

Kosovo

Rugova Supports Berisha's Position on Greece

AU0309132494 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1800 GMT 2 Sep 94

[Text] President of the Republic of Kosova Dr. Ibrahim Rugova held his regular news conference in Prishtina today. Shaban Arifaj has the report:

[Arifaj] We ask the European Union countries and the United States to exert influence on Greece to develop a policy of understanding and good neighborliness with Albania and the Albanian nation. We support the stand maintained by President Berisha, the Albanian Government, and institutions so that the disputes with Greece can be resolved through dialogue and understanding. That is what President Rugova said at today's news conference and asked Greece to show maturity and a desire for dialogue and talks in order to reduce tensions in the south of the Balkans.

At this news conference, President Rugova welcomed the stance by German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel that the sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro be conditioned on the solution of the Kosova issue. He also welcomed the statement by Charles Redman, President Clinton's special envoy, that the Kosova issue be a condition of the lifting of sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro.

President Rugova hailed the start of the new academic year in Kosova, adding that even under these conditions and circumstances, this is the fourth year we have managed to defend the Albanian school by making efforts to preserve its teaching level, because uneducated people have no perspective. On this occasion, he thanked the pupils, students, teachers, and all citizens who helped in the teaching process. By doing so, we have created a system that functions, Rugova stressed.

Rugova devoted a part of his comments to the wave of daily police repression in Kosova, illustrating it with numerous facts of the violence and terror against Albanians, such as in Podujeve, Viti, Skenderaj, Gjynek, Kamenice, Suhareke, Istog, Malisheve, Prishtine, Gjilan, Peje, Prizren, Mitrovice, and other communes of the republic.

He further demanded that all political prisoners be released and reiterated his request that Kosova be placed under international protection. He also called for a greater international presence in Kosova.

In the last part of his comments, mainly answers to reporters' questions, President Rugova greeted the announcement of the visit of Pope John Paul II to Zagreb and Sarajevo and Turkey's understanding of the Kosova issue. Meanwhile, Rugova assessed the reaching of an agreement to stop Irish-British conflicts as an important and model step to resolve many targets of crises.

Rugova also answered other questions by reporters.

Police Accused of Killing, Wounding Albanians

LD0409172994 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 4 Sep 94

[Text] The Kosovo Committee for the Protection of Human Rights and Freedoms announced today that in August the Serbian police killed two and wounded two Albanians and maltreated and beat up eight Albanian children and six women. In the same period 128 Albanians were arrested, eight of whom were forcibly sent to the Yugo-army or on trial before the Nis military court. Under the pretext of searching for arms, 225 Albanian houses were searched and 171 persons were maltreated, 28 of whom requested medical assistance. This is stressed among other things in a report signed by Committee Chairman Adem Demaci.

Police Raid Albanian Schools, Ban Classes

AU0209162094 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1800 GMT 1 Sep 94

[Text] The new academic year has begun in the Republic of Kosova today. More than 350,000 elementary and high schools pupils started the term under very difficult conditions. Many elementary and all high schools will be obliged to hold classes in private homes. Shaqir Funiqi from Prishtina has the following report:

[Funiqi] The start of this new school year was also marked by Serbian police raids. Thus, at the Ibrahim Pervizi Elementary School in Mitrovice, where the Zheladin Deda High Medical School pupils were having classes, as soon as lessons started at 0700, the police ordered the teachers to send all the pupils out of the school building. The police then arrested Shefqet Beqiri, headmaster of the High Medical School.

The police also raided the Migjeni Elementary School in Mitrovice, where the Frank Bardhi Gymnasium pupils were having lessons.

In addition, the police banned classes at four elementary schools in the Ferizaj Commune: in Sazli, Softaj, Neroglime, and Pankosic.

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